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Transdiscursive Cosmopolitanism: Foucauldian Freedom, Subjectivity, and the Power of 
Resistance 
 
Joanna K. Rozpedowski 
ABSTRACT 
 
The following project will consist in the study and examination of the concepts 
and theories that lie in the domain of political theory. The enquiry into the dimensions 
and complexities of the socio-political organization and the political substance of 
individual human agents will be conducted with the intellectual assistance of the 
postmodernist turn of thought. 
I will interrogate and develop a specifically Foucauldian reading of international 
politics and the emerging global world order as well as situate Foucault’s insights and 
theorizing in a cosmopolitan framework, which calls for a progressive re-
conceptualization of the dimensions of power and the modalities of state-citizen 
autonomy, and sovereignty.   
The thesis will proceed through five stages of analysis: (i) examination of 
freedom and self-creation as foundational and fundamental to the cosmopolitan 
citizenship; (ii) investigation of governmentality, power and the role of personal and 
political resistance in shaping new horizons of political order (iii) development of a 
structural approach to cosmopolitan democracy; enhanced by (iv) decoupling of identity 
iv 
 
from citizenship, and prompted by (v) an inquiry into and recalibration of the political 
space and sovereignty of states and political agents.  
I will contend for a conception of citizenship, illuminated by a postmodernist lens 
of analysis, set in a cosmopolitan framework and premised upon a notion of a layered and 
constituted dialectic, as the most adroit model for a re-articulation of the spirit of 
democratic qua cosmopolitan citizenship in the world of increasingly displaced loyalties, 
porous identities, and atrophied civic commitments.  
The study aims to inquire into the possibilities of meaningfully addressing the 
fundamental question in political theory, that of: how is the state to be organized in an era 
of globalization accompanied by an unprecedented compression of space and time, and 
re-spatialization of socio-economic and political relations. The thesis will conclude with a 
synthesis of proposed theoretical assumptions that are to serve as the structural basis and 
philosophical guidance for the institutionalization of measures conducive to the 
enactment and perpetuation of cosmopolitan consciousness and cosmopolitical practice. 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
“The main interest in life is to become someone else that you 
were not at the beginning … The game is worthwhile as we don’t 
know what will be the end.” 
                -Michel Foucault 
 
Globalization, it has been argued, engenders homogenization, engineers specious 
consensus, subsumes and absorbs individuality into an “undifferentiated being,” and 
induces subject’s surrender to the “collective rhythm” of the indifferent world of 
corporate symbolism and largely anonymous spaces dedicated to the cultivation of virtual 
pseudo-personal relations. Due to its ubiquitous presence, the phenomenon as a corpus of 
ideas, processes and interactions changes the very nature of the international realm of 
governance, resulting in decomposition and an organic disintegration of the connective 
tissue that ties social capital qua citizenship to its communitarian and democratic values. 
The multidimensionality of the phenomenon thus appears to make dichotomous demands 
upon the situated agent, as it presents both an occasion for challenging the ossified, 
asphyxiating, and inflexible modes of being and feeling a citizen, as well as prompts 
alienation from the public participatory dialectics of socio-political existence which ensue 
in the praxes of individual ethical ambiguity, powerlessness and inertia.  
Furthermore, it is argued that contemporary modes of globalization have shifted 
concentration of power from the states to other non-territorial and supraterritorial entities, 
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 as the importance and condition of territorialization diminishes. Hence, it is possible to 
speak of the transition from statism – the centralized regulation and operation of 
territorial, bureaucratic and national governments1 - to polycentrism - a societal condition 
of governance in which power radiates from various dispersed nodes of supra- and sub-
state parties, that is; power as “incarnated in historical social practices”2 emanating from 
various nodes of power on a web of socio-political relations. Such shifts have significant 
effects on governance, as the state becomes an increasingly reconstituted and 
reconstructed, if not an obsolete bastion of power. In view of this, political space and 
political community are no longer defined and limited by a strictly national, statist-
oriented framework. Increasingly, the phenomenon of power diffusion signifies emerging 
multilayered governance, marked by development of regional and global institutions and 
laws governing the administration and management of globalization, and coextensively, a 
transnational citizenry.  The emergent forms of new spatial arrangements, which testify to 
the redistribution of centers of power require for their conceptualization a transdiscursive, 
Foucauldian lens of analysis, in order to not merely understand them, but to recalibrate 
the architectonic function of political theory and practice itself. The purpose of the 
following study is to situate Foucault in a cosmopolitan framework and develop a 
specifically Foucauldian reading of the international politics.  
The following pages will be dedicated to the examination of Michel Foucault’s 
contribution to the globalization-cosmopolitan citizenship debate. In the course of the 
analysis the following key terms will be taken under consideration and their theoretical 
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1 Scholte, Jan. 2005. Globalization. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan). Pg. 186. 
2 Dreyfus, Hubert, L. 2004. “Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault.”International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 4 (1). Pg. 3. 
 
 influence upon the aforementioned dyad will be examined: power, governmentality, and 
sovereignty. I contend that a novel understanding of citizenship set upon a Foucauldian 
conceptual skeleton and rooted in three themes of analysis: (i) space, (ii) sovereignty, and 
(iii) subjectivity, can serve as one of the most adept schemas capable of advancing a 
cosmopolitical alternative more amenable to situating a constituted subject in a world of 
porous identities and shifting loyalties.  
The thesis will be divided into three sections; the first of which will concern itself 
with the debate on the ontological question of cosmopolis as employed in socio- and 
historico-philosophical investigations of the ancients and the moderns, deemed especially 
pertinent as it captures and concretizes the quintessence of the evolution and 
materialization of critical analytical approaches to the realization of an alternative form of 
governmentality. The second section will be comprised of an analysis of the 
aforementioned conceptual dyads:  power-discourse, governmentality-sovereignty. Third 
section will attempt to locate Foucault’s subjectivity qua self-creation theorizing in the 
political enterprise, thus underscoring his inadvertent relevance to the cosmopolitical 
project.  
To date, contemporary scholarship in the poststructuralist International Relations 
tradition has employed Foucault to: (i) support deconstructions of realist international 
theory, (ii) analyze modern discourses and practices of international relations, (iii) 
develop novel accounts of the contemporary global liberal order.3 In addition, recent 
attempts to situate Foucault in the Marxist framework have provided further 
3 
                                                 
3 Selby, Jan. 2007. “Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR.” 
International Relations 3(21). Pg. 324.  
 
 substantiation for the students and scholars of political science and international relations 
interested in political theory and questions pertaining to the globalization of the political 
economy and governance to engage in the study and analysis of Foucault’s 
transdiscursive genealogical unfolding of the power problematic and the means of 
resistance. The Foucauldian approach to the study of world politics via genealogy and 
deconstruction of political power, juridico-political discourse, governmentality and 
sovereignty, analysis of the birth of biopower and biopolitics, and the investigation of 
mechanisms constituting the ontology of the present, equips the discipline of 
International Relations with indispensable evaluative and theoretical instruments, which 
enable further insight into the workings of structural power and the role of agency in 
relations of power interposed, incorporated by and operating in the global arena.  
Scholars have also noted Foucault’s enduring influence on war and security studies, 
institutional development, postcolonialism, feminist critique of the state, and theories of 
democracy.  
Thus, Edward Said’s 1978 book, Orientalism, for instance, employs Michel 
Foucault’s notion of a discourse (as an institutionalized way of thinking and a social 
boundary defining the limits of conventional wisdom) described by Foucault in The 
Archeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to account for the ubiquitous 
presence of psychological and material elements of domination concentrated at the behest 
and at the disposal of the imperialistic gaze of power. Likewise, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri in Empire (2000) conceptualize and situate the new paradigm of power in 
Foucauldian biopolitics, where “the control of society over individuals is not conducted 
only through consciousness or ideology, but also in the body and with the body. For 
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 capitalist society biopolitics is what is most important, the biological, the somatic, the 
corporeal.”4 For it is in the space between bodies that the relations cum actions, equipped 
with intentions, obtain the capacity of power. The intimate relationship between 
discourse, knowledge, and the ontological self, as a subject and also at the same time an 
object, rests on a presupposition that that entity which determines what can be voiced and 
talked about also determines what can be known, how the subject ought to think, and who 
the subject, the self, is.   
Furthermore, as contemporary debates about International Relations’ elusive 
actor, globalization, suggest, the question of power, its modalities, instrumentalities, 
organization and distribution, is key to understanding the shifts and transformations in the 
scale and quality of human social relations. The spread of transplanetary and increasingly 
supraterritorial connections between people,5 and a transformation in spatial organization 
of social relations and transactions, generate unprecedented transcontinental and 
interregional flows and new networks of activity, interaction as well as new sources and 
contests of power.6  The growing enmeshment of the local and global blurs distinctions 
between strictly domestic and global affairs and processes. Likewise, the decisional, 
institutional, distributive, and structural impacts7 of distant events have significant 
consequences on the socio-cultural and political-economic dynamics of the local social 
order. The aforementioned supraterritoriality of connections suggests further 
5 
                                                 
4 Hardt, Michael, Negri, Antonio. 2000. Empire. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). Pg. 27. 
 
5 Scholte, Jan. 2005. Globalization. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan). Pg. 59. 
6 Held, David. 1999. Global Transformations. (Stanford Stanford University Press). Pg. 16. 
 
7 Ibid. Pg. 18.  
 
 decentralization of more traditional unidirectional power-relations themselves, and thus 
demonstrates a noticeable shift away from the dominant Hobbesian-Hegelian treatment of 
power qua sovereign police ‘power-over’ to the Foucauldian notion of diffuse, 
“nonegalitarian and mobile”8 processes of confrontation and restructuring of force 
relations of power, re-conceptualization of the sites of political resistance, and re-
articulation of political space.  
6 
                                                
Thus, the project upon which I am about to embark will consist in the study and 
examination of the concepts and theories that lie in the domain of political theory. The 
enquiry into the dimensions and complexities of the socio-political organization and the 
political substance of individual human agents will be conducted with the intellectual 
assistance of the postmodernist turn of thought. I will argue for an inadvertent 
cosmopolitan slant that the ‘thin’ communitarianism9 of Michel Foucault nonetheless 
contains in order to render, interrogate, and develop a specifically Foucauldian reading of 
international politics and the emerging global world order. It is not my intention to 
‘internationalize’ Foucault’s admittedly narrow engagement with transnational politics, 
 
8 Foucault, Michel. 1978. History of Sexuality Vol. I. (New York: Vintage Books). Pg. 92. 
 
9 Mark Olssen in his book Toward a Global Thin Community represents Michel Foucault as ‘thin’ 
communitarian. Olssen’s understanding of community deviates from a pre-modern notion of community 
defined by a “substantive common goal” and asserts an “interactive multiplicity not ruled by any 
organizing or binding law or principle.” Such a notion recognizes community as an expression of “tacit 
agreements, understandings, and rules which represent the basis of political reason as a pragmatic code for 
problem solving rather than a set of universal epistemological principles based on truth” (38). This 
departure from an organic unity and totality and assertion of interdependence, relational reciprocity,  and 
social and historical character of existence structured and sustained by an “institutional  and political 
outside,” Olssen argues, is provoked by Foucault’s six explicit themes contained in his political philosophy: 
(i) a social theory of practice; (ii) a conception of the historical constitution of the subject; (iii) a 
relational/dialogical  conception of selfhood and ethics of agency, autonomy, and social interdependence; 
(iv) an agnostic conception of liberty as nondomination and equalization of power; (v) a critique of 
monistic communitarianism and totality; (vi) an opposition to governmental policies that conflict with ‘self-
creation.’ (42).  
 
 but rather, to situate his insights and theorizing in a cosmopolitan framework, which calls 
for a progressive re-conceptualization of the dimensions of power and the modalities of 
state and citizen autonomy, and sovereignty.  
To render the cosmopolitan reading of Foucault’s theorizing more legible and 
make it compatible with the current literature on the subject, the thesis will proceed 
through five stages of analysis: (i) examination of freedom and self-creation as 
foundational and fundamental to the cosmopolitan citizenship; (ii) investigation of 
governmentality, power and the role of personal and political resistance in shaping new 
horizons of political order (iii) development of a structural approach to cosmopolitan 
democracy that is enhanced by (iv) decoupling of identity from citizenship, and prompted 
by (v) an inquiry into and recalibration of the political space and sovereignty of states and 
political agents.  
The evocation of Foucault’s social philosophy  and its co-extensive political 
dialectic is meant to supplement the traditionally espoused Kantian moral and political 
stances toward cosmopolitan order as well as guard against the epistemic apodicticity of 
the problematic of globalization as depersonalizing totalization, and close the gap 
between the scope of human agency and the aspiration to cosmopolitical arrangements. 
Kant’s conception of citizenship as constituted by and constitutive of a common moral 
sense and self-legislating practical reason is deemed insufficient for the realization of a 
meaningful individual political existence in an era of globalization, and is thus in need of 
a revisionist schema. For this purpose an affirmative Foucauldian understanding of 
resistance qua a creative act of a social movement and political engagement will be 
advanced. I will, likewise, contend for a conception of citizenship, illuminated by a 
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 postmodernist/postructuralist lens of analysis, set in a cosmopolitan framework and 
premised upon a notion of a layered and constituted dialectic, as the most adroit model 
for a re-articulation of the spirit of democratic qua cosmopolitan citizenship in the world 
of increasingly displaced loyalties and atrophied civic commitments. The thesis will 
conclude with a synthesis of proposed theoretical assumptions that are to serve as the 
structural basis and philosophical guidance for the institutionalization of measures 
conducive to the enactment and perpetuation of cosmopolitan consciousness and 
cosmopolitical practice. The following study will inquire into the possibilities for 
addressing the fundamental question in political theory, that of how is the state to be 
organized in the era of globalization, unprecedented compression of space and time, and 
re-spatialization of socio-economic and political relations. Thus, the aim of the following 
study will be to use Foucault’s philosophy as a toolbox for advancing a Foucauldian 
political theory, which permits us to rethink the conditions for cosmopolitan citizenship 
in an era of globalization.  
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CHAPTER I 
COSMOPOLIS - A BRIEF HISTORY: 
FROM AGORA TO GLOBAL FORUM 
 
“Homo sum: Humani nihil a me alienum puto.” 
-Terence 
In Another Cosmopolitanism (2006) Seyla Benhabib inquires after the ontological status 
of cosmopolitan norms in a postmetaphysical universe, and their authority in a universe 
not backed up by a sovereign with the power of enforcement. Although, Benhabib does 
not hide her predilection for Kantian ethics, the formal construct underlying her inquiry 
can no longer be substantiated by recourse to a 17th century rationalization of political 
order and moral standards of socio-political conduct. For one, the very assumption of a 
life lived within ‘postmetaphysical’ structures of governance, rather than guided by 
intuited a priori innate duties vested in universal laws and codes of obliging obedience, 
both eternal in duration and divine in character, presupposes a re-evaluation of values 
governed not by an assumption of intelligible teleology and purposiveness of providential 
linearity of history, but rather a dissociated, contingent, and fragmented unfolding of 
constructs that come to constitute and define human praxis. Second, the displacement of 
identities and allegiances problematizes in new ways the conceptions of indivisible 
sovereignty, first introduced to the political lexicon in 1576 by Jean Bodin in his 
9 
 
 masterwork, Les six livres de la Republique,10 giving salience to alternative formations 
not constrained and limited by the exclusive constructs of national socialization. 
Furthermore, the ontological plane of analysis requires that the state, classically 
considered an organic structure expressive of people’s social nature, be reconstituted to 
accurately portray and serve the plethora of variegated identities embedded in a global 
context. The decoupling of complex networks of identity from citizenship ought to be 
conducted with a ‘rhizomatic’11rather than concentric conception of political order in 
mind, to ensure fair representation and the survival of democratic spirit of governance.   
 In thinking about the parameters of cosmopolitan governmentality, it is necessary 
to set it in the postructuralist school of thought and invoke the underlying premises of a 
Foucauldian strand of analysis. Just as the dawn of modernity marked the emergence in 
17th and 18th centuries of the self-sustaining political units, nation-states; the post-modern 
period is linked with the “eclipse of national sovereignty” and demands institutions that 
“overlap national boundaries and serve transnational social and economic needs.”12 
Conducting an analysis of a political subject matter under the guise of a presiding 
postmodernist theory does not absolve discourse of a habitual recourse to modernity’s 
10 
                                                 
10 Bodin viewed sovereignty to be: (i) the essential element of the state, whose (ii) legitimate holder is the 
king, who (iii) has absolute or indivisible supremacy that is not be shared with others, and whose (iv) 
power is subject to the laws of God, of nature, and of nations.  
11 When Connolly in From Ethos to Pluralization speaks of rhizomatic pluralism he adopts an arboreal 
signifier to illustrate the ideal, which he describes thus: “a rhizome ceaselessly adopts connections between 
semiotic chains, organizations of power and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social 
struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic but also 
perceptive, mimetic, gestural and cognitive … To be rhizomatic is to produce stems and filaments that 
seem to be roots , or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new 
uses.”(94)   
12 Toulmin, Stephen. 1990. Cosmopolis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Pg. 7. 
 
 
 rational methods of inquiry that were established among European thinkers in the 17th 
century, and which “promised intellectual certainty and harmony,”13 and uninterrupted 
progress. Rather, the term implies a more circumspect study and interpretation of the co-
existent and co-determinative systems of knowledge and power that result in the socio-
political arrangements of our time. Only through such a lens of analysis and method of 
inquiry will the skeletal configurations of politics be revealed and its practices uncovered 
from the thicket of inter-dependent relations.  
11 
                                                
Thus, I will argue that five explicit dimensions and imperatives of Foucault’s 
analysis parallel the requirements of the dominant strands of the contemporary literature 
regarding the project of consolidating cosmopolitical arrangements, and which the project 
deems ineffaceable: (i) ethical self-creation; (ii) emphasis on pluralist and polymorphous 
political ontology; (iii) view of history through the prism of differentiation and 
discontinuity as opposed to teleological unitarism and totalization; (iv) utilization of the 
dialogical principle and anti-atomism; (v) consolidation of a polycentric and 
democratically egalitarian socio-institutional level, which privileges openness and 
avoidance of closure within a deterritorialized and global cultural order. Naturally the 
above may well be called into question by invocation of opposites: How much liberty do 
the state’s systemic routinizations sanction and permit for acts of authentication via self-
elected and identified modes of self-authorship? Is not history a centralizing and unitary 
element upon which the constructs of nations and states are enacted? Do not vertical 
hierarchy rather than bureaucratically ineffable polycentrism characterize the institutions 
of the state? Is it not in the nature of communities and states to be exclusionary and 
 
13 Toulmin, Stephen. 1990. Cosmopolis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Pg. 9.  
 
 partial rather than unconditionally unrestricted in law and socio-political practice? Seyla 
Benhabib, once again, vocalizes the cosmopolitically intuitive argument by asserting that 
it lies in the exclusive parlance of strong democracies to unveil universalist rearticulation 
through which they fashion the meaning of their own peoplehood through contestation, 
repositioning, resignification, and reappropriation of fundamental principles via practices 
of jurisgenerative politics14 and the dialectic of rights and identities.15 The guarded 
recourse to legal norms provides a point of departure for the discussion of the modalities 
of self-creation in a Foucauldian vein of analysis. 
The following chapter regards self-authorship as fundamental and foundational of 
the cosmopolitan effort, and will, therefore, precede formal and more extensive 
elaboration of Foucault’s political theory. I will proceed first by evoking the paradigmatic 
ancient premises of cosmopolitanism, as derived from Classical Greek thought of the 
Stoics and the Romans. Second, I will draw parallels between the libertine approaches to 
political and social orders of the ancient Greek thinkers and Foucault’s anormative 
critique of the modern, post-Enlightenment era’s socio-political arrangements. Third, I 
will demonstrate the necessity for the post-structural cosmopolitanism to incorporate into 
their expansive vocabulary the premises of a Foucauldian discursive paradigm, which 
distances itself from the liberal conceptions of positive and negative freedoms and relies 
12 
                                                 
14 Benhabib in Another Cosmopolitanism regards jurisgenerative politics as a model that permits 
democratic people to think of “creative interventions that mediate between universal norms and the will of 
democratic majorities”(49). As a process, it permits for an interactive engagement centered upon acts of 
reappropriation and reinterpretation of guiding norms and principles, which not only make one a subject of 
such laws, but also their author.  
15 Benhabib, Seyla. 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism.(Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pg. 69. 
 
 
 more heavily upon the dialogical episteme for actions of affirmation and resistance which 
take place within the socially and historically constituted matrix, and which aim toward 
reworking of political subjectivity. The critical attitude of poststructural ethos 
reinvigorates the interrogation of limits which are set upon human thought, and enables 
their critical contestation and renegotiation through argumentation. As Devetak points 
out, “discourse ethics promotes cosmopolitan ideal where the political organization of 
humanity is decided by a process of dialogue in which participation is open to all who 
stand to be affected by the decision.”16 By taking human individuality and subjectivity as 
effects of the operations of power, Foucault severs universalism and essentialism, 
imposed and harbored by the foundationalist presuppositions, from the internal 
manifestations of the human person. It is at this juncture that the discursive conditions, 
created by deconstruction of the material fabric of socio-political relations, enable the 
practices of individualized self-creation. Conceiving of discourse in terms of a 
performative materialization rather than static set of preordered constructions, permits for 
the emergence of competing representations, practices, meanings, and narratives, which 
fashion and come to characterize political identities of hermeneutic subjects.  
 
The Discourses on Cosmopolitan Universe 
Cosmopolitanism, as a moral construct and a normative ideal, which is 
inextricably bound and structurally realized through the all-pervading processes of 
globalization, is said to promote a moral-ideological disassociation from tradition, 
13 
                                                 
16 Devetak, Richard. 1995. “Critical Theory” in S. Burchill, A. Linklater et al. (eds.) Theories of 
International Relations (London: Palgrave).  Pg. 172.  
 
 religious belief, and familial directives and prescripts, and move toward a narrower form 
of individualism reflected in agent’s ability to reason autonomously, and thus to prescribe 
and employ the means toward one’s own self-determination. The context and substance 
provided by the community, communitarians contend, as the foundations from which 
individuals derive their initial identity and proper moral aptitude, are subject to increasing 
translation and universalization. The permeability of borders and internationalization of 
norms of national society imply that dignity of individuals is no longer solely linked to 
their particular place in a constricted and bounded statutory group, but progressively 
more to their character as moral and universally-oriented human beings and citizens. It is 
this very collectivity of citizens that enacts newer and more distinctive sets of identities, 
open to and “conscious of cosmopolitan solidarity.”17 In addition, an expansion of social 
citizenship that is accompanied by a displacement of sentiment for communal and 
national belonging increasingly calls for institutional expression on a supra-national 
level. 
The contemporaneous accounts of cosmopolitanism as a political and social 
project and philosophy of being are rooted in the ancient Greek conceptions of the 
‘cosmic city of men.’ In the Hellenistic era, the Stoics instituted a new school of monistic 
and materialistic orientation of thought. The school or “The New Academy” was first 
established by Zeno of Citium, whose provocative, albeit utopian, political tract, The 
Republic, stipulated measures for the abolishment of organized civic institutions, courts, 
temples, the coinage system, conventional education, and marriage, justified by an 
14 
                                                 
17 Balibar, Etienne. 2004. We the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship. (Princeton: 
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 assumption that transgressions of justice, to which the establishment must be ready to 
dispense legal judgment, will not be committed. The Stoics argued for the moral 
advancement to take place in “conformity with nature” and the attainment of rationality, 
happiness, and the good life were to constitute its most ideal ends. This distinct political 
philosophy of the Academy has its foundations in the ethical conceptualization of being 
as infused with nature, yet independent of it due to humans’ reliance upon reason. Nature 
is understood as a rational, harmonious, and divine entity. The political life, for Stoics, 
must coalesce with nature and through it, remain faithful to reason. Nature’s logos 
governs not only over the individual human agents, but also over the laws of the universe; 
and the link between the human nature and cosmos, between the human obedience to 
virtue and human obedience to the laws of nature, is established solely by reason. Hence, 
the kosmos itself is the only true city in which all rational and divine human beings share, 
and in particular, all good and wise human agents. The natural rights of each citizen, in 
the Stoic tradition, not only referred to the method of arranging one’s life in accordance 
with the limited stipulations of the state and various social entitlements, which inevitably 
emanated therefrom, but to the determination of the appropriate political media and an 
interchangeable sphere of communalist jurisdictions through which each person 
recognized and structured the moral space deemed most adequate for the pursuit of 
amicable relations with the other human selves.   
The observable reconstruction of the city, the reformation of its conceptualization 
as dissociated from the earlier more grounding and tangible theories of the state, 
inaugurates the notion of cosmopolitan thinking. It is this community of sages, the 
envisaged society of the wise citizens, the communal ideal of concord and moral as well 
15 
 
 as political virtue, that rises above the artificial confines of the nation-state, national 
identity, class or ethnic membership, and as such, pays homage to the universal rather 
than positive and temporal laws of human’s ingenious creation. In the elitist view of 
Christoph Martin Wieland, a German Enlightenment novelist, a true cosmopolitan is a 
sage, a person who has grown wise through experience and reflection, and who knows 
what is most reasonable to do in given circumstances.18 Thus, the transcendent telos of 
society, for the Stoics, lies not in an agent’s submission to conventional prescripts of the 
polis, but in recognition of and loyalty to moral virtue, regardless of the agent’s 
associative proximity, kinship, citizenship or location, which are but elements of 
happenstance rather than inherent constructs substantive to proper political organization 
and order. The Stoics define the city thus: 
“The universe is in the proper sense a city, but those here on earth are not –  
They are called cities, but are not really. For a city or people is something  
morally good, an organization or group of men administered by law  
which exhibits refinement.”19  
The location of the city is the universe itself; and the mortal as well as the divine, in the 
Stoic theological understanding of nature, inhabit the premises of the city, remaining 
obedient to its legal accords and rules of justice, which stem from reason. The law, for 
the Stoics, does not emanate from the prescriptions and the authority of the state, but 
rather finds its originative or efficient cause in logos, which is one and common to all 
human agents. The internalization of the moral law and subsequent issuance of the law 
from within, dictates the principles and normative imperatives that are to guide the social 
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 life of the community of citizens of kosmos. Hence, the etymological derivative of 
kosmou polite, where kosmou denotes the universe or cosmos, and polite, a citizen. For 
Stoics one’s citizen status transcends the political border restrictions of the city-state, and 
constitutes a novel orientation in thought, where a de facto citizenship refers to the 
cosmos at large. Further, an individual is bound by a dual or a binary form of citizenship: 
(i) natural citizenship in the grand universe of the human race in which, as Plutarch so 
eloquently states, the “universe is a city and the stars citizens”20, as well as (ii) artificial 
citizenship, contingent upon the “accidental” circumstances or geographical location of 
one’s birth. Yet, for the Stoics, to achieve a truly cosmopolitan sense of being, only a 
single, natural form of citizenship, which is the “source of our most fundamental and 
social obligations”21 is the sufficient, ideal, and indispensible requirement. For as 
Diogenes the Cynic asserted felicitously, echoing the Stoic narrative:   
“My country is not one tower, one roof, 
 But the whole earth is a citadel and  
Ready for us to spend our life in.”22  
 
Moreover, an emphasis on the rule of law was seen as the grounding and necessary 
element deemed essential for the definitive articulation of boundaries and the 
preservation of the city itself, and which Diogenes conceived as a “refined and habitable 
construction to which people may have recourse for the dispensation of justice.” As a 
‘citizen of the universe’, therefore, to be morally refined is to share in the experience of 
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 the law, which gives expression and substance to the political constitution and natural 
citizenship in the universe. Habitation in a cosmic city is analogous to the Aristotelian 
notion of habituation to virtuous conduct and leading a life in accord with law within the 
bounds of the collective polis. Only, here, the polis assumes an extrapolated 
cosmopolitical significance. 
 Similarly, a perpetuation of cosmopolitan sentiments is noticeable in the writings 
of Seneca, Cicero, and Marcus Aurelius, the Roman political thinkers. For Seneca, the 
cosmic city is a morally justifiable construct, which the human mind conceives in a 
binary sense, as:  
“The two commonwealths (res publicae): one great and truly  
common – in which gods and men are contained, in which  
we look not to this or that corner, but measure the bounds of  
our state (civitas) with the sun; the other the one to which the  
particular circumstances of our birth have assigned us (urbs).”23   
  
The conception of the city, as emanating from the Stoic tradition and adopted by the 
Roman philosopher, is the association of minds sharing in the communal and ordered 
intellectual feat, which is not subject to any spatial delimitations. Seneca writes:  
“The very reason for our magnanimity, is not shutting ourselves up  
within the walls of one city, but in going forth into intercourse with  
the whole earth, and in claiming the world as our country, that we  
have a wider field for our virtue … Look how many broad stretching  
countries lie open behind you, how many peoples?”24 
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 world in the spirit of rational optimism infused with a sense of responsibility and service 
to the people of heterogeneous identities and moral sensibilities, constituted a paradigm 
for cosmopolitan thinking, which the Romans emulated. Under the early tractates of 
Roman jurisprudence, established upon fixed, immutable and universal principles of 
natural law and in correspondence with the Stoic creed, equality under law constituted a 
normative stipulation to be ascertained and propagated.  
 Human agents, Cicero insisted in De Officiis, are equal, not in respect to their 
wealth or accumulated property or learning, but by natural human predisposition to 
reason and honor the moral law. The legal order, as described in the early Roman 
writings, did not place delimiting conditions upon human agents by conferring equality 
under law solely to declared citizens, privileged by birth or residence. The 
unconditionality of this procedure was not subject to arbitrariness, and in all matters of 
significance, systematically codified laws that were applicable to all civilized people 
were to be preserved. The continuity of this stream of jurisprudential thought and 
recognition of the equality of human agents under law were given significant expression 
and recognition in the 18th century documents, such as the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen, as well as, the 20th century Universal Declaration of the Rights of 
Man ratified by the United Nations. The Roman law, because of its early emphasis on 
equality and universal reason, in a sense, transcended the specific and coincidental 
manifestations of spatial aspects of citizenship. The three branches specific to the Roman 
law consisted in: jus natural – the natural law in its ideal form; jus civile – civil law 
applicable to Roman citizens, and jus gentium – which governed the non-citizens of the 
Roman Empire. As the imperial ambitions expanded along with the acquisition of 
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 landmass, the concept of jus gentium – the law of nations common to all civilized people, 
constituted a transcendent precept. The later institutionalization of legal procedure and 
stipulations of the Roman law by the states of Europe had an irrevocable influence upon 
the jurisprudential and political orientation and thinking of the Continent’s intellectual 
elite, giving rise to subsequent conceptual analyses of the state, its sovereignty, questions 
of justice and its violations and inadequacies.  
The broad extrapolations of the human universal condition imbued with a 
cosmological perspective initiated by the Classical Greece, bracketed by Platonists, 
Aristotelians, and Stoics, enabled a view of human life as contingent upon two distinct 
orders: (i) an Order of Nature (cosmos) evidenced by practical activities revolving around 
the annual cycle of seasons, and the monthly changes of tides; (ii) an Order of Society 
(polis), evidenced in the organization of the administration of cities and collective 
enterprises, ensuing in a politically organized unit, the polis. Thus the belief that the 
“structure of Nature reinforces a rational Social Order”25 led to a manifest presupposition 
of a link between nature and social artifice, between cosmos and polis, and an eventual 
philosophical fusion of orders into a single unit, cosmopolis. The broad outlines of the 
universe combined did not limit themselves to mere speculations, but found expression in 
the “universal language” of the 17th century rationalists and “new philosophers”, such as 
Descartes, Leibniz, or Newton. Here, the conception of the mental and the material, of 
the mechanical phenomena and of their intellectual underpinnings called for new patterns 
of social practice and thought. The fusion of the systems of thought, which deemed 
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 stability and mutuality as chief virtues of social organization, necessitated an expressive 
political order and a refashioning of the new Europe of nations. Leibniz’s commitment to 
resolving the problem of accommodation of the continent’s diversity of characters, 
languages, and intellectual formations, ensued in characteristica universalis, or the 
“universal system of characters” to be utilized in diplomatic negotiations, international 
relations, scholarly exchanges, and philosophical debates, and as its author argued: 
“will constitute a new language which can be written and spoken. This language  
  will be very difficult to construct, but very easy to learn. It will be quickly 
  accepted by everybody on account of its great utility and its surprising facility,  
  and it will serve wonderfully in communication among various peoples.”26  
 
This ideal, Leibniz continues: 
  “is the highest effort of the human mind; and when the 
   project is accomplished, it will simply be up to humans  
   to be happy, since they will have an instrument that  
   exalts the reason no less than the telescope perfects our vision.”27 
 
As Stephen Toulmin contends, the exploration of the possibility of the universal language 
was fundamental to establishing a shared view of nature and humanity.28 Yet Leibniz’s 
minimum of “rational conceivability” unified under a single system of natural 
philosophy, was deemed an insufficient explanation by the mechanists and dualists of his 
era. Thus, a new framework for modernity came to be identified with the Cartesian 
dichotomy, which stipulated clear distinctions between the mental and the material 
experiences and set the standard for reordering of political and institutional systems of 
human organization. The 1700s established the ‘law-governed’ understanding of the 
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 world, in which rational history of humanity and the causal history of nature intertwined 
but not intervened in each other’s trajectory of regularities. This, in turn, gave rise to the 
conceptualization of the system of politics that recognized both the laws of morality as 
premised upon the stipulations of reason, and the movement toward a civic 
commonwealth or, as Kant would have it, a universal civic society which administers law 
among men as necessitated by material conditions of history.  
Kant dissociated himself from the prevalent question of the era – “What 
constitutes man?” – as a scientific paradigm of study or a circumscribed political agent 
committed to a semi-mechanic operation within the rigid feudal constitution of the state, 
and, in turn, engaged in the reflection on the ontology of being, the transcendent rights 
and binding obligations that ought to guide one’s actions. Thus in his moral and political 
writings, principal among them Toward Perpetual Peace and Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, Kant committed himself to a systematic 
meditation on the course of human history in the period influenced by religious and 
political zealotry, which materialized itself either through the cosmopolitan project of 
consolidating and unifying nations within the Orbis Christianus, or the transgressive 
colonizing ambitions of states. In “The Doctrine of Rights” Kant claims that human 
beings are not in their very essence political animals, and that entering into social 
condition is not merely an exercise that stems from moral necessity, but a geographically 
structured phenomenon. The political community, Kant claims, would not be necessary if 
the earth’s surface were an infinite plane rather than a sphere, where humans, “could so 
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 distribute themselves on it that they could not come into community with one another.”29 
Hence, by some form of natural necessity, the “peoples of the earth have … entered in 
varying degrees into a universal community, and it has developed to the point,” Kant 
states, “where a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”30 Thus, as 
Jan Plug in “Citizens of Modernity from the Cosmopolitan Point of View” observes, 
Kant’s cosmopolitanism, being “predicated on the conception of community as 
commonality”31, exists in: (i) the realm of adherence to a singular entity localized in 
particular spatial dimensions, whose citizen-body aligns its commitments primarily with 
the exclusive interests of the state, and (ii) the common superstructure – kosmos – in 
which all beings, by necessity, partake. A moral citizen, thus, in Kantian terms, is a 
member of a particular polity, which first and foremost, enables all individual agents to 
share in its moral orientation; and second, the formation of an ethical commonwealth is 
an effect of that very ‘moral community’ of shared morality. The responsibility of each 
agent, as Phillip J. Rossi asserts in “The Moral Dimensions of Citizenship in Kant’s 
Ethical Commonwealth”32, is to work with one another cooperatively in order to sustain 
conditions for reasoned argument and ensure agreement on issues of fundamental social 
concern. Kant recognizes that the ensuing sensus communis requires of agents moral and 
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 political autonomy. In her conceptualization of Kantian autonomy, Onora O’Neill implies 
that the individuated human condition must be considerate of the following three 
maxims: (i) an agent is to think for oneself; (ii) to think from the standpoint of everyone 
else, and; (iii) always think consistently.33 Whereas, (i) and (ii) concern directly the 
autonomous status of the individual agent, (iii) calls for active and  definitive public 
engagement in the communicative components of the political order. Further, it is 
through the conformity and unity of general wills of all moral agents, Kant upholds, that 
a political community can be established and freely entered into. Such an establishment 
holds “humanity as an end in itself” and thus, mediates between the concept of inner 
moral duty and the demands of the external public law, through the means of a 
categorical imperative. This community of free wills culminates in the Kantian idea of a 
moral world, in which agents, apart from considering their personal values and private 
projects, remain committed to, and respect the moral personality of others, which 
subsequently leads to general public morality that adequately advances the values of all. 
The political agent, on Kantian account, instead of being “enwrapped in itself as if it were 
the whole world, understands and behaves itself as a mere citizen of the world”34 and 
recognizes the totality and interrelatedness of other human beings. Kant’s revered ‘union 
of wills’ thus defined and consolidated the parameters of the moral order and the 
cosmopolitan right, and constituted the first modern articulation of the political 
cosmopolis. Kant’s interpretation of the Enlightenment as “man’s release from his self-
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 tutelage” constitutes a precursory vision of subjective political emancipation from “man’s 
inability to make use of his understanding without the guidance of another”35 and opens a 
window of possibility for counter-being, or “the art of not being governed quite so 
much.”36  
 What characterized modernity, and made it fecund for a post-modern 
argumentation, was an orderly division of the world into two structures influencing the 
systems of thought that superimposed themselves on the social and political organization 
of life. The naturalistic and social orders illuminating one another brought about the 
“new picture” of the cosmopolis, which from the 1600’s on, distinguished itself by a 
systematic inquiry into the ideal methods and ideal languages by which the knowledge of 
the universe was to be obtained. Such strivings, pursued with uttermost deliberateness, 
were short-lived and intermittent, however; for upon reaching a fissure in the systems of 
thought, the beliefs in ideals of unity and universality of humankind and its occupations 
collapsed, only to give birth to darker visions of decay, chaos and disharmony; where the 
tearing of moral and social fabric of political life aggravated the human condition by 
dislodging the centrality of all things deemed stable and unassailable, the family and the 
transcendent Telos. John Donne, the 17th century British poet, in his 1618 Anatomy of the 
World, put it thus: 
 And now the Springs and Sommers which we see, 
 Like sonnes of women after fifty bee. 
And new Philosophy cals all in doubt, 
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 The Element of fire is quite put out; 
The Sun is lost, and th’earth, an no mans wit 
Can well direct him, where to looke for it. 
And freely men confesse, that this world’s spent, 
When in the Planets, and the Firmament 
They seeke so many new; they see that this 
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomis. 
‘Tis all in peeces, all cohaerance gone; 
All just supply, and all Relation: 
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot, 
For every man alone thinks he hath got 
To be a Phoenix, and that there can bee 
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.37   
 
What seemed socially, politically, and spiritually coherent at the cusp of the century, has 
made an Augustinian turn, in the process of which the failure to maintain a rational 
organization of administration and preserve the soundness of social relations was 
attributed to the innate depravity of humanity, the original sin. This religious explanatory 
import validated itself through a string of armed conflicts, the Thirty Years War being an 
example par excellence, the participants of which, the Protestant and Catholic armies of 
Europe, sought to prove their theological supremacy, both on the battlefield and within 
the parameters of their political establishments. None other than Alexander Pope in his 
Essay on Man was able to give expression to the distortions and ambiguity of the ‘fallen’ 
nature of the human experience, which led him progressively farther away from the 
Morean utopian shores and the Kantian state of perpetual noblesse oblige: 
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state, 
A being darkly wise, and rudely great: … 
[Man] hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest, 
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast; 
In doubt his mind or body to prefer, 
Born but to die, and reasoning but to err; 
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 Alike in ignorance, his reason such, 
Whether he thinks too little, or too much: 
Chaos of thought and passion all confused; … 
Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurled: 
The glory, jest, and riddle of the world!38   
  
Why is it, then, that in this vilified state, human beings are nonetheless capable of 
creating social systems? What accounts for these drastic changes in the episteme, read 
productions of knowledge, and subsequent overturns and substitutions of all socio-
political discourses? Michel Foucault as a legal materialist and a legal realist thought 
productions of power to be always-already embedded in human social relations. Thus, 
“relations of power,” Foucault writes, “are interwoven with other kinds of relations 
(production, kinship, family, sexuality) for which they play at once a conditioning and a 
conditioned role.”39 In this polyvalent state of nature, the self-organizing, logically 
purposive, and intentional networks of relations are the precondition for the emergence of 
an ensemble of new modes and mechanisms of power, which force a social settlement. 
The multi-directionality, de-centeredness, ubiquity, impersonality, and relationality of 
power, however, account for the system’s instability, and results in changes to the modes 
rather than the forms of the systems of power. “By system,” Foucault contends, “we must 
understand an ensemble of relations which maintain themselves, transform themselves, 
independently of the things which they bind.”40 Power’s substrate is not self-generating 
nor self-sustaining, but organized around and conditioned by an ever-changing 
environment. Hence, the contemporary political governance, polycentrically arranged 
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 under the multidimensional processes of globalization, dislodges the neat dual 
conceptualizations of the early cosmopolis. The artifice, rather than the metaphysical or 
predetermined tendencies of nature, now comes to define the political and civic life of 
social subjects, thus allowing for the requisite versatility and fluidity in the understanding 
of overlapping social contexts and identities, and sets before the subjects a new task, that 
of vigilance against ready articulations of new institutional arrangements, which may 
unleash “new destructive forces inimical to the possibilities of being free”41 its modes of 
organizing knowledge and its productive capacities.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
                                                 
41 Dumm, Thomas L. 1996. Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom. (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield). Pg. 153.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER II 
THE POSTMODERNIST TURN AND A CASE FOR COSMOPOLITANISM: 
A FOUCAULDIAN CHALLENGE TO THE REALIST ORTHODOXY 
 
“A spectre is roaming through Europe: the Postmodern.” 
-Portoghesi, citing Le Monde 
 
 
When in 1939, Arnold Toynbee in the footnotes to his Study of History proposed to refer 
to the formative period between 1918 and 1939 as post-modern, he concretized, 
constricted, and historicized in time an idea, whose fragmentary vision of social order 
assembled by Leibniz, Hegel, Nietzsche or Heidegger was yet to emerge as a totalized 
paradigm. The word ‘postmodern,’ Docherty claims, from its very inception is 
characterized by an ambiguity – “on the one hand it is seen as a historical period; on the 
other it is simply a desire, a mood which looks to the future to redeem the present.”42 It is 
possible, thus, to point to the polyvalent applicability and peculiar tension created by the 
simultaneous adoption of the term in aesthetics and cultural and political studies. 
Moreover, it is claimed that only under the rubric of the ‘postmodern’ it is possible to 
catch a glimpse of the intimate relationship and a discourse between the aesthetic style 
and material history as political reality, between the realm and structure of language and 
the realm of being and structure of consciousness.  It is no accident, perhaps, that Centre 
29 
                                                 
42 Docherty, Thomas. 1993. Postmodernism: A Reader. (New York: Columbia University Press). Pg. 2. 
 
 Pompidou as a post-modernist architectural feat that fuses museum exhibitionism and 
library intellectualism with theatre, cinema, literature, and the spoken word, was a 
brainchild of the president of the French Republic. Likewise, with the dawn of 
postmodernist thinking came the rays of micropolitical analyses which shed light on the 
vicissitudes of the grand universalist narratives, and transformed political engagement 
into specifically local and intertextual, which like postmodern literary texts, intended to 
‘absorb and transform one another.’ Society came to symbolize not only a temporal 
distortion, fragmented and non-linear in its narration, but increasingly confabulated by 
technocultural and hyperreal simulations, and noticeable changes in space-time relations. 
The aspiration of postmodernism, then, in all its tangential aspects was, in John Barth’s 
words, “to somehow rise above the quarrel between realism and irrealism, formalism and 
'contentism'” and to “neither merely repudiate nor merely imitate either his twentieth-
century Modernist parents or his nineteenth-century premodernist grandparents.”43 The 
paradigm’s pastiche thus aimed at replenishing the vast reservoir of a democratic 
experimental spirit in a post-atomic age by rethinking Enlightenment subjectivity, and 
transposing and refracting singularity and sovereignty of an E Pluribus Unum with an E 
Unibus Pluram. 
 The formal structure of the postmodern paradigm is attributed to have derived its 
roots from the Frankfurt School, and most especially the 1944 work of Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. In the context of the rising state 
capitalism and mass culture, not only did the authors rebel against the Enlightenment 
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 consensus on the teleological path, historical progress, and emancipatory power of 
knowledge, but deemed reason reduced to form and conformed to rules of computation 
and utility, the principal illusionist of power and a locus of ideology, which enabled 
domination, manipulation, and enslavement. The theme of subjectivity with which 
postmodernism in inherently concerned, and which inescapably posits the problematic of 
proper aesthetic and political engagement in a world of ritualistic confirmations of agreed 
upon reality, calls for a “rupture of such ritual, the eruption of history into the 
consciousness in such a way that the aesthetic or formal structures of consciousness must 
be disturbed.”44 Assuming the lack of totalizing metanarratives and disturbed continuity 
and uncertainty of means and ends, the authors in the postmodern tradition, such as 
Lyotard, Baudrillard, Benjamin, or Bauman, point to the startlingly normal intertwining 
of imminently present facades of civilized modernity with barbarity. The Arendtian 
‘banality of evil’ transmogrifies into Baumian ‘rationality of evil’ and finds its self-
serving purpose in the technologically engineered ‘normalcy’ or ‘familiarity’ of/with 
modernity. Thus, “every ‘ingredient’ of the Holocaust”, writes Bauman, “was normal not 
in the sense of the familiar … but in the sense of being fully in keeping with everything 
we know about our civilization, its guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the 
world.”45 In this rationalization of place and the human subject, fear alone becomes less 
economical. Reason, in lieu of access to tools of forceful resistance, permits the victim to 
become complicit in its ways in hope of survival. It was, after all, modernism’s penchant 
to set reason on the pedestal, while also submitting for comprehensive examination and 
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 rationalization that element which by an edict of the law belongs to the public power, the 
body. Postmodernism, according to Johanna Oksala, rethinks the subject and its 
emancipating potential by positing restraint and limiting forms of subjectivization as 
historically contingent.46   
Zygmunt Bauman presents two dominant visions that assisted les Lumieres of 
Europe in articulating and advancing the Kingdom of Reason and structuring socio-
political organizations around conceptualizations that defied human proclivity toward 
unmitigated stasis: (i) The Faustian man of Nietzsche, conveyed an image of “power and 
its superiority, considering all other human forms as inferior to itself … Faustian man 
was a romantic … the maker of history, not its product.” History itself was a “triumph of 
the daring, the courageous, the insightful, the profound, the clear-headed over the slavish, 
cowardly, superstitious, muddled and ignorant.”47 (ii) Freudian vision of modernity in 
which the ‘reality principle’ supersedes the ‘pleasure principle’ provoking people to 
“trade off part of their freedom (and happiness) for a degree of security, grounded in 
hygienically safe, clean, and peaceful environment.”48 With the deliberate and calculated 
‘imposition of patterns,’ individual human impoverishment and ‘partial intellectualism’ 
became symptomatic of  modernity’s always nascent, ongoing, and open-ended processes 
of subjectivization, which is to be understood as a procedure for the objectification of 
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 one’s own self, subsequent constitution of oneself as a subject, and a simultaneous, 
“binding of oneself to a power of external control.”49  
It is argued, in the postmodern vein, that excessive and uncontested predilection 
for rationalism (reminiscent of Weber’s view of history as ‘progressive rationalization’) 
“produces an administered society, not a rational society: reason is replaced by efficiency 
and by the aesthetic and formal vacuities of rationalism.”50 Reason thus stands as the 
judge and jury of inclusion and exclusion, and a categorical definer of rules which are to 
apply universally. This production of mass ‘normativity’ around which rules of social 
behavior and conceptualization of reality are formed, Baudrillard in Simulacra and 
Simulation contends, calls ‘reality’ into question and subverts its principles of 
legitimation. The arising heterotopias and simulacra, as loci of struggle against 
normalization, which by necessity transpose time and space, reproduce images with dual 
and contestable meanings, which either: (i) reflect reality; (ii) pervert reality; (iii) imitate 
and artificially simulate reality; or, (iv) bear no relation to reality. As such, 
postmodernity’s concern with caricaturing reality lies in ascribing value and moral 
appraisal to the artificially produced phenomena, rather than the actuality of its 
experience. And it is this very suspicion that gives birth to an hermeneutic enterprise 
concerned with authenticating the credibility of surface-level meanings through 
“strip[ping] off the concealment, unmasking of interests"51 and an in-depth exploration of 
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 untenable claims. Lyotard referred to postmodernism as ‘rewriting of modernity’, whose 
“negations” in the words of Octavio Paz, even in the highfalutin spheres of politics, “have 
become repetitions: rebellion has become method, criticism has become rhetoric, 
transgression has become ceremony. Negation has ceased to be creative.”52 Thus, an 
epistemology (gnosis) has been contaminated and replaced by pure ontology (praxis), and 
the uprooted representation of human subjectivity and identity have been placed in the 
consensually agreed upon framework of rationalized automatism, which deems all action 
a priori predictable and knowable.  
The history of Western thought points to two trajectories of deliberating and 
legitimizing social and political orders: (i) the European Enlightenment model, which 
assumes the presence of a foundational, rational, and truthful knowledge that determines 
socio-political and cultural practices, bestows institutional legitimacy, and ensures 
communitarian integrity. It displays a tendency to portray society “as a potentially unified 
subject with a unified will”53; (ii) the postmodernist model, which is inherently anti-
foundational, and rejectionist in its attitude toward a coherent totality. It is far from 
accepting the Platonic realm of forms or a set of objective truths by which the ordering of 
society takes place. The postmodern condition, Madan Sarup argues quoting Lyotard, is 
one in which “the grands recits of modernity – the dialectic of Spirit, the emancipation of 
the worker, the accumulation of wealth, the classless society – have all lost credibility.”54 
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 It is, moreover, characterized by speculative and allusive thought, which questions the 
intentions of ideological conditioning and power relations. Autonomous subjectivity and 
abstract reason are problematized and revealed as mediated, contingent, and provisionary, 
set within the historical horizons of fragmentary truths and knowledges from which there 
is neither escape nor recourse to some transcendent universal. The very framework of 
ideological conditioning, which self-legitimizes itself through repetition of the contents 
of the world it structures and shapes, is contested by the postmodernist paradigm, phrased 
in the cultural politics of 1968 and the overbearing effects of insurgent technology and 
scientization of society. Its methods have been represented by Foucault in his 1975 
genealogical magnum opus, Discipline and Punish, where a relentlessly institutional 
analysis of the 18th century penitentiary, its system of highly structured techniques of 
control, have cast a shadow on the modern bureaucratic-industrial state and societal 
arrangements, and suggested a premise of subjectivity as by-produced and ritualized in 
the habits of existence.  
Before, however, conducting a more comprehensive study of Foucault’s political 
insights in regards to human subjectivity and spatial reconfiguration of governmentality, 
to which his writings allude, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the relation 
between postmodern thought and liberal politics, with which politics in general, and 
International Relations as discipline, in particular, in the Western hemisphere have been 
up to now concerned.  
 
Postructuralism in International Relations 
35 
 
 The postmodern (poststructural) strain of thought entered International Relations 
in the 1980’s with the works of Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, and R.B.J. Walker, 
who emphasized the relationship between power and knowledge, representation and 
identity, while cultivating a critical attitude toward realist and neorealist theories. David 
Campbell argues that postructuralism, as expressed by its critical attitude rather than 
general theory, marks a different perspective on the relation between theory and practice, 
and sets up theory as practice.55 This, in turn, permits for the examination of the means 
by which predominant knowledges and practices have been established and solidified in 
socio-political consciousness. Such treatment and approach to the question of politics, 
accompanied by a Lyotardian ‘distrust of metanarratives’ with which it has become 
invested, provokes a number of questions, which provide an overarching framework 
through which implicit truths are interpreted and contested. The paradigm, thus, purports 
to analyze and inquire after: (i) the origins of the state and how it has come to be regarded 
as an indispensible unit of analysis; (ii) practices of statecraft, which appear as both 
essential and natural; (iii) problematization and investigation of state identity and foreign 
policy; (iv) representations of sovereignty and productions of subjectivity.  In this way, 
postmodernism tries the limits of liberal thought, which has assumed a position of 
neutrality, or what Joseph Raz has labeled as ‘epistemic abstinence,’  in regards to social 
ends, and the maintenance of fair-minded equilibrium among competing interests and 
actors.  Liberalism’s early embrace and entrenched belief in the superordinate  position of 
regulatory mechanisms ensuing from and ensured by the market forces, Foucault argued,  
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 has led the subscribing political unit to form  a novel conception of its raison d’état; that 
of maximal enrichment, which necessitates reorganization of the means of production, 
rationalization of labor, harmonization of economic and political power, and finally, 
cultivation of the relational aspects of identity by means of the modification of social 
nature, and construction of institutions and discourses that implant the internal logic of 
the operating system within the individual subjects’ psyche. The art of government, 
which up to now adhered to Aristotelian logic that set priority on the admixture of 
specialized knowledge (techne) and wise judgment (phronesis), transmogrified into a 
political process and a disciplinary regime informed solely by the former.56 It should be 
noted that postmodernism does not aim at subversion of the political and social modi 
vivendi, but rather at an inquiry and explanation of the assumed ‘natures’, ‘truths’, and 
‘functions’, which stem from its agnosticism toward facts and habits implicated in the 
ever present productive and restrictive relations of power.  Only through rendering the 
institutional substrate more transparent, can the devolution of its practices be 
comprehended.  
 
Injunction of Realism 
“Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of 
heir nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the 
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 first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing 
before us, and we shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to 
make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same 
power as we have, would do the same as we do.” 
 
       -Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War 
 
The intention of the following section is not to summarize the contesting claims 
of the grand theoretical narratives, but to shed light on how a specifically Foucauldian 
version of postmodernism challenges the core realist assumptions about politics. Prima 
facie, Foucauldian postmodernism and realism share a core conjecture about political life, 
that of the omnipresence of power.  Be it vested in intentions and motivations of actors, 
systems, institutions, ideologies, and knowledges, power plays an instrumental and 
terminal function. On a substantive level of analysis, however, the two traditions 
significantly diverge.  
There are six general principles and four particular aspects of the realist paradigm, 
which have characterized the political norms of engagement and practice. They are: (i) 
realism’s belief in government set on the principles of objective laws rooted in human 
nature; (ii) rationalization of interests in terms of power; (iii) belief in the objectivity and 
universal validity of interest and its role as the governing principle of political action; (iv) 
adoption of ethics based in  political consequentialism and recourse to prudence as the 
supreme virtue in politics; (v) maintenance and preservation of the autonomous political 
sphere resulting in a refusal  to align moral aspirations and right of states with the divine 
plan; (vi) view of the realist paradigm as intellectually autonomous  and sui generis.57 
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 The principles are supported with the following assumptions about the international 
domain of politics, which are the following:(i) the assumption that nation-states are the 
only consequential actors in international relations; (ii) assumption that political action 
and relations among states are directed primarily towards enhancing national security qua 
military capability, ideological coherence, and territorial soundness; (iii) assumption that 
international relations are a competitive conflict-based zero-sum game; (iv) assumption 
that coercion, economic and military capability testify to states’ power and influence.58 
The institutionalized practices of realpolitik, grounded in the Thucydidean logic and 
implicated in the theoretical conception of sovereignty and balancing of power to which 
the aforementioned have given rise, have prevented moving beyond their immediate 
sphere of application and tainted any such attempts, as crassly utopian. For instance, the 
organization of the world into states and articulation of state-centric ethics of 
international conduct in terms of power, its gain, sustenance, and maximization, a priori 
determined that politics exhausts itself within its set reasons of the state and its proclivity 
for ‘temporary alliances of convenience,’ inhibiting gestures of lasting reciprocal 
recognition and cooperation, and overlooking the possibility of mutual responsibility for 
political subjects by endowing citizens and non-citizens, alike, with positive rights and 
duties. 
Foucault presents a highly original reading of discursive power, which subverts 
strictly mechanical understanding of its application and consequences. It is precisely his 
method of analytically delving into the origins of the ‘rationality’ of realist assumptions, 
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 which permits him to create an opening for questioning of their core modes of operation. 
In congruence with his typical genealogical method of analysis, Foucault in “Omnes et 
Singulatim” uncovers the Biblical and Homeric narratives which have imbued politics 
with an early rationalization of power. In so doing, Foucault questions the formality of an 
ahistorical and dislocated objectivity of realism, which not only denies the subject any 
involvement in the processes of political life, but erases the importance of her 
emplacement within history and its many contingencies. Furthermore, Foucault shows the 
problems of relations between the ruler and the ruled, between the political power - as a 
legal framework, and - ‘pastoral power’ and the development of ‘pastoral technology’- as 
‘duty’, ‘devotedness’, and general shepherdness. Here, Foucault shows, power aspires 
toward service rather than domination, guidance of subjects rather than mere knowledge 
about them. As evidenced by Plato’s works, Critias, The Republic, The Statesman, and 
Laws, the Greek notion of commanding men, Foucault notes, was ultimately reducible to 
a more subordinated act of keeping watch. The Platonic shepherd-magistrate became the 
dominant theme of monastic thought of medieval Europe, where: (i) the responsibility for 
the destiny of the whole flock, and (ii) the flock’s obedience to and compliance with 
shepherd’s will, aimed at ‘weaving of a strong fabric’ for the political life of the city.59 
The subject’s act of submission (Latin subditi or the Greek apatheia ), in turn,  was not 
only elevated to the status of virtue, but made into an individualized path to salvation, 
ensured by confessional techniques for the self cross-examination of conscience. The 
economic, cultural, and sociopolitical structures, however, Foucault observes, 
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 necessitated an epistemological and practical turn away from the Greco-Roman practices 
of obedience, self-knowledge, and confession toward a justification of the state power. 
The appearance of the (a) reason of state60, and (b) theory of police61 eventuated in the 
‘art’ of governing, that is, a reflection on the nature of what and who is being governed 
(enhanced by the implementation of arithmetic and statistics), and understanding of the 
state’s own material capacities for the enlargement, sustenance and preservation of its 
strength indispensible for correct government.  
The above challenges the realist paradigm in two ways: (i) it shows the historical 
variability, fluidity, and contingency of the reasons and functions of the state power; (ii) 
it presupposes that the changing rationality of state’s capacities may eventuate in a 
radical recalibration and transmogrification of the state apparatus and practices of 
statecraft, even at the expanse of its own dissolution, should it judge that its power of 
governing is better achieved by some other mode of organization. Hence, what appears as 
natural and without a present alternative, is shown to be an effect of artificial constitution, 
a fungible and changeable adoption of perspective, and a historical production of 
knowledge.  Above all, an obstinate insistence on the preservation of the discourse on 
sovereignty, as an untouchable condition and fact of political existence, inhibits 
rationalization of the modes of power, which, as Friedrich Balke argues, have long ceased 
to operate according to the accepted model of sovereignty.62   
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 At another level of analysis, Foucault distinguishes between ‘disciplinary power’ 
and ‘juridical power’. In “Two Lectures” Foucault notes: 
“…we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the 
juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which 
accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, 
towards forms of subjections and the inflections and utilizations of their localized 
systems, and towards strategic apparatuses.”63 
 
I suggest, that the juridical power may be read more closely as a characteristic of a realist 
conceptualization of power, whereas disciplinary power, as a political transgression in its 
regicidal, postmodernist intentions, is therefore, more amenable to cosmopolitan 
treatment. According to the juridical power model: (i) power is possessed; (ii) power is 
hierarchical and flows from top to bottom; (iii) power is prohibitive, sanctioned, and 
repressive. The disciplinary model holds power to be: (i) exercised rather than possessed; 
(ii) disseminated, rhizomatically distributed, flowing from the bottom up; (iii) mobile and 
productive; (v) analytic rather than hermetically enclosed within the confines of a theory. 
Foucault acknowledges the multiplicity of force relations and thus regards power as 
always contested, non-institutionalized, intentional, and non-subjective. The state itself, 
as that human community and political entity which claims a monopoly on power, 
Mitchell contends, is reduced to an effect of a set of “detailed processes of spatial 
organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, supervision, and 
surveillance,”64 which the realist tradition justifies metaphysically, thus inevitably 
creating the appearance of the world divided into sovereign states competing for survival 
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 in an anarchical system. Foucauldian standpoint disputes the presupposition of stable 
human nature, arguing that orders create norms, identities, communities which sustain the 
subject; proposes an ethics of action under which resistance is affected by architecture of 
repression; asserts multipolarity as status quo; and contends that the rationalization of 
structural organization and relations are emplaced in malleable disciplines and micro-
contexts rather than inert grand theories of the state and its rigid raison d’état.  Foucault 
shares with realists, to a certain degree, an equally pessimistic view about the possibility 
of socio-political tranquility. Society, he admits,  is a war of all against all, as the battles 
for  the status of ‘truth’  rage even in times of relative peace during which new social 
institutions arise through which an ‘unspoken warfare’ for domination is continuously 
expressed.65 
 In sum, the intellectual and pragmatic dominance of the realist paradigm in its 
unquestionable assertion of a community of sovereign states generates a built-in 
consensus and a ‘discourse of limits.’ International relations concedes the ‘fact’ that the 
state sovereignty and a system of states are absolute; that power is centralized; that it is 
riddled with often imbalanced, conflictual power struggles for domination; that states are 
rational actors relying on utilitarian calculus for political gain; that maximization of 
power is based in ethics of intention, whose predictability is rooted in human nature. As 
R.B.J. Walker contends, the emphasis on the claim of state sovereignty obscures the 
attempt to explain its consequences,66 preventing a conceptual turn that responds to the 
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 emergence of novel forms of global organization and the changing nature of the socio-
political standards of international life. The political life of states, Luigi Bonanate 
suggests, resembles “a series of hierarchically linked concentric circles”, which 
progressively elide the prerogatives of state sovereignty, and which are characterized by a 
conceptualization of the international system which: (i) overrides anarchy, or an 
international consensus on the content of inter-state relations as represented by “alliance 
and hostility, of peace and of war”; (ii) repudiates the use of international violence; (iii) 
promotes interstate pluralism, which responds to reciprocal acknowledgement of respect 
in alliance formation and free organization; (iv) encourages democratization of the 
international system based on coexistence, mutual recognition of “equal prerogatives, 
rights and duties both of the states’ own nationals and of foreign citizens”; (v) promotes 
“collective acceptance of elementary principles of equity” and “respect of fundamental 
rights of individuals regardless of citizenship.”67  
 
Foucault’s Postmodern Paradigm: the Question of Political Sovereignty 
 
The Foucauldian re-conceptualization of sovereignty, of the self, of political 
endeavor as ‘art’ rather than governmental routine, of discourse as space, serves as a 
precedent for a postmodernist cosmopolitan theory and practice, and bears twofold 
implications. First, the de-routinization of political practices permits the reinterpretation 
and re-situation of their symbolic meanings in relation to newly legitimized forms of 
social interaction. Second, systems of cultural signification and meaning become 
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 modified through practice and normalization procedures, which both incorporate and 
reconstitute power, and coextensively alter the national self-understanding, formal 
allocation of procedural rights and bestowal of social status, and amend external 
behavioral practices of states, social groups, and citizens alike. The Foucauldian analysis, 
by subverting mere symbolism of the uncontestable state sovereignty and the essential 
subjectivity of citizens, has regenerated interest in effective challenging of subjective 
standards and norms, and continues to provide a theoretical schema for highlighting the 
political significance of power, sovereignty, resistance, and governmentality, while also 
defining a framework for the achievement of substantive change via creative acts of self-
authorship. As a conceptual tool, it permits for a variegated approach to questions of 
power relations by situating this universally recognized concept - power - at the epicenter 
of discourse. It thus avoids epistemic constriction, which may dismiss its utility when 
addressing historically, politically, and culturally distinct problems and novel 
conceptualizations of being in the world. Moreover, a critical approach to foundationalist 
and historic schemata permits the emergence of formal hermeneutics of the political 
enterprise. This is not inconsequential, as the complex political and existential 
problematic embedded in the domestic, international and global contexts, requires not 
merely an empirical and procedural understanding, but a substantive grasp of the 
intermediary processes which structure and constitute the anatomy and autonomy of 
actors implicated in the ‘always-already’ political and essentially human relations. 
Accordingly, the following section will examine how Foucault’s genealogical enterprise 
and his critical interrogation of discursive practices permits to reveal the underlying and 
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 determining elements of human subjectivity, and conditions for resistance and self-
enactment. 
 
Genealogy, Archeology, and Discourse in Politics 
In “Sexuality and Solitude”, Foucault makes the following assertion: “Let me 
announce once and for all that I am not a structuralist, and I confess, with the appropriate 
chagrin, that I am not an analytic philosopher.”68 The tendency to situate Foucault in one 
overarching intellectual tradition runs the risk of compartmentalizing his transdiscursive 
and transdisciplinary thought and thus misconstruing his ambitious 
archeological/architectonic and genealogical enterprise qua research activity. Foucault’s 
“Two Lectures” (1976) and an interview “Truth and Method” contained in the book 
Power/Knowledge (1980) offer an expansion on his research methodology.  Thus, 
genealogy is to be understood as a “form of history which can account for the 
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc. without having to make 
reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.”69 The fundamental function 
of the genealogical project, Foucault contends, is to:  
“entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate 
knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, 
hierarchize and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some 
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 arbitrary idea of what constitutes science and its objects … Genealogies are 
precisely antisciences”70  
 
To resurrect knowledge sedated by centralizing powers of institutions and sanctioned 
scientific discourses, in order to account for its subjection and struggle against its 
formalized and ossified unitary theoretical postulates, is to engage in genealogy. This 
“emancipation of historical knowledge from that subjection,”71 which genealogy as a 
tactic undertakes in order to reactivate local knowledges, requires a proper methodology 
that Foucault terms, archeology, through which “local discursivities” are analyzed and 
their historical relevance brought into play in the representation and constitution of the 
present. Foucault writes, “archaeological analysis individualizes and describes discursive 
formations. . . Far from wishing to reveal general forms, archaeology tries to outline 
particular configurations.72  
Discourse, for Foucault, constitutes institutionalized and regulated linguistic 
practices that shape and construct the objects of knowledge and testify to their “truth” 
value, which is internal to a given discourse, and beyond which object’s manifestations 
cease to produce any meaning. Discourse is, therefore, a group of statements, which 
provides language appropriate to a particular topic and particular historical time period, 
and which consolidates and is, in turn, consolidated by an array of social practices. The 
hermeneutic approach to socio-political situatedness by way of linguistic constructs is 
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 elemental to a Derridian deconstructive tradition, in which the ethical and the political are 
implicated in the historical, temporary and contingent structural configurations that 
convey and are mediated by ideas, knowledges and systems of power. This approach is 
especially pertinent to Foucault’s genealogical enterprise aimed at revealing the 
artificiality of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of subjectivity and 
socio-political practice, methodically constituted and re-constituted by the dynamic 
interaction of knowledge and power.  
In his 1970 inaugural lecture to the College de France, entitled “Orders of 
Discourse,” Foucault for the first time introduced the concept of power, which from then 
on permeated his subsequent works, such as Discipline and Punish (1975), History of 
Sexuality (Vol. I-III) (1976), and Power/Knowledge (1980). With this, the dominant 
conception of power in the Hobbesian, Machiavellian, Shakespearian or Kantian edition, 
as a centralized system of coercion which affects its absolute possessor absolutely, as 
“the possession of power inevitably corrupts the free judgment of reason,”73 begins to 
signify for Foucault an “interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations … relations 
[that] are both intentional and nonsubjective … [where] power is exercised from 
innumerable points”74 and where an equal resistance is an admissible principle for action. 
This understanding of power has not been immune from criticism. Charles Taylor insists 
that “Foucault’s opposition between the old model of power, based on 
sovereignty/obedience, and the new one based on domination/subjugation leaves out 
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 everything in Western history which has been animated by civic humanism or analogous 
movements.”75 Likewise, resistance, itself, has been called into question. Michael 
Walzer, for instance, denies that Foucault provides adequate reasons for his “calls to 
resistance - … resistance for the sake of what?” Walzer asks by way of a critique, “for the 
sake of whom? To what end? None of these questions can be satisfactorily answered”76, 
he concludes.  
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Admittedly, power, and by extension, resistance, so conceived has mandated a 
Copernican revolution in thought, a Kuhnian paradigm shift requiring greater 
decipherment of discourses and epistemes that structure and concretize human political 
reality, and accompanying it scientization and valorization of disciplinary forms of 
knowledge and social organization.  Thus, in “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault 
postulates that in order to “conduct a concrete analysis of power relations, one would 
have to abandon the juridical notion of sovereignty” as this model, Foucault argues, 
“presupposes the individual as a subject of natural rights or original powers; it aims to 
account for the ideal genesis of the state; and it makes law the fundamental manifestation 
of power.”77 The requisite abandonment of a habitual association of ‘man’ or ‘human 
nature’ with unchanging historical essences reified by discursive practice,  and fostered 
by the Enlightenment and its normative presuppositions, offered a possibility for a 
“reshuffling of configurations” and classificatory schemas, while placing contingency, 
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 arbitrariness and discontinuity at the center of analysis. Moreover, the reversal of the 
Platonic adage, led Foucault to posit the soul as body’s carceral structure, reified and 
maintained by: (i) the centrality of ‘man’s’ universal Enlightenment pathos; and (ii) 
circumscription and constitutiveness of ‘man’ by “the order of things”, that is, present 
practices and institutions defining the systems of normativity, culminating in the critical 
meta-study of social organizations of thought and discipline. The reconstitution of one’s 
ontology through resistance to sovereign power structures and a demand placed upon 
self-authorship constitute the core existential requirements posed by the poststructuralist 
approaches to a cosmopolitan pathos. It is thus that human history unveils itself anew, as 
a history of choices, by way of which political agents claim their personal sovereignty 
and enter into a democratic, civil and political cosmopolitan society.  
 
 
Foucault on Sovereignty 
“Theory of sovereignty is the great trap we are in 
danger of falling into when we try to analyze power.” 
 
-Michel Foucault 
 
To better analyze the mechanisms of power, Foucault insists on departing from 
the juridico-political notions of sovereignty, which date from the Middle Ages and are 
constituted around the questions of monarchy, and engaging in an analysis of power 
which escapes entrapment and justification of its means in the theory of sovereignty.  But 
even such an analysis, Foucault notes, which should logically have led to doing away 
with the theory of sovereignty and its juridical substantiations altogether, as an 
organizing principle of political and social life, has merely accommodated 
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 complementarities, while working to ameliorate the more acerbic confrontations. The 
problem, as Foucault sees it, lies in (i) the conflict between a right of sovereignty and a 
mechanics of discipline; (ii) the conflict of ends between the jurisprudential guarantee of 
rights and the disciplinary normalization; and which arose as a result of sovereignty’s 
grand democratizing gesture, and a subsequent “establishment of a public right 
articulated with collective sovereignty” and enshrined in juridical codes. The devolution 
of hierarchically ordered degrees of power into “the general economy of discipline that 
runs throughout society”78 constitutes a transition from the paradigm of sovereignty to 
that of governmentality.   
The politico-juridical ‘negative’ conception of monarchic power and sovereignty, 
intricately bound to territoriality, and premised upon Roman law and its Grotian 
interpretation, as the principle of restraint and regulation, has posited the inviolability of 
the state, as the basis for a requisite formality in international relations, characterized by a 
perpetual struggle for survival and optimization of power under the dictates of the ius 
belli. A formal system enshrining the reason of state and guaranteeing the impermeability 
of its boundaries, Foucault contends in “Security, Territory and Population”, resulted in: 
(i) a diplomatico-military technology that consists in “ensuring and developing the forces 
of a state through a system of alliances, and the organizing of an armed apparatus” in the 
search for a European equilibrium or balance of power under the guiding treaties of 
Westphalia; (ii) policy/police designed to increase forces from within; (iii) apparatus of 
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 commerce and ‘population-wealth’ increasing the quantitative potential of the state.79 In 
his analysis, Foucault intent on inverting Clausewitz’s thesis, sees law as a contingently 
expeditious mean, “born in the middle of expeditions, conquests and burning cities … 
raging within the mechanisms of power … to constitute the secret driving force of 
institutions of law and order.”80‘Politics as war pursued by other means’ privileged 
therefore, war, and by extension, sovereignty’s presiding mandate as the appropriate 
media for Foucauldian study; as their extensive politicization permitted for the  regulation 
and advancement of subject’s ‘happiness’, which in turn, enhanced the functionality of 
the apparatus of the state.  
 “How and under what conditions a ruler’s sovereignty over the state can be 
maintained?”81 “How, since when and how, did people begin to imagine that it is war that 
functions in power relations, that an uninterrupted combat undermines peace, and that the 
civil order is basically an order of battle?” … “Who first thought that politics was war 
pursued by other means?”82 The application of an “archival” examination of the 
problematic of power, sovereignty and politics as structured discourses and practices has 
led Foucault to [their] problematization, under which object’s or concept’s constitution 
comes to the fore and becomes the subject for reflection and analysis. In attempting to 
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 account for the power, domination, and governmentality problematic, it is essential to 
underscore the concepts’ non-classical interpretations and associations which Foucault 
introduces into political theory. In his lecture on “Governmentality”, the term 
‘government’ is associated with the ‘rationality’, ‘technology’ and ‘art’ of governing or 
regulating conduct [of others or of oneself]. This “technology of state forces” leads to the 
development of an ensemble of institutions vested with the responsibility of enacting 
rational and conscious means, tactics, techniques and procedures for ordering and 
managing a population. “We need to see things,” Foucault writes in “Governmentality”, 
“not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and 
the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government” but 
form a triangular conceptualization of “sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as 
its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of 
security.”83   
Barry Allen in “Foucault and Modern Political Philosophy” interprets Foucault’s 
‘governmentality’ neologism as that which combined the idea of government or “the 
power to direct conduct, with the idea of a peculiar mentality with which the activity of 
government has been approached in modern times: the presumption that ‘everything’ can, 
should, must be managed, administered, regulated by authority.”84 In this way, not only 
the physical expansion of governmental bureaucracy, but also an increased specialization 
in all forms of expert management of knowledge and administration, which increasingly 
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 and insidiously infiltrated into every dimension of individual life, came to typify the 
modern nation-state and the disciplinary society it brought about, along with the birth of 
the ‘police state’ designed to ‘see to living’ and to “maintain and augment the happiness 
of its citizens”85 which was deemed necessary, if not indispensible, for the consolidation 
of strength and the very survival of the state itself. 
By retracing the political history of sovereignty, Foucault shows how an 
alternative, seemingly less authoritarian, less self-legitimating and entrapping modus 
operandi takes root, whereby power ceases to be conceived in terms of “law, prohibition, 
liberty, and sovereignty”86 and requires for its discrete constitution neither the law nor the 
king. This, in turn, leads to the abolishment of a systemic consensus which stipulates that 
the only legitimate power emanates from the juridico-political theory of sovereignty 
which establishes and concentrates authority in the enigmatic and indivisible Leviathan, 
making it a condition sine qua non, as “pure sovereignty is indivisible, or it is not.”87 To 
dethrone the king via powers imminent in society is to negate the transcendental 
metaphysics of legitimized sovereignty, and to deny it an exclusive loyalty of a citizen 
and subject. Foucault reveals that the historico-political discourse has attempted to situate 
the sovereign in fictitious immanence imbuing him with a peculiar ‘foreignness’ and 
estrangement inaccessible to his subjects, wherein his incontestability has lain. A 
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 genealogical decipherment, however, procured by Foucault, deconstructs the ‘myth’, 
eventuating in nothing less than regicide. From now on, knowledge rather than 
“ostentatious signs of sovereignty”88 is to serve as a textual and practical vade mecum for 
the administration of society. The king’s dethronement presents itself as an opportunity 
for positing an alternative realm of existence, where neither citizen-subjects’ personality 
nor individual identity are reduced to and exhausted by a single inert skeleton. The 
techniques of analysis offered by Foucault, permit for a re-conceptualization of political 
reality, by recognizing the fluidity and hybridity of social affiliations and narrative genres 
which accompany them.   
For Aristotle, the essence of the polis has lain in its pedagogical purpose that 
defined the political destiny and fortune of citizens. In Considerations on Representative 
Government, Mill proposed the “first element of good government, being the virtue and 
intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of 
excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and 
intelligence of the people themselves.”89 With Foucault, a nominally and substantively 
different utility is being assigned to the state and its governmental practices. Foucault 
contends that the state does not have an essence or an essential purpose, and it is not a 
universal or an autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but “the mobile 
effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.”90 The government thus shows itself 
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 through disciplinary techniques which structure the social command via a “diffuse 
network of dispositifs or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and 
productive practices” 91 which reach beyond the corporeal manifestations of being and 
enter the realm of consciousness, and which eventuate in docile and malleable social 
bios. It is also evident in Foucault’s analysis that it is precisely the learned residuals of 
habits and customs that insert themselves in economic and political practices, which 
enable “the structures, mechanisms, and justifications of power to function.”92 
The individual within the system so conceived is a fabricated atom, an artifact and 
a product of a technology of control, and an ideological representation of society. 
Foucault argued that the transition from the sovereign state to the disciplinary state, 
inevitably resulted in the transmogrification of the state’s raison d’être. In “The Political 
Technology of Individuals,” Foucault outlines the new raison as that devoted to taking 
“care of men as a population. It wields its power over living beings as living beings, and 
its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics.”93 The state is, thus, not merely invested 
with the potential for basal recourse to coercion but with ‘intelligence’ and productive 
capacity, an aesthetics which is to sculpt and refine the skeleton and the mind of the 
citizen it is interested in governing. The processes underlying the ‘new political anatomy’ 
of disciplinary society are no longer unified under a rigid, monolithic framework of 
operation, but rather show themselves as 
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 “a multiplicity of minor processes, of different origin and scattered location, 
which overlap, repeat, or imitate one another, support one another, distinguish 
themselves from one another according to their domain of application, converge 
and gradually produce the blueprint of a general method … adopted in response to 
particular needs.”94  
 
The social construction of subjects predisposed and more amenable to the requirements 
of economic production necessitates and justifies the utilization of closely administered 
institutional modes of disciplinarity and management of populations. Thus, life itself, 
says Foucault, becomes an object of power. With this, the philosopher breaks with the 
tradition of a ‘benign’ analysis of sovereignty and the liberal convention of analyzing 
sovereignty from the point of restraint on power, and dares to inquire after the extra-legal 
means and reasons for its exercise. “With government,” Foucault writes, “it is a question 
not of imposing law on men, but of disposing things … of employing tactics rather than 
laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics.”95 The law qua jurisprudence was 
dethroned from its central position within the apparatus of state and replaced with a 
regime of discipline and tactics of disposal. 
 
The State of Being qua Creative Becoming   
In conceiving of the basic human unit of social organization, the state, under 
globalization, it is necessary to invoke some unifying philosophical presuppositions. The 
following will certainly assume more about the function and purpose of the state than Sir 
Thomas More’s sinister adage had purported to capture, when he believed the state to be: 
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 ‘a conspiracy of the rich who call their intrigues laws.’ A contrario, in Book I of the 
Politics, Aristotle insisted on the state being a “community of some kind … established 
with a view to some good … a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.”96 For 
Cicero, the state or the commonwealth was “that association and federation of men bound 
together by principles of justice.”97 In the Revolt of the Masses “the polis is not primarily 
a collection of habitable dwellings,” Ortega y Gasset wrote, “but a meeting place for 
citizens, a space set apart for public functions. The city is not built … to shelter from the 
weather and to propagate the species … but in order to discuss public affairs.”98 Neither 
one of the above definitions is exhaustive; yet common to all three is an identification of 
the state with a public space, a community of individual citizens bound to share and 
propagate the good in accordance with the laws of justice. This democratic assumption, 
which is premised upon a primarily communitarian logic, defines the parameters of 
citizenship by: (i) investing  public spaces with the opportunity for the use of 
‘autonomous’ public reason, endowed with an appropriate level of critical reflection, 
which in turn; (ii) enhances the norms and nomos of the political unit, even or, perhaps, 
all the more so, when invested with a spirit of resistance.  
Genesis, continuity, totalization: these are the great themes of the history of ideas, 
and that by which it is attached to a certain, now traditional, form of historical 
analysis. . . But archaeological description is precisely such an abandonment of 
the history of ideas, a systematic rejection of its postulates and procedures, an 
attempt to practice quite a different history of what men have said.99  
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 The attitude of resistance, abandonment and dissociation, proposed above and 
employed by Foucault in his “archival” enterprise, however disowned by a 
communitarian principle as the  bonds of mutual constitutiveness become subject of 
gradual dissolution (and thus is constitutively more in tune with a cosmopolitan mode of 
dialectical enterprise between the world and the self), creates an opening for self-
authorship, under the edicts of which the self voluntarily discovers the ‘imaginative 
horizons’ and aspires toward their surpassing. It is the acting and reflecting person, then, 
who in the “vivacity of the spirit” is not simply able to turn “the power of consciousness 
back upon the self and its imaginations,”100 but also to intend and to project oneself 
toward the self of one’s own ambition. The implied subjectivity suggests a “retreat into 
the self” in order to excavate the potential for the development of personal reason, or to 
find logos already dwelling there. The methodological approach in enacting the “ethical 
subject” (Foucault), the “liberal self” (Sandel), the “cosmopolitan self” (Hill) is through a 
process of self-reference by which the “individual delimits that part of himself that will 
form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept that he 
will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve his moral goal.”101  
The portrait of creative becoming, which Foucault adroitly paints on his 
philosophical canvas, necessarily regards ‘existence as preceding essence,’ however, 
distrusting the ‘essential beingness’ which aspires toward nothing less than metaphysical 
transcendence. To posit ‘coming into being’ as an existential task, and by extension, a 
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 cosmopolitan project, based on the understanding of the historical and socio-political 
narratives that define the psyche/‘soul’ and confine the body, and which impinge upon 
and encumber the being that already is, and the one that is not yet, is to presuppose that 
agents posses an affinity toward self-discipline, self-cultivation, and an ethical aesthetic, 
an array of artistic and stylistic gifts which issue in ‘practices of creativity’ and 
resistance. In this way, the constitutionality of human ontology is rarely ‘natural,’ 
definite, exact, and unambiguous, but rather invariably ‘optional’, plastic, contingent and 
indeterminate. In view of the above, it becomes necessary to inquire after the relevance of 
the state in the development of beings qua citizens in the expanded sphere of concern it is 
invested with under globalization. Question of this kind is not inconsequential, as 
increased privatization of human existence and rearrangement of public spaces for 
democratic deliberation, alter the capacity and the paternalistic role of governments, and 
through it, realign citizens’ reference points for self-identification. 
 
A Prelude: Political Significance of Space 
The liberal order provides numerous exemplars of context-dependent radical 
thought, intent on either habituating citizens in good (Aristotle), maximizing the greatest 
happiness (Mill) or deliberating upon and selecting the principles of justice from behind 
the “veil of ignorance” (Rawls). All of the above presupposed that the human condition is 
necessarily immersed in and intimately tied to the polis or the state, and the spaces 
delineating its function, which form the fundamental identity rooted contextually to a 
collective of customs and mores. From Hobbes through Locke and Rawls political theory 
has relied upon arguments aimed at legitimation of political power and justification of the 
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 legal system as maintaining order, promoting safety and enshrining popular consent by 
providing positive guarantees, protocols protecting natural rights, persons, and property.  
The political significance of space, physical as well as mnemonic, generates a set 
of questions concerning its character and constitution and above all its influence upon the 
citizen-subject. Space, as ‘definitional,’ such, by which rules of spatial behavior are 
explicitly articulated and codified; ‘historical’, situated in a specific context, and; 
‘cultural’, predicated upon a plethora of specific significations and meanings, define(s) 
and circumscribe(s) the parameters for political engagement. It aggregates and excludes, 
impinges upon and confines, initiates and disrupts the scope and structure of political 
action. In her book, Radical Space (2003), Margaret Kohn, reasoning about the 
potentialities of spatial analytics and the socio-political and cultural importance of the 
spatial dimension vis-à-vis subjectivity and citizenship, raises the following concerns by 
asking: Is there something about shared physical presence that intensifies and transforms 
political experience? Could particular spaces serve a transformative political project as 
well as a disciplinary regime?102 Could the space left open in the spirit of counter-
politics, or ‘politics of sedition’ constitute as equally compelling an act of a nonetheless 
‘political’ resistance as the space inhabited and occupied?  What becomes of the territory, 
the demos, the democratic process, war and intrigue, when space which presided over 
and orchestrated socio-political behavior faces its own annihilation by the insatiable time, 
assiduously loyal to the progressively space-compressing processes and technologies of 
globalization?   
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 The above questions will constitute the foundation for a Foucauldian analysis of 
spatial politics. As James F. Keeley in “Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International 
Regimes” suggests, Foucault “does not theorize or hypothesize; he produces jarring 
interpretations that uncover and promote struggles, therefore, we cannot deduce 
hypotheses form his work; instead, we can adopt an attitude of fundamental 
contestability, apply Foucault’s analytic devices, and explore possibilities.”103It is 
precisely this methodology, sustained by an attitude of contestability, which will preside 
over the following chapter. Adoption of this analytic procedure inevitably dilutes the 
foundations of any strict, quantifiable, objective disciplinary science and its uncontestable 
“truth” by denaturalizing dominant narratives, while providing instruments for critical 
analysis of political actors and their relations on the stage of the international theater, as 
well as opening prospects for conceptualizing a normative core of democratic 
engagement under the auspices of a cosmopolitan form of being. Since, transnational 
processes of, and contests to, globalization extend themselves beyond national borders, 
the idea of democracy premised upon a rigidly demarcated political forum, can no longer 
be viably sustained. As a consequence, the philosophical and pragmatic ends of atomistic 
and sheltered political communities or territorial nation-states must be rethought. And the 
conceptual and legal underpinnings and duties of citizenship, which are a conditio sine 
qua non of every democratic polity, must be revised and expanded beyond spatial 
confines of the nation-state, in order to assume an increasingly mediating and dialogically 
engaged role. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORIZING POLITICAL SPACE, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY 
 
“The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space.                          
W e are in  the  epoch  of  simultaneity:  we   are in the epoch of 
juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of 
the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience 
of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than 
that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own 
skein.” 
                                                     - Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces”  
 
 
In theorizing political space it is incumbent to consider the public sphere and social space 
that defined and enabled the essential nature of the political enterprise.  Though familiar 
investitures of the Greek agora or the Roman forum provided the necessary schemas for 
architectural design and accommodation of the democratic debate in the ancient world, 
and the writings of the Enlightenment of Kant and Mill equipped it with theoretical 
imaginings of a place destined for collectivization of rational individuals in the attempt to 
reach agreements on issues of common concern, the more substantial theorization of 
space as the cornerstone of transformative politics in an era of deterritorialization, 
internal fragmentation, and physical-intellectual dispersal remains yet to be conceived.  
The analysis and understanding of the spatial dimension and repositioning of the 
state, apart from its geographic placement, cannot be accomplished without the 
examination of the definitive political markers of citizenship and sovereignty, which are 
deeply implicated in the political process and operation of ‘imagined communities’ at 
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 local, national, and global levels. Camilleri et al. in the State in Transition  (1995), claim 
that the statist paradigm has monopolized our understanding of the political, putting a 
‘stranglehold’ on international relations, and constraining a variant discourse around the 
concepts of state, security, and power. The marked polycentrism of modern governance, 
Scholte points out, is distinctly multi-layered and trans-scalar, creating an impression of a 
‘shrunk’ or ‘partial’ sovereignty.104 The fluctuating and shifting internationalism 
provides, therefore, the testing-ground for the adaptive capacities of states. Adaptation, 
by definition, requires revision and adjustment which are a result of a reflex response to 
the changing circumstances. Camilleri et al. argue that states’ symbolic and formal 
reactions permit for the articulation of their ‘possible trajectories’, while at the same time, 
reawakening reflection on the means by which the state has been conceptualized thus far.  
Before considering, however, the consequences and various decouplings of ethno-
nationalist projects, ontological and ethical dilemmas, and identity politics to which re-
spatialization of politics under globalization inevitably gives way, it is necessary to 
concentrate on the transitions and alterations in the sphere of public space and discourse 
in order to uncover their impacts upon human and citizen agency and subjectivity.  This 
chapter will be dedicated to the analytic exploration of the public sphere, which “links the 
liberal ideologies of the enlightenment to its constitutive social structures”105and attempts 
to redefine the utility of public political debate in the age of globalization, corporatization 
of the state and privatization of public locales of socio-political activity, which issue, on a 
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 personal level, in considerably greater anonymity, autonomy, and dislocated authority 
that re-disciplines public consciousness and transmogrifies citizen sovereignty, while 
simultaneously and paradoxically, making the subject more politically transparent.  
In recent literature, political theorists have begun to turn their analytic attention to 
the progressive privatization of public spaces and the resultant democratic privation 
accompanied increased atomization and degradation of value systems, which have 
traditionally placed emphasis on democratic ideals of participation and reasoned 
deliberation. Due to spatial extensiveness of modern democracies and technological 
regulatory apparatuses in place, the disappearance of mental and material agoras, the 
centrally located open market areas and the designated physical spaces where the public 
life of the city and discussion of political affairs occurred, have called for a re-
conceptualization and transformation of public engagement in political discourse. Kohn 
argues that the privatization of public spaces has undermined the opportunities for public 
speech and reinforced patters of existing social segregation.106 Since, space encodes 
power, Lefebvre contends, it “lays down the law because it implies a certain order – and 
hence a certain disorder,” and thus “commands bodies”107 which become readable 
through the sites of their emplacement in the “power- geometry” of social relations.108 A 
dynamic public sphere situated in a non-intimidating public space ensures the survival of 
a democratic civil society. “Only a democratic state” Walzer claims, “can create a 
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 democratic civil society;”109and only a democratic civil society can build sustainable 
“social ties and a sense of mutual obligation by weaving together isolated individuals”110 
into a larger social body.  
Today, Bennett and Entman point out, “the public sphere is comprised of any and 
all locations, physical or virtual, where ideas and feelings relevant to politics are 
transmitted or exchanged openly.”111 It is important to note that a dislocation and a 
relocation of public space from pure and experienced physicality to more anonymous and 
abstract virtuality has not produced visible alterations in the originative premise of public 
space, which conventionally relied upon its own distinction and alterity as the organizing 
principle of discursive interaction that institutes itself in separation of, if not in overt 
opposition to, the state mandate. Nancy Fraser describes the public sphere as that ‘arena’, 
which is “conceptually distinct from the state; it is a site for the production and 
circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state.”112Theoretically, its 
supposed alienation from economic relations and independence from unsolicited 
encroachments of the market forces, permits the public sphere to function “as a theater 
for debating and deliberating rather than for buying and selling.”113 This historically 
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 performative exercise in deliberative democracy and the geographic expansiveness of its 
effects, Habermas argues, were furthered by the 15th century development of the printing 
press. This, in turn, gave rise to all forms of printed media, which created “the foundation 
for a type of national narrative that fostered the development of the nation state.”114 With 
the rise of multidirectional and multipoint global discourse, the proliferation and presence 
of technologically viable low-threshold of access discourse locales has redefined the 
public function of piazzas and squares, replacing the ‘public’ face of the citizen with the 
inscrutability of a computer generated graphic, while substituting for gradually evolving 
relations of trust the immediacy of guarded demeanor and general mistrust, as well as 
replacing socio-political transparency with oblique manipulation and abrasive deceit. 
Paradoxically, the wider avenues for the cultivation of positive ends and more engaged 
public dialogue via communication and political participation generated by the 
evolutionary pace of technology, point also to potentially destabilizing trends. Doug 
Walton underscores the following four, as indicative of the altering character and 
priorities of the contemporary demos: (i) the degradation of value systems; (ii) the decline 
in civic engagement; (iii) the sub-optimization of political campaigning, and (iv) the sub-
optimization of media on entertaining.115The respatialization of political and institutional 
enterprise augurs a reconfiguration and readjustment of policy and politics. Jean-Marie 
Guehenno points to the adverse effects of the multiplication and increased reliance upon 
public opinion surveys. The amplification and technologically enabled instantaneity of 
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 volatile but monolithic public opinion polls, Guehenno argues, does a disservice to a 
representative democracy on account of minimizing the will and the need for public 
debate, mediation, confrontation of perspectives, and compromise, as representatives dare 
not contradict the “public’s” already variable sentiments.116 Thus the states’ legitimation 
is now not only derived from its ability to ensure and propagate the material summum 
bonum of its citizens, but above all, from the loyalty to public passions and the technical 
mobilization of the apparatuses of knowledge capable of gauging them. Technocratic 
governance sustained by the intransigence of technology in modern society threatens the 
survival of a spontaneous spirit of public and democratic assembly, yielding the floor to 
“specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” self-satisfied with “attaining a level 
of civilization never before achieved,”117 but journeying under a ‘blind guide’ of a 
‘tyrannical majority’ consisting of a virtual mass public opinion. A natural objection may 
be raised about the legitimacy and efficacy of public opinion embedded in an amalgam of 
capitalist and neoliberal orders. A much less explored function of public opinion lies not 
in its volatility and capriciousness, but in its critical nature, which not only aims to check 
domination, but democratize governance itself.118 This presupposition, however, raises 
two problems. First, for the public opinion to stand the test of legitimacy, according to 
public-sphere theory, it must show itself based in and upholding two principles of (a) 
inclusiveness; and, (b) participatory parity. The inherent hybridity and disaggregation of 
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 the enterprise of opinion building contests legitimacy, as territorially unbounded masses 
of interlocutors often reveal themselves, after close examination, as monochromatically 
homogeneous transnational elites, who possess, above all, the means necessary for 
effective global networking,119 the modern prerequisite of political participation. 
Because the systems of communication extend the sphere and possibilities for 
civic engagement, and increasingly call for a more democratized forms of citizenship 
under the mutually affecting norm of globalization, they are also the inadvertent cause of 
tensions between democratic principles which advocate the inclusion of a broader array 
of political actors, and civic ideals that put a moratorium on a tolerable number and 
nativity of such actors. It becomes incumbent, therefore, to not only investigate the 
ramifications of the respatialization of political dialogue, along with its priorities and 
commitments, but the new status anxiety of citizens themselves, whose legally proscribed 
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations to fellow compatriots, in an era of globalization, 
ineluctably transcend the institutional limits of the state, and encompass an assemblage of 
heterogeneous existential responsibilities and dilemmas for which no formal 
constitutional mandate exists.  
 
Postmodernism and the Rise of the Politics of Social Space 
 
When in 1969 from the ashes of post-war European political turmoil, the ‘New 
Constructivism’ as an art movement took shape, the artists of the period took upon 
themselves a project of advancing a new society and raising the social aesthetic 
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 imagination to the level of utility, with the narratives concretely derived from the masses 
contextualized in socially pre-defined political situations. Lacan himself promoted the 
use of neo-constructivist theory to modify society through an integration of social life 
with action and art. Thus, the concept of ideological art, discontented with mere 
decoration of society and replication of agreed to ‘reality’ on canvas, aimed, primarily, at 
an erasure of boundaries between art and life. Foucault referred to this conceptual 
framework as ‘the neo-dialectic paradigm of discourse’ that denoted the bridge between 
society and reality. Society thus became, as Derrida would have it, a “part of the 
economy of consciousness,” and artistic psychological mechanisms and the 
accompanying outburst of expressionism became the symbolic portrayals of the world, 
which conveyed and referenced social and economic problems of the times. The apparent 
realization that the so-called reality is not so real at all and its constituent elements, but 
consensually agreed upon norms and habits reified with an aid of absorbent human 
consciousness and its predisposition for orderly attachments, labels, and categories, has 
resulted in the appropriation of socio-political narratives to the masses, in the midst of 
which discourse has become created and actualized, and subjects given dimension and 
contextualization. The image of the world as implicitly and mutually constituted by 
norms, shared understandings, and intersubjective truths presupposed a recognition based 
on the realization that the existence of the world and political as well as social facts was 
not independent of our minds, but organized into categories, which necessitated an 
interpretative/hermeneutic approach. Plastic and performance art thus created a forum for 
the publication of commentaries on the socio-political dimension of existence, and 
narrated in fragmentary pieces, the artificiality and fungibility of political constructs. Not 
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 only did the artist become the despondent interpreter of the symbolic function of politics, 
but chief among them, a public conscience of resistance, who situated his/her art within a 
silent space destined to reverberate the many conflicts and struggles of the citizen-
subjects of whom the work was a carbon-copy, and resolutely addressed to the guardians 
of the governmental order.   
 With the accelerated transformation of communal life into social life, in the 18th 
century, the publicity of human interiority has begun to constitute a novel paradigm of 
existence. The progressively increasing differentiation of units, heightened secrecy, and 
multitude of possibilities for population distribution and proliferation of information 
resulted in the creation of public loci for participatory rational-critical debate and 
variegated practices of consensual politics. Margaret Kohn distinguishes three potent 
addendums to the public sphere, whose progressive disappearance in the late 20th century 
the social scientists, chief among them Robert Putnam, bewail: labor unions, houses of 
the people, and civic associations. In her analysis, Kohn assigns to space corporeal, 
symbolic, intuitive, experiential, and cognitive dimensions, which facilitate the 
development of identities and political practices, including practices of resistance.  Such a 
conception of space opposes the traditional formulations advanced by Michel de Certeau, 
Ernesto Laclau, or Ludwig Feuerbach, who deem spatial denotations of place, locales, 
milieus, nations as static, resistant to transformation, and therefore, fixed and subject to 
control. In political theory, Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon serves as a paradigmatic image 
of the aforementioned fixity of spatial conditioning, which, like the paradigm of the 
nation-state, delimits the movement of its own potentiality that necessarily looks beyond 
its confines.  
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 Early in the 20th century, in his 1930 book, The Revolt of the Masses, Jose Ortega 
y Gasset, mindful of the accelerated agglomeration of masses and the sense of stifling, 
indocile, and invincible urban ‘plenitude’ stemming from the ever greater rationalization 
of industry,  reignited the debate on the spatial components of politics. He pointed to the 
pervasively held sentiment of nationality and the institutions surviving from the past as 
objects of a progressive conceptual elision. Their anachronistic function gradually 
dwarfed by the machinery of industrialization began to constitute an obstacle to 
expansion.120 Ortega y Gasset’s prescience in regards to the respatialization of socio-
political and economic domains provided an early critique of the global acceleration of 
mass movements and a blueprint for analytical theorizing of alternative configurations, 
i.e. the Union of European States. Similarly, Foucault, who took upon himself the 
analysis of themes and ‘haunting obsessions’ of the 19th century, referred to the 
problematic of spatial propinquity between human elements as the problem of 
‘emplacement’, which has, in the new era, supplanted the medieval space of localization, 
thus, putting under review the ‘sacral’ givens of the social order: the oppositions between 
private space and public space, between family space and social space, between cultural 
space and useful space, between the space of leisure and that of work.121 
Classical political theory, however, by confining space to geography (as seen in 
Aristotle, Montesquieu, Kant) and by downgrading it to discursive non-entity, inhibited 
transformative visions and action based in political possibilities, thus making it ill 
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 prepared to reform its field of knowledges in order to address a ‘new’ and emerging 
reality, which revealed itself in various ‘transgressions’ of globalization. How is it that in 
an order in which political organization and conflict are premised upon the nation-state, 
political theory, so far, has failed to inquire into attenuating measures, modes of 
citizenship that necessarily reach beyond the institutional and geographical confines?  It 
is necessary to emphasize that political theory’s fundamental areas of specialty, which 
claimed to have uncovered the ultimate reading of political reality, with the onset of 
globalized thinking, proved inept, however, in answering questions of: (i) the role and 
relevance of the post-Westphalian state; (ii) the reconciliations and decouplings of 
pluralism, multiculturalism, and political membership in the identity-conscious and 
rapidly changing world; (iii) the inevitability and omnipresence of international conflict, 
possibilities for democratic peace, and international justice; (iv) the structurally, 
economically, politically, or religiously motivated deterritorialization of political actors 
and terrorist organizations; (v) the geographic, multi-nodal redistribution and capacity of 
non-governmental organizations to set the standards for novel modes of 
institutionalization of authority and global governance. All of the above presume a spatial 
component that makes the immediacy of their compiled dilemmas all the more politically 
relevant in accommodating the changing rationality of government and its proactive 
mechanisms of governmentality.  
 Critics assert that the adopted paradigm of postmodernism is likely to be equally 
less forthcoming with responses to the new modes of global society and governance.  
Zygmunt Bauman argues, that:   
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 “This postmodern reality of the deregulated/privatized/consumerist world, the 
globalizing/localizing world, finds only a pale, one sided and grossly distorted 
reflection in the postmodernist narrative. The hybridization and defeat of 
essentialisms proclaimed by the postmodernist eulogy of the ‘globalizing’ world 
are far from conveying the complexity and sharp contradictions tearing that world 
apart.”122  
 
The argument defended in this thesis begs to differ. Although, postmodernism in political 
theory does not account for the many ‘unarticulated’ experiences and complexities to 
which Bauman scathingly refers, its method of genealogical uncovering, nonetheless, 
permits for a detailed and complex analysis of micro-contexts. The investigation of a 
preponderant political function of space in Foucault’s writings yields an insight into 
situated conditioning of groups and sub-groups of citizen-subjects placed in variegated 
and prefigured social milieus. Thus, the discourses created by the school, army barracks, 
prisons, clinics, concentration camps retrace a heterotopian reality, which references the 
grander and more global relations of power.   
Postmodern theorists identify the 20th century as a marking point for the 
disappearance of a distinctive private realm which caused, in turn, a transformation of the 
public sphere. The mass-based consumer culture, Kohn argues in Radical Space (2003), 
inserted itself into the home, breaking down the realm of “interiority” and privacy, while 
the mass-media eviscerated the line between the public and the private, subordinating 
both to the homogenous standards of consumer culture. The same may be said of the 
internet and the proliferating social network sites, where political agency interweaves 
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 with superficial curiosity and publicity on demand and becomes the norm for the 
consolidation of virtual citizenship.123  
As brought up earlier in the discussion, modern political theory, until quite 
recently, overlooked the power of the place or of the political space and the theoretical 
significance of “spatial politics”. Michel Foucault suggested two reasons for this long-
standing dismissal of space in political theory: 
(1) Space used to be either dismissed as belonging to nature, 
(2) Or, considered as the residential site or field of expansion of peoples, of a 
culture, a language, or a state.124  
In other words, space was and still largely continues to be conceived as either nature or a 
community. It was/is conceived as either incidental or as antithetical to change and 
innovation that are critical for political transformation.125 Why then, in this era of infinite 
spatial arrangements enabled by the globalizing world, should we be conscious and 
concerned with distinctly political space?  
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 It is important to underscore that spaces create our subjectivity as individuals and 
citizens; they delineate our place in the chain of social relations; they hierarchize, 
disadvantage by demoting and honor by promoting. They create subjects, citizens, power 
relations, and sites of resistance. They force “social consciousness”. Space also functions 
symbolically as a “repository of historical meanings” that reproduce social relations, and 
as “mnemonic devices for recovering memories”.126 The power of place and spatial 
arrangements comes from the fact that social relations, as inevitable and immutable, are 
the extension of the world we inhabit. What happens then, when the world enters, or even 
pushes uninvited onto our up to now private and exclusionary spaces? What 
responsibility are we to take for the images that weigh heavily on our citizen conscience, 
yet the persons depicted in them as suffering are not our immediate compatriots to whom 
we would otherwise have sacrosanct duties? Do we have, in the globalized order, special 
obligations to strangers and enemies, regardless of political border demarcations or of 
enemy lines, perhaps, even despite them? How do we redesign political spaces to 
incorporate the demands of non-citizens, and enact spaces of resistance and advocacy 
which provide a context for political speech, reflections and action?  
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I argue that the Foucauldian postmodern paradigm offers five modes of procedure 
in attending to these questions: (i) thinking of democratic freedom as a mean of self-
creation, which is fundamental to both the maintenance of communitarian soundness and 
the development of a cosmopolitan way of being, which regards none that is human, 
alien; (ii) calling for a critical investigation of the character and mentality of global 
governance,  of power and the role of personal and political resistance in shaping new 
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 horizons of political order (iii) of developing structural approaches to cosmopolitan 
democracy; which are enhanced by (iv) a decoupling of identity from citizenship, and are 
prompted by (v) an inquiry into and recalibration of the political space and sovereignty of 
states and political agents; and, finally, (vi) a consolidation of a polycentric and 
democratically egalitarian socio-institutional level, which privileges openness and 
avoidance of closure within a more deterritorialized global cultural order.  
The post-modern period is linked with the inevitable “eclipse of national 
sovereignty” and calls for a creation of institutions that “overlap national boundaries and 
serve transnational social and economic needs”.127 Conducting an analysis of a political 
subject matter under the guise of a presiding postmodernist theory implies a more 
circumspect study and interpretation of the co-existent and co-determinative systems of 
knowledge and power that result in the socio-political arrangements of our time. Only 
through such a lens of analysis and method of inquiry will the skeletal configurations of 
politics be revealed and its practices uncovered from the thicket of inter-dependent 
relations.  
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For Foucault, the modern individual is an historical achievement and an effect of 
the operations of power, whose identity is culturally constructed though a series of 
exclusions. Social spaces, tangible material local sites and institutions, such as the 
modern city, the clinic, the prison, the military barracks, the university as well as virtual 
domains, are formations that link together the diverse field of power relations, which 
outstrip in their unifying capacity, shared languages or mutual religious commitments. 
The global virtually enfranchised citizen, in addition to the contingencies of space,  is 
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 now also exposed to the contingency of speed, which increases as a consequence of new 
technologies that affect not merely communications and information, but also the 
processes of deliberation, decision-making, issues of surveillance and security, and 
ultimately the citizen’s own subjectivity. An acceleration of speed leads to a compression 
of space; and increased speed, which overcomes great distances leads to the 
disorganization of regular working capacities of systems, ultimately resulting in a 
prophetic reality predicted by Paul Virilio, in that “the more speed increases, the faster 
freedom decreases.”128 This observation calls, therefore, for vigilance against the seeming 
opportunities offered by unbounded promises of technological progress, requiring not 
only the protection of law in a progressively less state-centric world, but of global ethic 
and an art of living and governing that does not encumber upon human development.  
 
On the Art of Government 
Foucault contends that the realist paradigm promoted by Machiavelli and the 
Florentine political tradition in the 16th Century concerned with governmental enterprise 
which centered on the state, the reason of state, and territorial sovereignty has been 
extended to an ‘art’ of government in which economy becomes a standard for political 
practice. “To govern a state, will mean therefore, to apply economy, to set up economy at 
the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants ... a form of 
surveillance and control,”129 that is, engage in active and continuous administration of the 
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 socio-political nucleus, the population. The Western penchant for rationalization, 
classification, schematization, tabulation, and recording, which constitutes and is 
constituted by a particular systematicness of political culture, infused the individual under 
studied surveillance with imagery and vocabulary that essentialized, homogenized, and 
fossilized its unanimous content, and made it thus, unamenable to contestation, while the 
political practice associated with it, enabled a much more precise isolation of elements, 
i.e. the population and its sub-groups, opening them to analytical scrutiny and 
intervention. Thus in modern times, one paradigmatic model for spatial partitioning and 
orderly redistribution of human subjects was to place them under the alert, objectifying, 
and permanently registering gaze, which “gives power of mind over mind”130 and which 
by its disciplining techniques ‘automatizes’ and ‘disindividualizes’ in order to normalize. 
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One of the salient examples, which Foucault meticulously analyzes in his work, 
Discipline and Punish, is Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. The structure, based on the 
principle of perpetual surveillance was originally conceptualized as a prison with a 
central tower that rendered celled inmates, located at its peripheral edges, permanently 
subjected to the guard’s omnipresent ‘gaze.’ Bentham thus illustrated the power’s 
visibility without its unverifiability. The Panopticon, or the ‘house of certainty’ 
engendered a technique which encouraged self-regulation and moral reformation. The 
prisoner in the cell is seen, yet unable to ascertain the exact moment of the guard’s 
concentrated gaze. The inmate thus becomes the object of unidirectional information and 
classification, but never a subject of communication. This, in turn, induces a state of 
conscious and permanent visibility, because the surveillance, even if at times 
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discontinuous, is permanent, and internalized by the subject being observed. The inmate 
becomes the principle of his own subjection in assuming responsibility for the constraints 
of power. The structure possesses a functional basis, that of: (i) individualizing 
observation and analytical arrangement of space, and (ii) laboratorial experimentation on 
men in order to analyze behavioral responses to stimuli. Its role is disciplinary, one 
aiming at increased docility and utility of multitudes, effectively neutralizing agitations, 
coalition, and revolts, yet its premise is democratic rather than tyrannically repressive in 
that it is a spatial arrangement which permits for observation of any of the observers. The 
image of power deducted from the application of the panoptical arrangement in society is 
one not of restrictiveness, prohibition, unidirectionality, but of asymmetry, mobilization, 
dissimulation, invisibility, unverifiability, and omni-presence. Its principle of operation 
does not so much inhere in a person, as in an arrangement and distribution of bodies, 
lights, gazes, and in mutual relations in which individuals are caught up.131 Power is now 
a “strategy without a strategist”, which naturally does away with the ostentatious model 
of possessed, absolute, and undivided sovereignty, which deems all power as legally 
sanctioned and primarily repressive (rather than productive) in exercise. With Foucault, 
as Charles Pierce noted, the law of the habit qua docile subjectification, becomes 
ultimately the law of the mind. Further, Madan Sarup proposes an important reading of 
Foucault’s illustration of the apparatuses of power presented in Discipline and Punish, 
which he terms a ‘parable about human subjectivity’ in which Foucault shows how at 
some historical period the sovereign ruler’s self-ascribed value of individualization, and 
the juridical anonymity of the masses underwent a conceptual and practical  reversal and 
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 transformation.  Now, the bureaucratic body is seen as anonymous, while the subject is 
individualized132  and vested with the responsibility of internalizing the morality of the 
societal order.  
On the model of the aforementioned multi-nodal observation, some of the 
heaviest surveillance states, such as, China, Russia, Singapore, Great Britain, and the 
United States now employ a combination of visual surveillance, database registries, and 
tracking techniques to probe more deeply into the increasingly transnationalized human 
psyche. Thus, in present-day London alone, there are approximately 4.2 million CCTV 
cameras for face and movement recognition. Traffic databases process 35 million plates 
per day. National identity registers collect DNA and biometric information of all citizens 
and foreign nationals. In its instrumental application, technology is, as Heidegger argued, 
a way of revealing the truth(s),133 always present as “standing-reserve” and ordered to 
insure the possibility of surveillance.134 Thus, as Heidegger observed, the human subject 
in the technological age is, “in a particularly striking way, challenged forth into 
revealing.”135 Exposition becomes the location of politics,136 a site of struggle for 
information, which constitutes either a stratagem against power or a direct consequence 
of it.  
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 Since Hobbes, political theory has aimed to legitimize the use of political power 
and provide justification of the legal system as maintaining order, promoting safety and 
enshrining popular consent by providing positive guarantees and protocols protecting 
natural rights, persons, security and property. The implied consent has been exclusionary 
by design as slaves, women and children have historically failed to possess rights of 
access to the public realm which enabled the voicing of arguments and acting upon their 
premises. The spatial localization of the “passive” a-political agents within the privatized 
sphere of the household prolonged personal privation and ensured an erasure of 
autonomy, which became overwhelmed by the weight of state’s knowledge about each 
component of the citizen-subject’s life. As such, the individual’s relation to the spatial 
arrangements of social and political constructs has played, therefore, a fundamental role 
in the citizens’ conception of their own ontology, and of their own constitutional and 
instrumental role in the society at large. Therefore, the political significance of space, to 
which Foucault turns, as: (i) the conveyor of values and rank; (ii) a silent speaker; (iii) a 
marker of places and indicator of values; (iv) guarantor of the obedience of individuals 
promoting better economy of time and gesture; (v) connector of character to category, 
and (vi) a discourse, which naturalizes beings into the environment which they inhabit, 
while ‘mythologizing” and extending control over them, plays a crucial role in addressing 
the developmental gaps created by globalization, gaps resulting from situational politics 
that yield the ‘unprecedented opulence’ of some and a ‘remarkable deprivation’ of the 
many. Emplacement within diffuse socio-political and economic networks intoned by 
physically and temporarily mobile spatial arrangements of the globalizing world, rather 
than resulting in a ‘flattening out’ of difference and disruption of domination, 
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 consolidates space as that entity which unfailingly speaks of the human condition, fixes 
citizen subjection, frames sensations, manages responses and controls, and “mandates 
characteristic gestures crucial to the formation of individuals”137  inescapably beset by 
immanence and lack of self-generated agency.   
 
The Foucauldian Subject 
Foucault’s analytics of space are intimately related to his ‘history of the subject’. 
He was deeply interested in the history of thought and how space and ideas were 
indivisibly linked.138  His adopted modus operandi was that of a diagnostician committed 
to a study of the conditions and differentiations of human existence and relations between 
a broad array of social organizations and cultural conjectures, and an uncovering of 
regularities that constitute objects. With Foucault, “one begins with discourse, before 
moving to the object”139 in order not to see, as Deleuze would claim, “something 
imperceptible in the visible,”140but to interrogate the imperceptible in order to unearth 
and render exposed the visible. The diagnosis of the networks of relations set in spatial 
configurations is essential to illustrating the relationships and discourses that comprise 
the subject, testify to her subjugation, and open sites for counter-resistance. In his “Two 
Lectures on Power”, Foucault respatializes politics thus: 
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 “We should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, 
really, and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, 
energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. … This would be the opposite of 
Hobbes’s project in Leviathan, and of that, I believe, of all jurists for whom the 
problem is the distillation of a single will … from the particular wills of a 
multiplicity of individuals … Well, rather than worry about the problem of the 
central spirit, I believe that we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which 
are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power.”141  
 
The formation of subjects is defined by three sets of relations: (i) subjectification, 
under which human sciences and discrete locales of knowledge problematize the existent 
- ‘man’; (ii) subjugation, which implements processes of normalization to elide 
abnormality, delinquency, and ‘otherness’ of subjects; (iii) resistance, or the subject’s 
self-constitution as object, who regains radical freedom trough an ethics and aesthetics of 
the self, and thus situates herself beyond the domination of power, whose methods 
Foucault explicated by points (i) and (ii). But, how do we create, Boyer asks, in the 
empty space where we the spectators are positioned, new relational possibilities?142 
Perhaps, the opportunity for achieving new relational possibilities lies in forms of 
relationship to the self as the subject of ethical actions. “For what is morality,” Foucault 
asks, “if not the practice of liberty, the deliberate practice of liberty?”143, which invests 
the subject with the responsibility to “rethink political habits, introduce new ways of 
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 thinking and seeing, requiring originality and creativity in ways of speaking, in posing 
questions to politics and the forms of ‘political rationality’ on which it rests.”144  
Foucault, in questioning the genesis of human subjectivity, differs fundamentally 
from Kant or Husserl, the canonical reference points in Western philosophy, in the 
identification of the ‘sources’ of the self. Up to now, the classical 
transcendentalist/idealist tradition of thought considered the subject as a metaphysical 
fact and all reality as routinely subordinated, relativized and able to be cognized and 
apprehended by the subject. Further, the argument went, the objective, empirical worlds 
and the worlds of subjects could not be presumed to be explicable through one another, 
but referred, as Husserl stated, to some “pure” absolute and transcendental object, a 
rational source of consciousness. With Freud, one recognizes the drive of the passions as 
the source of the self, and its conditions of conflict and intermittent periods of 
homeostasis as the foundations of consciousness. The same may be said of Foucault, if it 
be recognized that the substantive source of subjectivity is lodged in power, rather than 
Freudian passions, along with its multiple drives and conflicts, which comprise the 
content of subject’s consciousness. With this, Foucault severs with the Cartesian 
conception of being premised upon ‘I think, therefore I am’, which refuses finality and 
stipulates that one is not a subject (in a condition of constituted stasis), but is being a 
subject (in a condition of permanent becoming, who refers for one’s ultimate existential 
justification to Divine Reason). Foucault notes: 
“The relations between experiences (like madness, illness, transgression of laws, 
sexuality, self-identity), forms of knowledge [savoirs] (like psychiatry, medicine, 
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 criminology, sexology, psychology), and power (such as the power which is 
exercised in psychiatric and penal institutions, and in all other situations which 
deal with individual control). Our civilization has developed the most complex 
system of knowledge, the most sophisticated structures of power: what have this 
kind of knowledge, this type of power made of us?”145  
 
The Foucauldian subject in reacting to the world turns a mirror, at the same time, 
as a constituted entity embedded in a network of relations, onto one’s own self. For 
Foucault, subject is not a substance but a form, a historical event, a phenomenon set in 
and constituted by history. It is above all, a bodily matter constrained by its ‘soul’. The 
question of identity for Foucault was reduced to the deployment of power on subjects 
from the very moment of conception to natural death. But, as Foucault’s anti-humanist 
stance would suggest, since sources of ideas are not deposited in autonomous subjects, 
how does he deduct subjectivity from objects, systems of power, repressions, 
productions, alterities that lack it? Perhaps this question asks too much of Foucault. 
Perhaps, in the true postmodernist vein of which Foucault remains unconvinced, the 
philosopher seeks not profundity but density, complexity, and convolution, not 
transcendental deduction of causal forces or an underlying philosophical reality, but mere 
identification of surface manifestations. Perhaps, finally, Foucault’s method serves 
heuristic purposes for unearthing the ‘basal natures’ of ontological quarrels comprised of 
political actors challenging the abstractions, idealizations, as well as tangible and 
inevitable permutations and raptures in the models for civil organization of society, 
offering not an officious systemic response, but shreds of an uncommon insight. In a 
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 characteristic way, Foucault’s method of study, suspends daring questions which call out 
for an exhaustive response, and which exemplify the conditions of modernity.   
 
The Problematic of Subjectivity, Freedom, and Resistance 
Foucault’s theory of subjectivity seems to preclude the role of agency in the 
projects of counter-resistance and emancipation from the relations of power, as subjects 
cannot be conceived to reasonably exist outside of what defines their subjectivity in the 
first place. To do so, would be to assert Cartesian subjectivity capable of flourishing 
outside of any relations of power and processes of subjectification.  Habermas, for one, 
enjoins Foucault’s subjectivity claim by pointing to the norms of standardization to which 
Foucauldian subjects are inadvertently confined, and though which their humanity is 
expressed, if not exhausted. Habermas argues: 
“From Foucault’s perspective, socialized individuals can only be perceived as 
exemplars, as standardized products, of some discourse formation – as individual 
copies that are mechanically punched out.”146   
 
This instrumental conception, then, erases individual autonomy and authenticity, and 
negates any attempts at subversion or counter-action on the part of the subjected; as 
subjects are always implicated in and defined by political discourse, which holds as its 
end, identification of the means of subjection. Thus, subjectivity and subjection, as 
Balbus argues, are “correlative terms,”147 co-present phenomena constituted by the 
intentional relations of power, operating, as if instructed, to ensure one another’s 
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 manifestation. Such an interpretation may, indeed, lead to what Lentricchia labels as a 
“monolithic determinism,”148 rendering resistance highly improbable. Foucault, however, 
anticipated the problem of determinism, which is why he asserted in “The Subject and 
Power”149: (i) the subject’s essential freedom; (ii) the ‘possibility of recalcitrance’, or a 
choice of the multiplicity of behavioral practices that are to act as subject’s escape 
mechanism(s) over which power is exercised, precisely because of, and insofar as, the 
subject is and remains free. Power is, itself, conceived as that decentered, mobile and 
reversible capacity capable of value-neutral150 social change. Kevin Jon Heller makes an 
important distinction between: (a) power relations involving individuals, and (b) power 
relations involving groups. The former, Heller contends, admit of physical determination, 
by which the subject may be reduced to irreversible conditions, i.e. torture or execution. 
The latter are, in principle, reversible, therefore, never completely neutralized, subjugated 
or powerless. The hegemony of one group over another is neither total nor absolute, but 
set in contingency defined by material and discursive sites of struggle.  With every 
relation of power, therefore, there is a coterminous relation of resistance, by which 
“one can construct new rational behaviors, different from the initial program but 
which thus respond to their objective, and in which play between different groups 
can take place … This play can perfectly solidify an institution … because several 
strategies of several groups have come to intersect at this particular place.”151  
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 As Heller notes, “the power exercised by subject-position X will always be opposed by 
the power exercised by subject position Y (Y1, Y2 … Yn).”152 This speaks to subjectivity 
being never exclusively a material construct of dominant power relations; rather, at each 
juncture where hegemonic power asserts itself, a counter-power is likewise elicited. Thus, 
resistance is not a futile enterprise, as Heller points out, because even the lesser forms of 
power nevertheless contradict the operations of its better consolidated  rivals, and 
therefore never position themselves in ‘power-less’ immanence. Resistance, itself, is: (a) 
a form of power; (b) a condition of freedom; and it necessarily exists: 
“1) because all social formations produce both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
subject-positions; 2) because no individual or group, no matter how hegemonic, 
can control all of a social formation’s mechanisms of power; and 3) because all 
mechanisms of power are potentially capable of counter-hegemonic 
reappropriation.”153 
 
If socio-political reality, on this account, is one of perpetual contestation between the 
mechanisms of power, from whence is the subject’s freedom, when placed within the 
power-resistance matrix, derived? According to Foucault, there are two forms of power 
relation; those involving: (i) liberation; and (ii) domination. Because individuals are 
always in the dual position of concurrently undergoing and exercising power, there exists 
a potential for reversibility of the status quo. Individual claims, on both sides of the 
power-resistance spectrum, are able to co-appear and co-exist. Lack of this potential 
would materializes itself in the fixed forms of domination, by which the abuse of power 
would show itself in the imposition “on others one’s whims, one’s appetites, one’s 
89 
                                                 
152 Heller, Kevin, J. 1996. “Subjectification and Resistance in Foucault” Substance. 25(1). Pg. 99.  
153 Ibid., Pg. 102.  
 
 desires.”154 Directly connected with the imposition of limits on one’s desires is the 
education in the practices of the self. Foucault deducts from the individual’s dedication to 
‘the relationship of the self to the self, ‘knowledge of the self’, or ‘the self striving 
towards itself’155 in order to find foundations for actions, an other-directed ethic of care, 
which aims to reduce an impulse for domination and produce the good for oneself and 
others. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF DISCOURSE IN TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS: FOUCAULT’S 
PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL PRACTICE. 
 
“But if we are not to settle for the affirmation of the empty 
dream of freedom, it seems to me that this historic-critical 
attitude must also be an experimental one. I mean that this work 
done at the limits of ourselves must, on the one hand, open up a 
realm of historical inquiry and, on the other, put itself to the test 
of reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and 
desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should 
take.” 
       -Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” 
 
 
In any given discourse, the operation of the power and knowledge dynamic is at 
its most salient. Discourse, according to Foucault, “transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible 
to thwart it.”156 Its task is to measure the productive effects of power and knowledge 
utilized in various power confrontations. Power, however, can only be understood in 
relation to a given discursive context in which it inheres. And, as Foucault’s thesis posits, 
contexts can only be conceived in terms of power which is constitutive of and immanent 
in them.157Discourse, therefore, makes possible an analysis of “multiple and mobile field 
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 of force relations;”158of the reciprocal effects of power invested in public political 
enterprise, and a representation and reconstruction of the states of domination and 
consequences of being dominated.  
This mutually affective and reinforcing dynamic of power vis-à-vis contexts 
allows for identification of “normal”, homeostatic societal patterns. The achievement of 
stability, equilibrium or homeostasis in social life presumes dominance of certain 
discourses, which in turn check for and minimize social anomalies. Dominant norms, 
beliefs and values, in any given well functioning order, must be subjectively internalized 
for that order to remain in equilibrium. Individual subjects become socialized in 
dominant norms though the social system and its institutional framework that operates 
and administers them in accordance with law or contract.  To facilitate political and 
economic interaction, ensure conceptual stability and preserve internal coherence in 
group consciousness, it is, therefore, essential for collectively held beliefs to persist over 
long periods of time. Furthermore, historic political, social and economic crises can 
induce change in the dominant discourse, and thereby reorient the societal self-
understanding. In view of the above, change in the functional social framework amends 
the context and power relations operating in it, and thereby redefines the constitution of 
the internal dynamics of the state actor, its ideational preponderance and behavior reified 
by its habitual recourse to indivisible political and legal sovereignty.  
 I wish to demonstrate how the reversibility in discourses, therefore the functional 
operation of rhizomatically distributed nodes of power, affects the state policy vis-à-vis 
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 its citizen subjects, and how the role of the supra-national bodies begins to play an 
increasingly mediating role in international politics and policy. The proposed overview 
will be instrumental in identifying global trends in socio-political and legalistic thinking. 
It will help to characterize historic, political, economic and societal crises and their 
influence or ability to induce change in the dominant discourses, which ensure conceptual 
stability and preserve internal coherence in group consciousness, as well as affect the 
direction and spur alternative reorientations of pragmatic policymaking. Thus, three case 
studies of (i) the state-gender discourses and equal employment opportunity law in Japan, 
(ii) the protection of civil liberties vis-a-vis sporadic acts of organized terrorism, and (iii) 
war crimes and refugeeism, will instantiate the way in which global institutional 
formations and non-governmental organizations, at the urging of vociferous citizen 
action, have effectively moved beyond the paradigm of strictly state-to-state relations, 
broadened political space for deliberation, and incorporated citizen interests into their 
political enterprise.  
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 Case Study I: National/ State-Gender Discourses and the Administration of Society 
 
Over the course of two decades, Japanese society has been entrenched in a gender 
discourse brought about by the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 
April of 1986. The contributors to the debate can be divided along the traditionalist-
protectionist and reformist-feminist lines of argument. The former have argued that Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) represents an unjustified interference of 
governmental power at the expense of well organized corporate structure along with an 
established bureaucratic tradition and expressed socio-cultural norms. The latter, despite 
overt deficiencies in the deployment and enforcement mechanisms of the law, have 
recognized the important power function of the EEOL as both a promissory note and a 
measure of progress on the issues of access and equality of women, who have historically 
been denied their political and economic share in the Japanese social structure.159  It is 
not to say that feminist activists uniformly and uncritically hailed the promulgation and 
application of the law, which promised, among other things, equality in job recruitment, 
training and promotion of women workers. To the contrary, a good majority of feminists 
considered the law unacceptable, due to the lack of binding legal obligations on 
employers, and insubstantial conferral of rights on women.160 Furthermore, the law’s 
formulaic language, it has been noted, provided for a weak negotiation-based approach to 
EEOL implementation, favoring thus voluntarism and persuasion over compelled 
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 compliance with its letter.  Five years before the implementation of the law, a significant 
percentage of management level personnel, in a 1981 survey, had indicated that 
discriminatory practices, which account for [disproportionate] discrepancies between 
men’s and women’s work and income, stem from inherent differences between sexes.161 
Sex-stereotyping remains an issue today. Companies, in response to EEOL, have 
increasingly begun to implement a two-track system of employment: the managerial, 
sogoshoku, and the clerical, ippanshoku, or the “mommy track.” Feminist groups have 
attempted to resist this overt circumvention of the law through increased litigation 
practices in a society culturally adverse to litigious strategies. Recent statistical data show 
that in 2003 women’s share in administrative and managerial jobs was only 9 per cent, 
and women’s wages were 50-60 per cent that of men’s162  
The contributions of theorists such as Chizuko Ueno, Aoki Yayoi or Kanejiro 
Seiko have resulted in a substantial output of literature challenging the culturally 
preserved gender roles, in particular, the household division of labor and culturally 
embedded perceptions of political-social-economic utility of Japanese women qua 
mothers. An important consequence of the debate has been a gradually increasing 
confrontation between feminist groups and power-patriarchy via mediating media of 
political action encoded in the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (1986), the Basic 
Law for a Gender Equal Society (1999), and the Law for the Prevention of Spousal 
Violence and the Protection of Victims (2001).  Notwithstanding some critics’ views of 
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 the employment law as being largely spineless, it is possible to advance a counterclaim 
by regarding it as a centralizing mechanism of positive power in that, the law serves as 
both an enabling mechanism for resistance to state power through a variety of dispersed 
discursive power sites, women, and a constructive reform of social power relations 
encapsulated in the traditional normative imperatives of patriarchy, interestingly only 
recently more actively contested by Japanese feminist scholarship. Nevertheless, a long 
tradition of feminist activism in Japanese society had secured a tangible social contract 
between the state and women by way of which a particular will of the few has become 
the professed general will of those subject to the shared ascriptions and prescriptions of 
the law. Furthermore, the notion of the generalizability of the [collective] will, can be 
seen as a “way of formulating the constitutive norm of decision-making for communities 
with shared goods.”163 The shared good in this context refers to the law itself as both an 
ingredient in the problematizing and reconceptualizing processes of norms implicit in the 
culturally ingrained social behaviors in respect to agents of concern, here women, and an 
element mandating the reconstitution of public spaces in which normalizing functions are 
to eventually take place, such as the household and corporate bureaucracy.  
The women’s shared significance of acting to secure shared ends (aims and 
objectives) in an act-restrictive juridical and socio-political construct of Japanese order 
must be conceived in no lesser terms than those of power both as resistance to and an 
exercise of. Thus this power dynamic is nothing but, as Foucault would have it, a 
reflection of “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
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 operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through 
ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them” 
(Foucault: 1990, 92). Moreover, relations of power are not external to the social, political, 
and economic processes, but rather are immanent in them, constituted by them, and are 
the “immediate effects of [their] divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums.”164 One 
might wish to ask, how the norms constitutive of social practices, set and enduring in 
institutional structures, having become upset by powers immanent in them and 
externalities imposed upon them, change discourses that inform, and eventually 
reconstitute these societal practices and their coextensive institutions? The answer to this 
question will emerge, I think, after a broader discussion of the meaning and the role of 
discourses is advanced.   
The contested civil right to equal employment for women long victimized by non-
representation and discrimination shifts societal paradigms by problematizing power 
relations inherent to them. Opportunity to equal employment, due to being problematized, 
subjects institutions and corporate employers to a new range of regulations, to the 
production of new measures, new data and new documentation accounting for levels and 
substance of gender discrimination.165 For women, this unprecedented gain and 
expression of power is important for two reasons. First, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law becoming public had offered means of enforcing, however incidentally, 
97 
                                                 
164 Foucault, Michel. 1990. The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction. (New York: Vintage 
Books). Pg. 92. 
165 Yount, Mark. 1993. “The Normalizing Powers of Affirmative Action.” in. John Caputo et al.(ed.) 
Foucault and the Critique of Institutions. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press). Pg. 
195.  
 
 procedural rights to nondiscrimination as discriminatory hiring practices had been 
deemed illegal. Second, the discourse of equal employment opportunity had turned 
society’s attention to the substance of the problem. The shift from de jure recognition of 
women’s right to equal employment opportunities to the possibility of de facto equality in 
employment and opportunity has acquired a status of a moral imperative crucial to the 
pursuit of justice.166  
What then, does it imply for Japan and gender-power relations in the domain of 
employment? Three things can be implied: 1) Japan’s societal self-understanding has 
changed as a result of “reciprocal conditioning between global and micro-contexts”167 
inducing changes in societal discourses. An example illustrating this effect can be found 
in Article 24 of the Constitution, enacted in 1947 at the urging of the Allied Powers, 
which states that “laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the 
essential equality of the sexes.”168 As such, it defeated the up to now professed norm of 
“essential gender roles”, and imbued Japanese consciousness with alternative modes of 
conceiving of social relations that define its national character. With the adoption of the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, in 1979, Japan has been mobilized to draft legislation on equal opportunity and 
treatment of women in employment, which manifested itself in the Equal Employment 
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 Opportunity Law of 1986, once again reorienting Japan’s self-understanding. The same 
U.N. panel in a report issued in 2003 further stressed “the importance of sensitizing and 
training public officials and members of the judiciary to eliminate gender-based 
stereotypes, and end gender-based occupational segregation.”169 2) Changes in discursive 
contexts have disrupted and altered traditional power relations. Recent discussions on 
revising the Constitution and amending Article 24 sparked protests among women, who 
have come to view the lawmakers’ proposals as a bid to return to pre-war social model, 
confining women to home and primary care of the family. The women’s unprecedented 
positive-power agency at self-determination and self-representation of the female body-
politic, in voicing concerns about government’s move aimed at undermining guarantees 
of sexual equality, implicitly challenged the socially institutionalized gender-based 
stereotypical expectations, and ways that Japanese historic socio-cultural practices have 
come to organize women’s lives. 3) As conceptual stability has been undermined, 
horizontal and diffuse, rather than hierarchical and linear power relations have begun to 
emerge, challenging and modifying the normative framework.  Here, power is a positive 
social presence, as it is no longer held firmly in the hands of patriarchy, but exerts itself 
in all aspects of life and in all directions.170 Contests to power open the possibility for the 
state’s ontological transformation, and by extension, consolidate new derivatives and 
strategies of power that define the very limits of and prospects for substantive socio-
political change.  
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 I demonstrate how the global conceptual contestability of power impacts and 
informs Japanese cultural and societal norms in respect to women and labor issues 
entailed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Law.  I argue that norms constitutive of 
societal practices, upset by economic externalities and imperatives of globalization as 
well as domestic revisionist rhetoric aimed at problematization of state-gender relations, 
change the terms of understanding of cultural typologies and social system’s 
normalization procedures in respect to women and women’s rights, including labor 
rights. I distinguish between three paradoxes, which further problematize the questions of 
power-gender relations in Japan, and reconstitute their dynamic: 1) The processes of a 
global socio-political and economic enmeshment and attempts at preservation of cultural 
distinctiveness; 2) The enactment of labor laws favoring equalization of sexes and 
maintenance of gendered employment practices; 3) The rise of unconventional feminist 
discourses and ossification of institutionalized interpretations of basic beliefs and mores 
of Japanese social reality.  The above stated problematic is not exclusive to Japanese 
society. Nonetheless, as a representative democracy and the second largest economy in 
the world, it is incumbent upon Japan to take an ethical, rather than historically and 
culturally grounded utilitarian171 perspective on woman issues in reconciling questions of 
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 traditionalism and social protectionism with the requirements of liberty and substantive 
equality (equality of opportunity and results), in view of the contemporary discourses on 
equal opportunity to employment. This chapter argues that an intra-societal contestation 
of power-gender relations in Japanese society, which results from open engagement in 
public discourse with an intention to reinterpret culturally preserved presuppositions 
about socially constructed gender roles, will induce a range of emancipating individual 
and collective decisions and choices necessary for the country’s balanced and efficient 
functioning in the global political-economic order. Such a contestation will be enabled 
and informed by an increasingly transsocietal diffusion of power, that is, a dispersal of 
positive power nodes among women, feminist groups and activist, as well as agencies 
and international commissions at a supranational level vested with the responsibility to 
check the behavior of states. This chapter further argues that power-gender issues ought 
not to be regarded as marginal to a well functioning national and international socio-
economic structure, but ought to be perceived as the very foundation and an increasingly 
compelling determinant of this structure’s relevance and functionality, progressively 
more enmeshed and inescapably operating within the context of accelerating globality.   
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What impact do processes of globalization have on Japanese socio-cultural norms 
and gender discourses? Aoki Yayoi argues that “recognition of the existing systems of 
global exploitation and discrimination,” entailed in the processes of globalization, “goes 
hand in hand with a growing awareness of the reality of sexual discrimination at the level 
of individual experience.”172 The historical and chiefly economic dependence of Japanese 
women can be summarized by four distinct socio-political conditions. First, under the 
 
172 Buckley, Sandra. 1997. Broken Silence. (Berkeley: University of California Press). Pg. 10.  
 
 feudal system that reinforced the gender hierarchy of servitude, the weak and gentle 
female subject was to regard her husband as the “lord and obey all his orders and not 
disobey him in the least.”173Second, under cultural reification of traditional Confucian 
teachings, the woman’s role and virtue, according to the interpretation of Nishimura 
Shigeki, “lay in cultivating harmonious relationships among members built on trust, a 
fundamental sense of humanness, and above all, a commitment to loyal action on behalf 
of others.”174 Third, under the construction of the family system that was carried on by 
male descendants, women had no part in inheritance.175Finally, the prevailing ultra-
nationalist ideologies relegated woman’s responsibilities for education of children, care 
of the household and husband.176 The above further normalized the dominant Japanese 
gender and cultural narrative by privatizing female ontology. The state’s exercise of the 
juridical power over women subjects reinforced the discursive notions of servitude, 
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 motherhood and separate spheres of existence and private-public engagement. This 
deeply ingrained and indelible modus vivendi characterizing Japanese social order has 
featured prominently in the debates on Equal Employment Opportunity Law. Employers 
opposed to legislating equality of employment stated that women were both physically 
and emotionally different from men and therefore subject to different treatment in 
workplace.177 It can be argued that the consolidation of power through reinforcement of 
culturally mandated gender differences, which impact and are determinative of the 
quality of inter-personal interactions, constitutes a global hazard for it undermines the 
creative potential of otherwise economically and politically productive individuals. Thus 
feminist approaches to deconstruction of privileged, masculine, logocentric acts of 
ordering, evaluating, categorizing, which necessarily involve deployment of power and 
discourse, correctly “extend beyond the limits of the state.”178 As the consolidation of this 
newly acquired power induces an alternative definition of social reality, discourse 
formation, and ultimately, an altered societal self-understanding. The state as the 
superstructural unit, as Foucault sees it, “is far from being able to occupy the whole field 
of power relations”179 and must rely for its effective survival on pre-existing, active 
power-networks that are constitutive of it. According to Foucault, the investment of 
power in the social body produces mastery and self-awareness. But once power, Foucault 
contends,  
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 “produces this effect, there inevitably emerge the responding claims and 
affirmations, those of one’s own body against power, of health against the 
economic system, of pleasure against the moral norms of sexuality, marriage, 
decency. Suddenly, what had made power strong becomes used to attack it. 
Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to counterattack in 
the same body.”180  
 
The encounter of the resisting societal body with global macro-discourses has 
shown itself to mobilize the Japanese “political, economic, institutional regime of the 
production of truth”181and undergo cultural recalibration and systemic structural change, 
along with redefinition of socio-political power dynamics. The global United Nations 
initiatives on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women have 
already borne tangible national fruits in the form of legislating for cessation of gender 
discrimination in employment. Thus the enmeshment of the macro-micro contexts 
influences and invites a reexamination of cultural particularities and perspectives which 
constitute them.   
“The nation-as-family”, “subject of the emperor”, “loyalty”, “filial piety”, 
“maternal desire” and “voluntary self-sacrifice” are telling of the Japanese conception of 
social ethic. Centuries long habituation of citizens in Japanese practices and mores have 
imbued interpersonal interactions with values aimed at the maintenance of harmony, trust 
and mutual concern.  It is inevitable, therefore, for the discourses entering the sphere of 
the ‘traditional’ to meet with resistance. Feminist theories presuppose the existence of the 
socially encoded norms of conduct and practice; however, they do not ascend to them 
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 indisputably. At every point relations of power, inherent in any system, have, in the case 
of Japan, been problematized and their truth values questioned, invalidating, by 
extension, the sanctity of the traditional presumption. The contests have revealed 
tensions, as one side “seeks to open up discourses that are too closed and self-righteous” 
and the other “to protect established truths it considers threatened.”182  
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law by problematizing gender has revealed 
the systemically enforced socio-cultural gaps between labor and role, men and women, 
employer and employee, state and the global order. It has further enabled the Foucauldian 
exercise of power, through challenges to and eventual usurpation of possessed power by 
the state and patriarchal hierarchy, in constructing new power-dynamics, definitions and 
structures within a historic framework of global gender contexts and discourses. The 
implications of this precedent are two-fold: first, the de-routinization of cultural practices 
has reinterpreted and resituated their symbolic meanings in relation to newly legitimized 
forms of social interaction. Second, systems of cultural signification and meaning have 
become modified through practice183 and normalization procedures, which both 
incorporate and reconstitute power, and coextensively alter the national self-
understanding, formal allocation of procedural rights and bestowal of social status and 
civil equality.     
A Foucauldian analysis of a universally recognized and reciprocally affecting 
power-gender dynamic, by subverting mere symbolism of culturally-distinct legal 
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 reforms and regenerating interest in effective challenging of social standards and norms, 
provides a theoretical schema for highlighting the political significance of gender and a 
framework for the achievement of substantive change. As a conceptual tool, it has 
permitted a variegated approach to questions of power-gender relations by deconstructing 
the presiding rationales of domination and subjugation. Perhaps, as some claim, the legal 
reforms incorporated and vested in the Equal Employment Opportunity Law are but tips 
of an iceberg. Nevertheless, effective modifications to labor practices have already taken 
place, and Japan’s national consciousness on gender issues has been raised and sustained 
by an omnipresent global referent. It is well documented in history that perceptually 
illusive tips of an iceberg can, indeed, sink the ship of patriarchal grandeur.   
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 Case Study II: Civil Liberties and the State of Exception 
 
Are basic rights subject to mediation? Are civil liberties, freedoms from 
unwarranted and  arbitrary interference of power, amenable to change? To what extent 
should active and positive liberties be sacrificed to governmental efficiency, and how 
much of that efficiency ought to be subject to the mechanisms of legality? What 
supplementary content is to be given to the ideas of freedom and liberty by the 
contemporary discourse on, and active engagement in the "war on terrorism" led within 
the globalized context? And to what extent can the traditional expressions of civil 
liberties be protected or safeguarded against passive compromise in the United States, 
Asia or Europe?  
The contemporary period is one of intense scholarly, legal and socio-political 
debate about the conceptual framework which ought to define a free society's mediation 
between the above stated questions. It is possible to distinguish a dichotomous, inverse 
relationship between the concepts in operation in both the domestic and international 
discourses of the post-September 11 world, those of civil liberties and security, due 
process of law and the state of war, tradition of democratic values and the state of 
exceptional emergency. Findings by Davis and Silver underscore this relationship, by 
pointing to psychological or sociotropic determinants that affect  policy stances; as such 
"the greater the people's sense of threat, the lower their support of civil liberties", and the 
lower the people's trust in government the greater their resistance to security versus 
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 personal liberty policy trade-offs.184 The prima facie malleability of civil liberties is 
greater in times of danger. It may be surmised, therefore, that the greater the ability of 
governmental agencies to decode, in the general public, a sense of psychological 
insecurity, exacerbated by on-demand access to variegated sources of informational 
media, the more intensely the state may advocate, and more readily and extensively 
deploy delimiting measures on rights and liberties; as the people's psychological 
insecurity is expected to influence their willingness to trade civil liberties for personal 
security.185 In other words, extreme circumstances may call for extreme measures; the 
implementation of which may be subject to contention and unwelcome encroachment on 
traditional legal protections of the human person and citizen, but the perceived need for 
which is so great, as to disavow any public opposition.  Hence, "national security 
considerations linked to foreign affairs, have in U.S. history "resulted in severe setbacks 
for civil liberties,"186as the Alien and Sedition Act of Congress legitimizing the arrests, 
convictions and imprisonment of journalists criticizing the government,187 President 
Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the Civil War, post-World War I 
"Palmer raids" on suspected immigrant radicals, and World War II Japanese internment 
or the McCarthy era cases demonstrate, and the recently introduced Patriot Act and 
Protect America Act measures continue to reassert. In exercising its governmental norm 
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 over security, territory, and population, the state effectively applied its juridical power to 
that idea which it has valorized the most, and the promotion of which constituted its 
ultimate raison d’état – the guarantee of unmitigated civil liberty.  
Compared to the United States, Japan, a site of "more than 200 bombings between 
1969 and 1989," has adopted a less "alarmist" and more incremental and "methodical" 
policy, "focused on the root causes of terrorism more than on the immediate actions that 
were required in a crisis."188 Likewise, the skeptical attitudes of the Scandinavian 
countries, Italy or Greece towards the European Union-wide policies, aimed at 
circumscription of civil liberties via European arrest warrants, border control, 
transnational police and judicial cooperation and immigration monitoring practices, may 
illustrate a distinctive "social definition of reality"189which reflects the society's 
historically embedded cognitive, normative, and instrumental beliefs and agreed upon 
institutional configuration. Such "social definition of reality" may be seen in the 
ascriptions attached to the events of 11 September 2001 that became, according to 
Rasmussen, "‘9-11’ by means of globalization." Global media infrastructures and the 
"extension of social spaces"190 for communication, have contextualized people's 
collective rationalization of the scale and timing of the event, which embedded itself 
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 inexorably in the ontology and collective memory of the international society.191 Peter 
Katzenstein drew an important distinction in the perceptual frameworks of the terrorist 
acts of 11 September between states: a) the act of "war" (United States); b) the "crime of 
global terrorism" (Europe/Germany); c) a "crisis" event (Japan).192 The perceptual and 
cognitive variation, which can be accounted for in terms of "past institutionalized 
practices and different conceptions of self and other,"193 Katzenstein argued, has framed 
and typified the state actor’s external response.     
Since grave injustices have often been motivated, as the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988 states, by "racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and failure of political leadership", 
how then, will the intensification and proliferation of the notion of collective "ontological 
insecurity,"194 and the accretion of formal and informal methods for the conduct of "war" 
by the state actor or actors, the very definition of which shifted from a state-centric 
confrontation to a diffused notion of (ideological, economic, cultural or civilizational) 
protracted conflicts, alter the tone and management of democratic participation and 
global discourse? Henceforth, the following pages will attempt to provide an overview of 
the dynamic discursive inter-exchanges between the two contested concepts, those of 
civil liberties and war on terrorism.  
110 
                                                 
191 Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2002. "'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and 
Globalization." Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies  Association  
37 (3). Pg. 334/342.  
192 Katzenstein, Peter J. 2003. "Same War: Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counterterrorism." 
International Organization 57 (4). Pg. 732.  
193  Ibid., Pg. 733.  
194 Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. 2002. "'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and 
Globalization." Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies  Association 37 
(3). Pg. 331.  
 
 Since discursive ‘hegemony,’ that is, a dominance of a discourse in any given 
society, facilitates adoption of institutions congruent with it, any hasty revision of basic 
beliefs and norms results in conceptual ambiguity and attempts at renegotiation and 
reconciliation of conflicts, such as, between the newly introduced laws and the traditional 
societal practices and beliefs, in particular and by way of illustration, between the U.S. 
Patriot Act and concerns for civil liberties. As such, the basic guarantees of essential civil 
liberties may become subject to greater scrutiny when conditions that have ensured an 
unobstructed protection of such liberties have altered as a result of external pressures and 
unforeseen challenges, i.e. intensification of terrorism or outside threats to national 
security. The minimization of liberties may very well be an accidental byproduct of 
governmental policy aiming at ensuring greater national security, or inversely, constitute 
a mean through which such security may be attained. In the words of J.R. Lucas: "just as 
we need men to interpret laws, so we need the laws to identify the men."195 An ad verbum 
interpretation of the aforementioned statement solicits the law to stand as the arbiter of 
power, however, the law in the hands of the power is capable of legitimizing, in times of 
extreme socio-political crisis, selective acts against the public good and human dignity, or 
be that power which determines what shall henceforth constitute the good and dignity. 
Agamben contends that a selective suspension of legal norms and abrogation of civil 
liberties are a result of a calculated rationalization on the part of the state, which issues in 
a juridical paradigm set upon a skeleton of a permanent state of exception.  
"[T]he extension of the military authority's wartime powers into the civil sphere, 
and a suspension of the constitution (or of those constitutional norms that protect 
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 individual liberties), in time the two models end up merging into a single juridical 
phenomenon that we call  the state of exception.”196 
 
Much of the up to now published research has concentrated on the causal and 
reactive accounts of terrorism. It has been acknowledged that "increased complexity on 
all levels of society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities."197 And that 
acts of terrorism, committed to "force the state to show its true repressive face"198 often 
alter the government's, policy's, urban economy's and city administration's operational 
structure, followed by a restitution of autonomous governance and shift towards inter-
governmental oversight and cooperation, adoption of new legal mechanisms, added 
responsibility and increased secrecy in their exercise. A society which exploits 
"momentary panic to impose long-lasting limitations on liberty"199 must itself do so in 
measures so as not to destroy the democratic balance of power and cancel citizens' 
recourse to law. Whereas some contend that liberal democracies are able, by their very 
construction, to withstand such moral hazards as negotiation between the revocability of 
liberties and commitment to individual dignity in times of crisis,200others argue that 
persistent inadequacies in respecting the Bill of Rights when foreign affairs are at stake 
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 are not merely a question of the limits of resistance and survival of a democratic tradition, 
but serious shortcomings in its pragmatic exercise and a sign of rhetorical hypocrisy.201  
Since history itself is neither an exclusively sufficient nor an exhaustive justification 
for the perceptual and pragmatic response to the changing geo-political climate, nor can it 
serve as an ultimate and reliable via media between theory and abstraction, an evocation 
of a terminal ‘state of exception’ puts a moratorium on the democratic regimes’ will to 
reconcile competing claims on individual liberties vis-à-vis sporadic acts of violence. In 
view of the global character of the “war on terrorism” vis-à-vis civil liberties impacts, it 
is possible to distinguish five general trends: 
1) Globalization makes the realization of universal security risks more salient and 
blurs the lines of distinction between traditional state-system categories.  
2) Common security risks issue in comparable, parallel legal responses independent 
of state nomenclature and socio-political traditions of governance. 
3) Direct civilian security risks and the general unpredictability of the scale and 
timing of terrorist attacks, tend to suspend public’s notions of and claims to 
inalienable rights to full and unobstructed liberty for the duration of the “global 
war on terrorism” rhetoric and sporadic recurrence of disclosed terrorist planning 
through highly publicized arrests or chronically resurging overt visibility of police 
activity.  
4)  Unmitigated state power in the area of security and monopoly on information 
gathering, control, and diffusion create relations of co-dependence, and 
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 5) Any differences in approaches and responses to terrorism by state authorities 
ensue from different threat perceptions and historical experiences, as well as the 
intensity and the scale of perpetrated acts of terror. 
The global “war on terrorism” has come to denote a policy stance by way of which 
this highly contested concept has come to symbolize both a rejection of, assault upon, and 
a defense against any activities referred to as “terrorism”. In view of innumerable 
proposals and the absence of an explicit United Nations definition of “terrorism,” partly 
due, as Bruce Hoffman in his book Inside Terrorism argues, to the “insidious” presence 
and ubiquity of the term in modern discourse and its historically changing 
meaning,202scholars have come to espouse variegated formulations, such as “the use of 
violence against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or to create generalized 
pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals,”203 or, 
“An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine 
individual groups or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, 
whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are not the main 
targets.”204  
Martha Crenshaw holds “terrorism” to represent a “systematic inducement of fear and 
anxiety to control and direct a civilian population,”205  in addition to recognizing 
114 
                                                 
202 Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press). Pg. 13-15.  
203 Alexander, Yonah. 1976. International Terrorism: National, Regional and Global Perspectives. ( New 
York: Praeger). Pg. 14.  
204 Schmid, Alex, et al. 1988. Political Terrorism. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books). Pg. 28.  
205 Crenshaw, Martha. 1981. "The Causes of Terrorism." Comparative Politics 13 (4). Pg. 380. 
 
 terrorism as the result of an “elite disaffection”, or alternatively, as a “strategy of a 
minority … that lacks other means” with a “reformist”, “anarchist” or “reactionary” slant 
aimed at an ever more “destructive and spectacular violence.”206 Title 22 of the United 
States Code, Section 2656f(d) harbors the following operational definition of terrorism, 
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets 
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” 
Moreover, the term “international terrorism” means “terrorism involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country.”207 The United Nations General Assembly in the 
Resolution 60/1 reaffirmed that “acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms 
and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and 
destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments,” and that the “international 
community should take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat 
terrorism."208  Entailed in the above stated definitions is the notion of moral wrong and 
unjustifiability of terrorism as a political act of violence directed against persons with an 
intention of inflicting injury or harm. Framing of the concept in these terms, Virginia 
Held argues, precludes the possibility to question whether given acts of terrorism might 
be justified,209 especially in view of invasive structural violence of dominant neoliberal 
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 acts and discourses, and their respective impact on exogenous  agents, who are neither the 
principal nor equal parties to the ‘Western’ monologue.  It is important to observe that 
denunciations of “terrorism” are usually applied to the opponent and rarely to the tactics 
and acts of one’s own government, or governments falling under a given acceptable 
rubric of conduct and tolerable rules of governance, by no means devoid of moral and 
legal culpability for perpetrations of “unofficial violence” or unintended collateral 
consequences. 
Critical theory introduces an explanatory, practical and normative evaluation to 
the discussion of terrorism. Thinkers such as Alain Badiou view terrorism as an 
intrinsically propagandistic term that tends to obscure the nature, origins and causes of 
terrorist actions.210 Along with Kapitan, Badiou criticizes the “obfuscatory and 
pernicious” contrasts made between the ‘Western values’ and terrorist projects, especially 
in view of the West’s existential sins committed in the course of the wars of 
decolonization of the post-Second World War period.211 Castells, on the other hand, 
points to the changing ontology of the ‘surveillance society’ spurred by global 
networking and greater decentralization of technology.212 Lyon provides a normative 
evaluation of this current trend in terms of decreasing trust and solidarity, an emphasis on 
control rather than care, and further creation of cultures of fear, suspicion, and secrecy.213 
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 The instances of the latter would be the U.S. Department of Security, Patriot Act, F.I.S.A. 
Act, Protect America Act, passage of anti-terrorist legislation in the United Kingdom, 
addition of Articles 278b to 278d to the Austrian Criminal Code incorporating 
incrimination of terrorism, addition of terrorism’s definition to Denmark’s Penal Code 
and Belgium’s, Greece’s and Finland’s Criminal Codes respectively.214 Under the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act, for instance, the federal government may now: a) use foreign 
counterintelligence in domestic criminal investigations; b) carry out surveillance of any 
religious, civic, or political organization in the United States, without suspicion of wrong-
doing; c) encourage private citizens to report on the “suspicious activity” of other people; 
d) under the “sneak and peak” warrants [covertly] enter a dwelling on the basis of 
“reasonable suspicion” alone without giving prior notice; e) carry out electronic 
surveillance and physical searches; f) access personal records of “United States persons” 
under Section 215 of the Act by requesting “any tangible thing (including books, records, 
papers, documents and other items), without that person’s knowledge; g) carry out more 
extensive surveillance of members of domestic organizations, anti-war protesters and 
civil rights activists.215  
 In addition, to adequately contextualize the “war on terrorism”/”terrorism” 
discourse vis-à-vis law it is necessary to do so with an aid and in terms of discourse 
theory. Habermas, in Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy, argues that there is a “conceptual and internal relation, between the 
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 rule of law and democracy.”216 As such, law and democracy function due to a synthetic 
regard for law as both a system of coercive laws and a source of legitimacy of rules and 
norms implicit in the law qua law. “Modern law”, Habermas asserts, “lives off a 
solidarity concentrated in the value orientation of citizens and activity issuing from 
communicative action and deliberation…mediated … by legal institutions and procedures 
[that cannot be] replaced by coercive law.”217 Further, democratic procedure in terms of 
discourse theory, “makes it possible for issues and contributions, information and reasons 
to float freely; it secures a discursive character for political will-formation,”218 which 
grounds and legitimizes the democratic process. In this context, globalization, in 
“creating a transnational space … and extension of social spaces beyond their traditional 
confines,”219 gives rise to new forms of power-contesting supranational alliances and 
networks of opposition and terror, which challenge the balance setting norm for 
international peace and efforts at intact preservation of the sovereign states system. 
Terrorism, according to Crenshaw, is designated to “disrupt and discredit”220 the process 
of government and constitutes, thus, the unintended third pillar, in addition to the national 
state and international organization, of power usurpation. The aforementioned transpires 
in Ulrich Beck’s theory of reflexivity and risk society, which regards terrorism as a 
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 largely negative consequence of the processes of globalization themselves, and calls for 
creation of new types of responses to the ever changing modes of socio-political, cultural, 
and economic power confrontations.  
Some argue that “war on terrorism” in its current usage has in itself a terrorizing 
effect in inducing reason-obscuring fear.221 Others point to the term’s ill-defined, 
demagogic notion that provides a warrant for any government which wants to engage in 
ruthless suppression of dissidents, and dismiss it as both simplistic and self-serving.222 
Still others consider the global “war on terrorism” to be a mere “rhetorical device,” as the 
absence of “legally valid war on terrorism” 223 delegitimizes, if not nullifies its claims. 
The pragmatic response to “war on terror” rhetoric has been a remarkably unanimous and 
rapid demonstration of NATO solidarity, and readiness for a collective response against 
any member.224 And the recurrent utilization or “literalizing” of the term has dissolved 
the legal boundaries between what a government can do in peacetime and what is allowed 
in war.225  
On September 29, 2001, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, quoted in the New York 
Times predicted that American citizens were likely to experience more restrictions on 
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 personal freedom than had ever been the case. “It will cause us”, Justice O’Connor 
asserted, “to re-examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal surveillance, 
wiretapping, immigration and so on.”226 Implicit in the remark is a belief in what 
Sniderman et al. in The Clash of Rights: Liberty, Equality, and Legitimacy in Pluralist 
Democracy term the “contestability of rights”, or a realization of a clash between external 
threats, civil liberties and society’s democratic principles and values. In consequence, due 
to protracted armed conflict, the notion of a perpetually indefinite state of war has 
supplanted the peace-time law enforcement rules with more permissive war-time 
international humanitarian law, characterized by suspension of the right to speedy trial 
(as trial occurs once conflict ends) and permitting acts of firing of shots at enemy 
combatants without warning. Congruently, as Hardt and Negri argue in Empire, the 
contemporary socio-economic and political climate has made it increasingly difficult for 
the “ideologues” to name a single, unified enemy” rather, the authors assert, “there seem 
to be minor and elusive enemies everywhere” – a phenomenon accompanied by the rising 
trend in “proliferation of minor and indefinite crises, or omni-crises.”227 In view of the 
above, the Club de Madrid working group, in its 2005 report, called for the rejection of 
the notion of the “war on terrorism” stating that it is “contrary to the basic principles of 
democracy and international law for any persons not to fall under the protection of the 
law”, especially in the instances when practices such as “indefinite detention without 
access to judicial review, extrajudicial execution, and inhuman and degrading treatment 
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 in the course of interrogations”228 have become the extralegal norm. In addition, the 
application of the term “war on terrorism” entails the possibility of indefinite human 
rights suspension, and sets a dangerous global legal precedent.   
Despite its contentious nature, ‘war on terrorism’ is a referent point for any 
governmental/military/intelligence activity that aims at curbing acts of terrorism. The 
definition of ‘war’ or engaged warfare has, itself, undergone evolution and change, 
especially in spatial and temporal terms as the traditional battlefield is no longer 
delimited to specific physical place and time constraints imposed by observable military 
losses and casualties. The operational definition of war is understood to denote an 
“actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities.”229 
Terrorist organizations fall under the rubric of “political communities”. As such, shifts in 
the ability to effectively target non-territorially established networks of terrorist 
organizations, have altered: a) the constitution of a battlefield; b) formal instruments for 
declaring war and establishing conditions for armistice, truce or legally documented and 
recognized surrender; c) the strategic approaches to combating a non-traditional enemy, a 
diffused network of agents and multiple adversaries, rather than a conventional army. The 
“war on terror” has altered the public’s perception and experience of war as a political 
means of mass mobilization, which called for utter individual self-sacrifice that was 
responsive to the climate of urgency and ubiquitous sense of patriotism, rather than 
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 voluntary acknowledgment of its moral imperatives and claims. In The Constitution and 
the Common Defense, Walter Mills wrote:  
“In a free society, foreign and military policies – especially when they risk or 
eventuate in war – can be justified only as they express a common good, or the 
total interest of the whole community. A free man cannot be compelled or even 
asked to sacrifice his life in battle for anything less; if he dies in the service of any 
private or partisan or class or special interest not his own, he dies a slave.”230 
The global dimension of the “war on terror” has recalibrated notions of traditional 
practices and political values along with individual civic and moral obligations that attest 
to the conception of the common good. As such, contracted mercenaries and special 
interests have come to redefine the premises of justified military engagement and civic 
duty to the nation in general, and citizens’ needs in particular.  The “war on terrorism” in 
its present ethical, strategic and legal ambiguity, has come to symbolize the Hobbesian 
state of war of the “West” against the indistinguishable mass of “Other”, and has become 
further exacerbated by a Foucauldian dispersion and readjustment of omni-present power 
relations.  Therefore, it is imperative to ask about the impact of the “global” character of 
conflict on the political character and constitution of the political systems themselves and 
the socio-political, psychological, and economic security of citizens.  
 In the Federalist No. 8 Alexander Hamilton expressed the following concern:  
“Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. 
Even the ardent love of liberty will after time give way to its dictates. The violent 
destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm 
attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to 
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 liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to 
destroy their civil and political rights.”231  
The notion of security, Tehranian suggests, can be conceptualized in political, 
psychological, cultural and communicational terms. Political security encompasses 
freedoms of speech, conscience, and assembly. It is based on the principle that upholds 
and honors the right to life in a society where fundamental human dignity and rights are 
protected against the abuses of the government.232 The 1948 UN Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states that “all human beings are born free and equal” and the 1950 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
serve as the founding documents institutionalizing this idea beyond the narrow political 
recognitions rendered to it by the nation state.  Psychological security concerns the 
principles of freedom from fear, the right to privacy, and tolerance of differences.233 In 
normative literature, the principles of non-violence and the idea of being a good neighbor 
promulgated in the 1995 reports of the Commission on Global Governance have assisted 
in conceptualizing the theoretical basis for arms-control theorists, such as Thomas 
Schelling and his analysis of the psychology of threats, strategies of defense, coercion 
and violence, and Robert Jarvis’ study of the perception and misperception in 
international relations. Moreover, cultural security, which concerns the right to freedom 
of identity and communication security that covers issues concerning “freedom and 
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 balance of information flows and security of mediated and unmediated 
communication”234 are cited as having aided in the delegitimization of violence and 
development and empowerment of civil society in advancing democratization and 
security.    
 Implicit in the above discussion is the notion of civil liberties, without which none 
of the entitlements to security could be given salience. Civil liberties, defined as certain 
rights, such as the right to vote, the right to equality in public places without any 
interference or restriction from the government, the freedom of speech, expression, press, 
assemble, and worship have been bestowed to all U.S. citizens under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution. Civil liberties in Europe derive their statutory 
recognition from France’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man of the Citizen and the 
1950 European Convention of Human Rights and its Five Protocols, to which all EU 
countries are signatories. In Japan the 1947 Constitution and subsequent establishment of 
the Civil Liberties Bureau on February 5, 1948235 institutionally protect, promote and 
mediate between contentious claims to individual rights and liberties.  
Within the realm of comparative political theory, justice in transition and the 
state’s legal responses to it, constrained both by a political and institutional tradition, are 
continually evaluated on the basis of a democratic norm. The strength of democratic 
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 protections and institutions is paramount to political security in liberal states.236 The 
global “war on terrorism” acts as a catalyst in transitioning or modifying the conceptions 
and practices of justice and the logic of governance, which naturally issue in the 
extension of limits within which sovereign power is to be exercised. Because a liberal 
state perceives its fundamental raison d’être in consolidating a security arrangement 
which, by the nature of its constitution, aims to deter external threats to its ontology, 
Michael Ignatieff in his book The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror 
recognizes one of the central democratic paradoxes, when he asks: 
“When democracies fight terrorism, they are defending the proposition that their 
political life should be free of violence. But defending terror requires violence. It 
may also require coercion, deception, secrecy and violation of rights. How can 
democracies resort to these means without destroying the values for which they 
stand?”237  
What constitutes the “moral check” on seemingly unrestrictive and invasive 
power, when majority interests and entitlements to individual freedom and dignity that 
comprise a given polity are no longer the prudential limits on governmental action, or are 
revocable in times of existential crises? What ought to be the modus operandi in cases in 
which overt conflicts between security, construed under the rubric of the “war on 
terrorism”, and civil liberties arise? And whose security and liberty is more at risk in the 
abstractly defined conflicts? Is formal “accountability and visibility of the centralized 
125 
                                                 
236 Tehranian, Majid. 1999. Worlds Apart: Human Security and Global Governance. (London: I.B. Tauris 
Publishers). Pg. 45.  
237 Ignatieff, Michael. 2004. The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). Pg. vii.  
 
 system’s actions”238a sufficient public stipulation in monitoring and preserving 
individual’s recourse to civil liberties?  
Questions of this type are important, as conflicts or lack of broader consensus in 
the international definition of terrorism, and situational risk analysis of each country’s 
counterterrorism measures reveal as many institutional tendencies and patterns as 
inconsistencies in adhering to the general, albeit, abstract norm of the global “war on 
terrorism.” For instance, Denmark’s 2002 anti-terrorism law in addition to forbidding 
instigation of “terrorism” or offering advice to “terrorists”, and banning financing of 
“radical groups”, also contains serious curbs on free speech, guaranteed in the Danish 
constitution, and significantly extends the powers of the police by sanctioning electronic 
eavesdropping on “suspected radicals” in a country with a long liberal tradition of 
tolerance. Moreover, the lack of legal instruments that can adequately address the 
changing policies on terrorism pre-charge detention in the United Kingdom, Norway, 
Germany, Spain, and Italy, to name but a few, have wide ranging human rights and civil 
liberties implications, as large variations in detention, charge and investigation 
proceedings often exceed the legal norm and undermine the civility and moral authority 
of countries engaged in such practices. The United Kingdom, for example, with the 
Terrorism Act of 2006, has put in place a twenty-eight day pre-charge detention law, and 
proposes to increase the detention period without official charge to fifty-six days.239 In 
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 France, detention without charge for a terrorist suspect cannot exceed four days, in Spain 
ten days, and under Japan’s proposed Kyoubouzai Hoan (conspiracy or collusion law) 
much tougher yet, as of 2006, unspecified measures are to take place in this domain. The 
U.S. Patriot Act allows the US Attorney General to detain without charge aliens 
suspected of terrorism for a period of seven days. An extreme variant of this detention 
practice is the U.S. Guantanamo Bay prison for the “unlawful combatants”, not only 
beyond the protection of the laws of the United States and their call for specific charge on 
the basis of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution to prevent 
an “unreasonable” seizure, but falling under no explicit category of either the 
International Law or the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war. By 
virtue of specific designation, i.e. “enemy combatants”, “radical groups” or “suspected 
radicals” governments actively engaged in the “war on terrorism” are able to circumvent 
explicit mandates of the law (national and international alike) and its authority to 
legitimize and delegitimize practices which the international community deems to be in 
strict violation of both civil liberties and human rights. In addition, interpretation of “self-
defense” has been greatly widened and legal provisions and principles of the 
humanitarian law have become almost irrelevant.240 The psychologically ubiquitous and 
pervasive “war on terrorism” and resulting civil liberties curtailments, in the very 
vagueness and abstractness of its conceptual framework, affect most often countries, 
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 citizens and institutions that have been the primary architects of the current socio-
political order.   
The current state of the US-EU “war on terrorism” discourse, as well as the 
passage and implementation of political, institutional and legal mechanisms that 
progressively inhibit the exercise of many of the fundamental individual freedoms, or 
alternatively penalize any such exercise with negligible due cause, redefine civic 
obligations and moral imperatives of private citizens and public officials, alike. A 
Foucauldian reading suggests that by stripping legal protections or altering their 
pragmatic application, the state, under autonomously defined conditions of ‘exception,’ 
amends the premises of the social contract, and re-constitutes itself though a series of 
exclusions, which transform the ‘abnormality’, ‘sporadicity’, and ‘crisis’ events  into  
routinized, normal features of the globalizing world.  The sovereign’s ‘power of the 
sword’ is reinforced by ‘policing’ technologies, which: (i) aim at the implementation of 
micro-practices that divide, isolate, and objectivize;241 and  (ii) aim to induce 
participatory self-scrutiny, self-examination, and confession in order to reactivate 
techniques of rehabilitation and normalization that are to eventuate in a voluntary choice 
of positioning oneself on the side of the right.  The scale of the anomalous phenomena to 
which terrorism belongs, along with its often opaque and complex nature, reinvigorates, 
on the part of the state, the pursuit and utilization of the mechanisms of security 
[despositifs de securite] in order to better define the field of possible interventions.  The 
disciplinarity of the bios which accompanies the curtailment of civil liberties operates 
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 through the social body, which becomes, as a result, malleable under duress and 
conscious of its subjectivization through added, conspicuous and inconspicuous, 
techniques of surveillance. The problematic of the state of exception vis-à-vis the legal 
prerogatives of citizens affirmed by a liberal ethos is based on the question of longevity 
of the intermediate suspension of rights and the degree of insight into citizens’ private 
sphere of socio-political existence. The exigency of democratic survival, however, 
depends upon the ability to decipher  law from life, for in meeting the basic principles of 
justice and minimal rights of citizens, the democratic norms, according to Olssen, must 
protect three indissoluble conditions: (i) the basic rights of all citizens individually and as 
groups to freedom of speech, thought, assembly, expression, lifestyle, and choice; (ii) 
“that no person or group is manipulated into accepting values represented by public 
institutions”; and (iii) “that public officials and institutions are democratically 
accountable in principle and practice.”242  Democracy, as an equalizer of power relations 
and progenitor of dialogue and habits of non-dominance, inhibits gestation of narrow 
national interest and institutional regimes of exclusion enveloped in indefinite perception 
and rationalization of threat, which violate the liberal will of citizen subjects and dissolve 
their claims to unobstructed representation as a legal person, rather than mere political 
corpus subject to infinite command.  
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 Case Study III: War Crimes, Refugeeism, and the Dilemmas of Citizenship 
 
To be rooted, writes Simone Weil in The Need for Roots, is the most important 
and least recognized need of the human soul. Rootedness obliges and privileges, binds 
and deinvisibilizes. The geographical space allocated to growing roots, conveys social 
rank and political value, and naturalizes beings into the environment which they inhabit, 
and within the confines of which they become legitimated subjects and bearers of right. 
Aware of this basic human need for socio-psychological stability, the world community 
in Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights extended protections 
over safe shelter and habitable human dwelling for thousands of displaced victims of 
forced “uprootings” of the 20th Century, induced by wars, military campaigns, 
occupations and political programs of denationalization and mass extermination. In times 
of forceful ascensions of some European powers and prompt dissolutions of others, 
during the period between the two world wars, the status of the Rights of Man became 
conjoined with the fates of nation-states. Thus, refugeeism, deemed a temporary 
condition and a by-product of some crisis event, was historically redressed either by 
assimilation, repatriation or naturalization. By promulgating every person’s right to 
citizenship, that is, the right to belong to a nation state, the United Nations moved from 
basic norms of the international law to a new cosmopolitan regime, a metajuridical 
proclamation of rights that was to apply universally; a promulgation, however, which 
never transgressed the immanent category of the nation-state, but reasserted it and took it 
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 for the sole sovereign agent capable of turning a human being into a citizen.243 The 
universal declaration of the human rights, therefore, is not so much a document endowing 
and privileging the human sphere with rights, as an obligation imposed upon the state to 
mobilize itself and extend its generosity in declaring that human sphere a recognized 
political unit, and thus, by extension, ensure the state’s own survival by admitting to 
naturalization those persons which make up its very own foundation for sovereignty and 
which show themselves as a fully integrated citizen-body. Social and political integration, 
through interiorization of the mechanisms of power proper to a given nation-state, 
transforms stateless alienation into disciplined subjectivity, a political aberration of 
refugeeism into the norm of citizenship. It is at this very moment, as Foucault observes, 
that “life has now become … an object of power”244 and has been inescapably inscribed 
into its techniques of administration and technologies of biopower.   
The United Nations commitment to universal human rights, best exemplified by 
its humanitarian interventionism, creates an institutional paradox. On the one hand, the 
organization constituted as a society of states with a global outreach, abolishes the statist 
paradigm of non-interference and sovereignty established by Hobbes, who insisted on the 
self-sufficiency of state units being in a state of nature in their relations with one another.  
On the other hand, due to lack of comprehensive theory of the global order, the United 
Nations cannot but integrate in and place under the protectorate of the state, the human 
agents which it sought, in the first place, to extricate from underneath its rule.  The 
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 victims of genocides, ethnic cleansings, and protracted civil wars generate a broad range 
of new positive and negative duties; and although the premise for intervention rests 
precisely on the assumption that neither their nor our humanity is exhausted by juridical 
citizenship, our collective destiny, nonetheless, is congealed by an institutional 
framework of the state vested with the power to acknowledge or annul our political 
existence.  
Presently, there are close to sixteen million stateless noncitizens, populating 
regions of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Latvia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar and 
Thailand. Displaced by migration, refugee flights and ethnic expulsions, the often ignored 
and most vulnerable strata of the nameless mass of noncitizens, lacking adequate proof of 
citizenship, remain without basic rights to schooling, healthcare, gainful employment and 
property ownership, and de facto lie outside the bounds of equitable legal protection.245 
Does statelessness, then, present us with an opportunity to envision a realm of existence 
devoid of habitual recourse to legal citizenship, or a Sisyphean burden that persists in the 
proliferation of its own limits?  
Cosmopolitans claim that it is incumbent upon us to expand our moral 
imagination and recognize the fluidity and heterogeneity of social affiliations and 
narratives, in order to redress the ills of legal and socio-psychological uprootedness and 
offer a program for organizing political entities and human persons in accordance with 
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cosmopolitan ethics that go beyond state sovereignty and, thus, redefine the political 
condition of being human. A viable mean encapsulated in the Cosmopolitan Harm 
Conventions (CHCs),246 which obliges states to apply the minimum principle of primum 
non nocere – above all, do no harm – permits for a rationalization of an international 
moral code by effectively aiding in regulating the interactions between human agents and 
states. In its form, cosmopolitan harm conventions entreat states bound by them to make 
no legally relevant distinctions between the insiders and outsiders, and accept the premise 
that insiders do not have the moral right to impose insecurity and fear on other societies, 
and finally recognize that the boundaries of moral community “are not identical with, but 
extend beyond, the frontiers of their bounded political community.”247 David Held 
enumerates eight universal principles through which equal significance of each human 
person can be protected. They are: (i) equal worth and dignity; (ii) active agency; (iii) 
personal responsibility and accountability; (iv) consent; (v) collective decision-making 
about public matters through voting procedures; (vi) inclusiveness and subsidiarity; (vii) 
avoidance of serious harm; (viii) sustainability.248 Seyla Benhabib, on the other hand, 
postulates the already unprecedented normative instantiations of the global civil society, 
which show themselves in the agencies of negotiation, articulation, observation, and 
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 monitoring, processes of naming and shaming, sanctions, and humanitarian interventions 
that aim to attenuate the monopoly on full mobilization of state power against groups and 
citizens.249 As a pressing existential task and a duty to be made manifest in the third 
millennium, these approaches necessitate, however, above all, a renegotiation and 
reconfiguration of our current discursive commitments.  
Precisely because citizenship has historically signified participation in the 
biopolitics of the state, and characterized itself by duties and obligations emanating from 
a developed sensus communis, its abrogation, in the case of refugeeism, seems an 
existential depravation. Agamben argues that such a state constitutes a state of exception, 
the bare life, abandoned by law and inhabiting a zone of juridical ambiguity.250 The more 
radical interpretation, however, would dare to suggest that refugeeism puts citizenship in 
question, whereby reduction of its learned practices to community, habitual recourse to 
political participation, superficial cultivation of virtues of patriotism, loyalty, piety and 
obedience to the community and the law inadvertently lead to an act of dissention and 
abstention sustained by a radical freedom from oppressive discourses centered around the 
political construction of the responsibilities of citizenship. In this vein of reasoning, 
Foucault suggests that the state of political dissidence and thus, by extension, also of 
existential ambiguity is “a significant agent of the spread of what could be called anti-
statism, or state-phobia,” 251 which is nothing but a crisis of governmentality, of state and 
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 civil society, and of politics of life experienced on a global scale. Finally, refugeeism 
may present itself as a Socratic “gadfly,” which not only contests the legal assumptions, 
dogmas, and underpinnings of citizenship, but serves as an “irritating moral and 
intellectual conscience”252 of the globalizing world by questioning and inviting 
reexamination of dominant conceptions and binding categories of citizenship.253   It was, 
after all, the peripatetic Socrates, who embodied, as Steven Johnston contends, the critical 
homeless ethos, which demonstrated that neither the city nor the immediate community 
“can or should be the unquestioned site of identification, or of loyalty and allegiance.”254 
Does it mean, then, as Dowden puts it, that “the deepest community is found not in 
institutions or corporations or churches, but in the secrets of a solitary heart”? 
Cosmopolitans would argue to the contrary, claiming that the “secrets of a solitary heart” 
ought to find moral and legal expression in the institutions, corporations, and churches of 
the modern megapolis.    
Refugeeism, by its nature, necessarily decouples identity from citizenship, making 
the former, however, ineffable within the current confines of the political order so used to 
equating the absence of formally recognized juridical citizenship with automatic political 
alienation, followed by a withdrawal of public recognition. Rather than dispossession and 
existential erasure, the refugees’ state of temporary or prolonged statelessness is also a 
condition of effective suspension of rights and responsibilities. According to James 
135 
                                                 
252 Villa, Dana. 2001. Socratic Citizenship. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Pg. xii.  
253 I do not wish to reduce an uncertain and oppressive condition of refugeeism to an academic thought 
experiment, but to suggest that the oppressiveness of the condition lies precisely in the discourses and the 
consensus created around the concept and practices of citizenship, their static nature, and tailored, 
pragmatic cut which can only ‘fit’ state centric ideations.  
254 Johnston, Steven. 2007. The Truth about Patriotism. (Durham: Duke University Press). Pg. 84.  
 
 Morrissey, refugeeism occurs when some aspect of the social environment is upset and 
presents an imminent threat to survival of the population, issuing in a precipitous, often 
undesired and unplanned flight.255 It is both an involuntary flight from the state and an 
exile of counter-resistance. As a historical fact, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian, 
Russian and Ottoman empires at the end of World War I introduced pronounced fissures 
into the European identity consciousness. Agamben contends that refugeeism of the 
period, “by breaking the identity between the human and the citizen and between nativity 
and nationality,” brought the originary fiction of sovereignty to crisis.”256 As such, when 
the state abuses its powers by impairing essential freedoms, violating basic rights, 
endangering social life, it rescinds its rights of sovereignty and representation. With its 
juridical legitimacy compromised, the state cannot claim the right to intervene nor put a 
delimiting hold on individuals. 
“The state does not have an essence. The state is not a universal nor is it itself an 
autonomous source of power. The state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, 
the mobile shape of a perpetual stratification (etatisation) or stratifications … In 
short, the state has no heart … no interior … The state is nothing else but the 
mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.”257  
 
The state finds itself in crisis due to its perceived inability to account for and ‘know’ the 
mass of individuals that inhabit it, which prohibit its eventual descriptive 
characterizations of groups and specification of more encompassing criteria for 
normalization. Political dissidence, which refugeeism may fall under, should be 
136 
                                                 
255 Morrissey, James. 1983. “Migration, Resettlement, and Refugeeism: Issues in Medical Anthropology”. 
Medical Anthropology Quarterly. Vol. 15 (1).  Pg. 3.  
256 Agamben, Giorgio. 1996. Means without End. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Pg. 20.  
257 Foucault, Michel. 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). Pg. 77.  
 
 perceived, Foucault contends, as primarily a crisis of governmentality, a struggle against 
totalization and objectification.  Foucault claims that the condition of refusal of what the 
subject is presents itself is a form of resistance to the spreading web of individuations and 
totalizations of modern power structures, a repudiation of the amalgam of closed totalities 
that constitute the sources of the self. 
“We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of a political 
‘double blind’ … the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days 
is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s 
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of 
subjectivity through refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed 
on us for several centuries.”258 
 
In Means without End, Agamben puts Foucault’s call for imaginative creation of forms of 
subjectivity to practice. By taking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over Jerusalem as a 
concrete point of departure, and a site of war crimes, forced expulsions, migrations, and 
refugee flights, Agamben proposes a topologically innocuous solution with important 
juridical effects for international relations. His vision for a peaceful solution rests in 
Jerusalem’s becoming a capital of two separate states dispossessed of any real or 
symbolic territorial partitions, whereby its occupants enter into a ‘relation of reciprocal 
extraterritoriality.’259 Mutual sharing of one politically significant regional space between 
two communities attempts to elide the up to now defended concept of the right (ius) of 
the citizen and replace it with the concept of refuge (refugium) of one territorial space. 
The extraterritorial singular community permits its inhabitants, in a ‘condition of exodus 
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 from each other,’ to nonetheless reciprocally ‘in-determine’ and ‘articulate’ each other. 
Further, the refugee territories as spaces of expulsion create perforated heterotopias, 
spaces of otherness that reflect and act back upon the territories of subsequent 
occupation; those, in turn, involuntarily internalize the images and constitute themselves 
in tandem. Agamben contends, that:  
“Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and 
topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the 
refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of 
humankind today thinkable.”260  
 
In his 1967 lecture to the Cercle d’etudes architecturales entitled “Of Other 
Spaces”, Foucault turned his interest toward spatial analytics of what he termed as 
‘localized utopias’ and ‘counter-spaces’. In the attempt to sketch the parameters of socio 
scientific thought in relation to the dynamics of power, Foucault argued that spaces of 
normalization always coexist alongside alternative modes of subsistence set in different 
temporalities and spatialities that mark and mold counter-discourses, sites of 
transgression, and resistance. The ‘other’ spaces, being an articulate embodiment of 
counter-power, “a principle of political emancipation, and a model of social 
transformation, locus of self-fashioning,”261risk also becoming sites of domination and 
oppression. Concretely, the spaces of normalization embodied in efforts aimed at 
consolidating the nation-state of Israel, meet with counter-sites of Palestinian resistance, 
the spaces of existential  deformation, alienation, emblems of severed possibilities, and 
incubators of moral-religious conflicts. Being far from benign counter-discourses, the 
138 
                                                 
260 Agamben, Giorgio. 1996. Means without End. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Pg.25.  
261 Kohn, Margaret. 2003. Radical Space. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Pg. 91.  
 
 seemingly marginalized Palestinian condition of continual exile and forced refugeeism 
embeds itself in the officially commissioned construction of Israeli state-centric politics, 
and inverts, reinterprets, contests, as well as reverberates its rational justification. The 
occupied territories are above all ‘heterotopias of crisis’  inhabited by individuals who, in 
their relation to the rest of the state-regulated global order, manifest themselves in crisis 
due to living a life within a strictly delineated and superimposed boundaries of the West 
Bank and its six hundred checkpoints by which lives are simulated and made 
inadvertently artificial. The problem of demographic propinquity and strategic 
emplacement shows itself in fenced settlements, which rather than abdicating politics to 
politics, are themselves extensions of state metanarratives, and a visible manifestation of 
a new political space based on the theme of ‘inclusive exclusion/exclusive inclusion.’ 
The walled settlements, as sanctuaries of expressively lived life of a citizen-subject, in 
themselves, constitute Foucauldian “counter-emplacements…in which…all the other real 
emplacements are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.”262 Every 
architectural wall, writes Boyer, ‘functions as a machine of elimination;’ its primordial 
function lies in the ability to separate, exclude, “circumscribe and avoid those things that 
bear offence”263 Paradoxically, just as it was the West that thought itself more imprisoned 
by the Berlin Wall than the East, so Jerusalem today presents itself as that  
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 “city of split realities separated into two ideology camps compel[ing] those on 
each side to gaze over the wall at each other yet remain[ing] a captive of their 
own imaginary beliefs and ideals.”264  
 
Two ideologies battling for the correct political modus vivendi that requires techniques to 
materialize it, and “discourses that will give form to the conjectures of our [human] 
psychology”265 manifest a need for architectural imagination, that is, a necessary 
discursive creativity which dares to uncover duplicities and take up Foucault’s question: 
“Through what system of exclusion, by eliminating whom, by creating what division, 
through what game of negation and rejection can society begin to function?”266 Rather 
than providing a readily articulated conclusion, Foucault urges to make the above inquiry 
a critical premise “an instrument of those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. 
Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal.”267  
 
The Power of Resistance and the Foucauldian Ethics of Self-Creation 
 
How is political refusal possible if the Foucauldian subject is always-already 
ingrained from within with a historical constitution, whereby any and all activities issuing 
from her conscious choice are delimited by an outcome of the techniques of 
individualization and socialization, which embody the dominant metanarratives of 
political orders? How are the achievement of ontological freedom imaginable and the 
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 project of individual self-creation sustainable?  Precisely because Foucault’s philosophy 
admits of instability and reversibility in the relations of power, it occasions an opening 
for freedom. As Wendy Brown in States of Injury observes, insofar as power always 
issues in resistance, the subject being capable of practicing resistance inevitably practices 
freedom. Power268 is never settled nor congealed into an unalterable form, but always 
dynamic, mobile, and operating within a complex realm of relational interdependencies. 
Resistance, as co-extensive with and always in a position of interiority rather than 
exteriority to the relations of power, is only actualized when power is manifest. Foucault 
writes: 
“If there was no resistance, there would be no power relations. Because it would 
just be a matter of obedience … So resistance comes first, and resistance remains 
superior to the forces of the process; power relations are obliged to change with 
the resistance.”269  
 
Since Foucauldian power is not, as the liberal Enlightenment tradition holds, a negotiated 
attribute or a commodity possessed and exchanged, but a de-centered, multidirectional, 
intentional, non-subjective, and, in itself, subjectless and non-coercive ensemble of 
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 practices, it is necessarily countered, not with a “single locus of great Refusal”270 but with 
a multiplicity of micro- and  macro- resistance(s), which 
“To resist, it must be like power. As inventive, as mobile, and as productive as 
power. Like power, it must organize itself, coagulate and cement itself. Like 
power, it must come from below and distribute itself strategically.”271 
 
There are two distinct conceptualizations of resistance in Foucault’s philosophy, 
which Kevin Thompson and Mark Kelly label, as (i) negative; and (ii) positive.  The 
former, articulated in Foucault’s The Will to Knowledge, characterizes itself by a practice 
of freedom from limitations. The latter, expressed in “The Subject and Power” 
concentrates on the practices of self-formation.272 The two conceptions invariably rely 
upon the will, as that human capacity, agency, or a life force capable of insubordination, 
a Nietzschean ‘will to power.’ Foucauldian resistance is not to be understood in terms of 
a set of relativized political manifestos which lie beyond cross-examination and critique, 
rather, its ethical efficacy ought to be seen as always intimately bound with questions it 
can posit to its own fundamental rational calculus which motivates it; as resistance may 
very well be either on the side of or against the systems of control and domination. The 
human freedom from limitations is analogous to a Kantian “release from [one’s] self-
incurred tutelage; tutelage, which is the man’s inability to make use of his understanding 
without direction from another.” Resistance cum critique institutes “the art of not being 
governed quite so much” as docile subjects of impersonal systems and tactics of power, 
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 but as discerning observers of the forms of domination and prescient interpreters of their 
consequences. As such, subjects will not enjoin themselves to be reduced to mere 
reactive nodes dispossessed of positive means of resistance, but rather, subjects 
concerned with their own ontological self-understanding and constitution, from within 
which critique unravels.  
The Socratic injunction of ‘know thyself’ issues in a Foucauldian genealogy, a 
method of disclosing historically layered discourses and power relations along with their 
motives and impacts upon human subjectivity. Foucault by analyzing three such 
variegated trajectories, as (i) pastoral power, (ii) disciplinary power, and (iii) biopower 
sets a distinctive premium on the return to the Greek conception of subjectivity 
enveloped throughout with a discriminating eye for the modes of self-enactment. In the 
passage worth citing at length, Foucault discloses the epochal transitions and rationales 
comprising the hermeneutics of the present self. 
“I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western 
civilization, one has to take into account not only techniques of domination but 
techniques of the self. Let’s say: one has to take into account the interaction 
between these two types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques 
of the self. One has to take into account the point where the technologies of 
domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which 
the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, one has to take into account the 
points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or 
domination. This contact point, where the individuals are driven and known by 
others is tied to the way they conduct themselves and know themselves, in what 
we can call, I think, government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the 
word … is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a 
versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques 
which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed and 
modified by oneself.”273 
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 By comprehensively studying the relations between pastoral power and the ‘policing’ 
reason of the state, the relation between confessional techniques and the types of bodily 
subjectivity shrouded in the mortality of the flesh, Foucault deepens his analytics of the 
subject in order to derive optimum techniques for resistance. The recovery and 
reinstitution of the Greco-Roman ethics of aesthetic existence and accompanying it 
technologies of the self, or cultivation of the relations of oneself to oneself, i.e., self-
writing, truthful speaking, abstinence, self-denial, appeal for guidance, exercise of free 
and deliberate choice,  by which subjects  conduct their own conduct, constitute for 
Foucault, the penultimate reversal of the relations of power.274 The Greco-Roman 
embrace of a ‘philosophical life’ permeated by moral reflection and an attendance, a 
return, to the self as ontologically prior to theoretical knowledge and care for the many, 
which a thoroughly political life demands, aims to ensure the subject’s freedom, while at 
the same time, making one an object of one’s own diligence.275 This existential 
condemnation of oneself to the self is not a limiting condition but an extension of 
deliberative space for a creative reconciliation of political rights and duties with 
inherently human capacities and opportunities. Ethics as self-creation requires a choice of 
a style of existence which materializes and actualizes a certain vision of the self, and for 
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 which it is always possible, Foucault contends, to make something altogether novel out of 
what it has been made into.276  
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CHAPTER V 
FOUCAULDIAN CRITICAL COSMOPOLITIANISM:  
TERRA INCOGNITA? 
 
Let observation, with extensive view, 
Survey mankind, from China to Peru; 
Remark each anxious toil, each eager strife, 
And watch the busy scenes of crowded life; 
-Samuel Johnson 
 
“Paragons of compassion: the great cosmopolitan souls, who  
surmount the imaginary barriers that separate Peoples and who, 
 following the example of the sovereign Being who created them,  
include the whole human Race in the benevolence.” 
-Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
 
 
 
The evocation of Greco-Roman, and particularly Epicurean and Stoic theories of 
ethical self-enactment, constitutes but one, however, incidental connection of Foucault to 
contemporary conceptualizations of the cosmopolitan ethos. A second, less superficial 
opening for a Foucauldian approach to cosmopolitanism is contained in his emphasis on 
and relevant analytics of asymmetrical and layered distribution of power relations and the 
“rich possibilities of multiple realizations at the level of the discursive that enables varied 
articulations of the good,”277 presently occasioned and propelled by the complex 
processes of globalization. A third reason for advancing a Foucauldian reading of 
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 cosmopolitanism can be found in a clear challenge that such an enterprise vis a vis 
institutional embeddedness and normative construction of rights poses to Kantian 
rationalists, Rawlsian contractualists and Sandelian communitarians, who long claimed to 
have either advanced a pursuit of a cosmopolitan commonwealth, or warned against any 
such ‘utopian’ conjectures. In this chapter, I wish to explore the tensions and 
complementarities between Foucault’s political philosophy and cosmopolitanism, by first 
delving into the premises of cosmopolitan assumptions articulated by Seyla Benhabib, 
who follows a Kantian jurisprudential-morality, and Martha Nussbaum, who defends an 
ancient Greco-Roman political code; and second, by positing a set of reasons legitimizing 
a far more Foucauldian approach to cosmopolitics. It is important to remember that the 
fundamental question of the political discourse – “how to govern?”  -  predominant in the 
15th and 16th centuries, with the inauguration of cosmopolitan thinking provides an 
opportunity for inquiring more profoundly into what Foucault set at the pedestal of his 
explorative theory: “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of principles 
such as that, in view of such objectives and by the means of such procedures.”278 This 
circumspect Foucauldian critical attitude which permits for ‘thoughtful indocility’ and 
‘desubjectivization’ widens the horizons of “historical analysis of the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.”279   
 
The Grand Narratives and Cosmopolitan Itineraries 
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 In an attempt to make cosmopolitanism legible, it is essential, first, to draw upon 
three exit questions, which Seyla Benhabib in the book Another Cosmopolitanism (2006) 
utilizes in her explication of the theory’s utilitarian and pragmatic application. Second, 
the provided analysis, instructed by the answers Benhabib offers, will provide the context 
for a succinct summation of an alternative view of a cosmopolitan ethic, advanced by 
Martha Nussbaum in her 2003 book Cultivating Humanity, 1994 Boston Review article, 
“Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” incorporated in an edited tome, For Love of Country?, 
and her 1997 essay on “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism.” Lastly, alternative readings 
and decipherments of the political philosophy of cosmopolitanism will set the tone and 
context for future dialectical explorations that reach beyond the emphatic and schematic 
themes the authors under review proffer. 
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 Following in the footprints of Arendt and Jaspers, who preceded the author in 
their reflections on the status of international law and the norms of international justice, 
Benhabib inquires after: (i) the ontological status of cosmopolitan norms in a 
postmetaphysical universe; (ii) the authority of norms that lack support of a sovereign 
vested with the power of enforcement, and; (iii) the ways of reconciling cosmopolitan 
norms with the fact of “divided humanity.”280 In a brief response to her above posited 
promissory notes, the author of Another Cosmopolitanism rearticulates, and claims as her 
own, the meaning of cosmopolitanism qua order and norms. Hers is a distinctly Kantian 
understanding, flavored by a multiperspectival ‘jurisgenerative politics’ by which a 
meaning of rights is not only legally and politically contested by both the excluded and 
privileged political actors, but, above all, ‘reposited,’ ‘resignified,’ and ‘reappropriated’ – 
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in sum – reconstituted via differing situational approaches to the dilemmas of being and 
faring in the world of multiple and competing constellations of meaning and signifying. 
The ostensible commotion at the core of political process seems to contradict the legality 
of a well-ordered society guided by rules and norms for which a positive and 
postmetaphysical, rather than natural, ethical justification exists. In a universe of 
‘disaggregated citizenship’, it is implied, one cannot rely on the singularity and 
commonality of collective identity for social support and moral sustenance which, up to 
now, have given one a  tangible as well as symbolic confluence of the sense of self. This 
very paradox, embedded in the notions of boundedness and aggregation on the one hand,, 
and unscripted itineraries, on the other, which provoke an existential disenfranchisement 
and challenge the ‘habits of the heart,’ does not go unnoticed in Benhabib’s work. The 
proposed remedy is found in ‘democratic iterations’, which presume to offer normative 
and institutional solutions to the paradoxes of democratic legitimacy, and synthesize 
complex ways of “mediating the will- and opinion- formation of democratic majorities 
and cosmopolitan norms.”281 What follows is a substantive account of newly recognized, 
largely optional, avenues of being an existent and a subject to the contents of 
cosmopolitan laws. The author recognizes the increased weight of proof and justification 
that rest upon those choosing to reach beyond the established cosmopolitan normativity 
citing crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, which have been given a 
universal assignation of moral objectionableness, and which prohibit and deem 
incomprehensible the formation of legal defense, as perpetrations against, and paradigms 
of maladjustment to, the generalizable norms that ought to govern the behavior of 
 
281 Benhabib, Seyla. 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pg. 45. 
 
 sovereign states and extend political imagination of citizens. The resultant novo ordo 
saeclorum endows individuals, rather than states, with indivisible rights and claims. This, 
in turn, eventuates in a model of cosmopolitan law based less on non-binding treaties, 
propounded by the international law, and increasingly upon responsive legal authority 
which disciplines and emends the will of all sovereign political actors. The societal and 
political image proposed is that of 
“…cosmopolitan norms [that] go beyond liberal international sovereignty by 
envisaging conceptual and juridical space for a domain of rights-relations that 
would be binding on nonstate actors as well as state actors when they come into 
contact with individuals who are not members of their own polities.”282   
 
This all-inclusiveness is an outgrowth of the discourse theory of ethics, in the vein of 
which Benhabib voices her arguments for a necessary mediation between the moral and 
the political, and which articulates a “universalist moral standpoint”283 that is unlimited in 
the scope of subjects and themes the ‘moral conversation’ involves and engages.  
Naturally, a secondary set of questions arises that pertains to: (i) the requirements, 
obligations, and values that the cosmopolitan norms impose upon acting persons, and; (ii) 
the provenance, sustenance, and enforcement of the ordering of the foregoing norms. In 
her response to point (ii) Benhabib asserts that only and exclusively, polities with strong 
democracies are capable of ‘universalist rearticulation’ and reconfiguration of 
citizenship,284and that a Rawlsian version of ‘self-enclosed moral universes’ does not do 
justice to the dynamic reality of the politics of peoplehood qua negotiation. Her 
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 illustration of the French l’affaure du foulard, or the German jus soli naturalization laws, 
follows a developmental trajectory of rights that in their constitutiveness are nothing but, 
and above all, the effects of negotiations that seek to overturn the stringency of alienating 
categories. As to point (i), Benhabib contends that the same democratic polities over the 
course of the evolution of cosmopolitan norms – extending from crimes against humanity 
to norms extending to refuge and immigration – have absorbed reflexive gestures of 
‘hospitality’ that re-constitute the boundaries of the demos and impose novel forms of 
civil and legal obligations to ‘aliens’, ‘foreign co-citizens’, and ‘third-country nationals.’ 
Here, Benhabib does not hide her predilection for Kantian ethics, and her deductions are 
informed by a specific view of the individual as a “citizen of a universal state of 
mankind.”285  Hospitality, so conceived, ascribes to the individual the status of being a 
“right-bearing person” and translates the language of morals to that of juridical rights,286 
which do not expire with the crossing of state’s political borders. The author 
acknowledges that moral obligations and duties arising as a consequence of membership 
in bounded communities, or communities of place, and the moral perspective that one is 
required to adopt by virtue of one’s own humanity, inevitably result in tensions and, by 
extension, minimized receptivity toward the “other in which the ethical manifests 
itself.”287 To attenuate this discordant apprehension, the ethical dimension ought and 
must, Benhabib asserts, illuminate the juridico-political sphere, which is to narrate, 
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 express, and define the new contours  of cosmopolitical citizenship, and in which 
individuals are “not only the objects but also the authors of the law to which they are 
subject.”288The process of greater democratization of the increasingly ‘porous’ borders, 
on this reading, calls for the establishment of legal frameworks for navigating and 
coordinating the policies and practices that simultaneously (i) instill and maintain respect 
for essential human rights; (ii) consolidate and advance a sphere of communal inclusion 
of foreigners; (iii) create opportunities for public representation, and; (iv) recognize the 
rights to asylum and legal immigration. The above conditions, if met, would complement 
Kant’s ‘Third Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace,” which Benhabib evokes, which 
stipulates measures and imposes limits upon the cosmopolitan right’s deference to and 
recognition of universal hospitality.  
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The uncoupling of the ideally-typical manifestations of citizenship, i.e. territorial 
integrity, residency, administrative subjection, cultural membership, and democratic 
participation, results in a de-emphasis on rights by entitlement and a greater recognition 
of moral claims to inalienable legal status irrespective of the primordial sources of origin. 
The proposed paradigm is far from reconciliatory, however, as the relationship between a 
cosmopolitan ethic and democratic self-governance, between grounded sovereignty and 
delinked human rights is far from being politically amicable and settled matter. 
Mediation of continuous semantic, ideational and pragmatic conflicts, rather than their 
totalization or transcendence, then, constitutes for Seyla Benhabib an apt preface to 
cosmopolitanism, which is capable of articulating via (a) democratic iterations, and (b) 
jurisgenerative politics, a form of political condition that insists less on an incautious 
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 democratic consensus and compromise, and increasingly more on overlapping and 
interconnected networks of dissension and contestation that eventuate in better 
pronounced works of self-authorship.       
Far from being an exhaustive and comprehensive footnote to political theory, 
cosmopolitanism, like the most regal of symphonic works, is subject to multiple 
variations on a single theme. Martha Nussbaum, in her edited volume For Love of 
Country, purports to present one such interpretation of the concept, while seeking to 
identify and define the multifaceted reverberations her Stoic-in-style and Kantian-in-
notation philosophy evokes. Hers is a cosmopolitanism of exile, which is, by nature, 
Janus-faced. Nussbaum extends the practices of citizenship and absolves them of a 
strictly territorial reality via cultivation of three capacities: (i) a distanced capacity for 
critical self-examination and context-boundedness; (ii) an ability to see oneself as a 
citizen of the world, bound to others by ties of moral concern, rather than a citizen of a 
strictly delineated and delimited local region or group, and; (iii) a capacity for a generous 
narrative imagination, which is to confer a privileged and empathy-inducing insight into 
the emotions and desires of persons. The undertones of Stoicism, which saw education 
for world citizenship as requiring a transcendence of the definition of oneself that was 
thickly embedded in the context of group loyalties and identities, are generative. Thus the 
transcendent telos, which Nussbaum recognizes and cultivates in her philosophical 
output, lies not in the agent’s submission to the conventional prescripts of the polis, but in 
recognition and loyalty to moral virtue, irrespective of the agent’s associative proximity, 
kinship or citizenship, which are but elements of happenstance rather than substantive 
constructs of one’s own and one’s circumstantial political ordering. Therefore, proper 
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 internalization of the moral law mandates that “reason and moral capacity” of human 
agents ought to attract our first allegiance and respect. Cosmopolitanism is intrinsically 
valuable, Nussbaum contends, “for it recognizes in people what is especially fundamental 
about them, most worthy of respect and acknowledgment: their aspirations to justice and 
goodness and their capacities for reasoning …”289 Yet, one of the greatest obstacles to 
rational deliberation, Nussbaum admits, is the ‘unexamined feeling’ that one’s customs 
and preferences are the natural and neutral expressions of superior humanity.  
What renders the rationalist views of Stoicism and Kantianism relevant, for 
Nussbaum, is their undivided focus on the non-arbitrary rational human core, fully 
capable of setting itself an ambitious goal of transcending the confining and the 
parochial. In “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism” Nussbaum writes this about her 
intellectual allies: “[theirs was] a politics based upon reason rather than patriotism or 
group sentiment …that was truly universal rather than communitarian … one that was 
active, reformist, and optimistic rather than given to contemplating the horrors or waiting 
for the call of Being.”290 In Nussbaum’s accounts and visions of the cosmopolitan ethos 
the worth of reason in each and every human being, revered by the Stoics as the causa 
efficiens of moral law that dictates the principles and normative imperatives that are to 
guide all human conduct and ordering of the social life of beings and communities, 
occupies a super-ordinate position. Unlike Benhabib’s sober cosmopolitanism imbued 
with legal doctrinaire and empathically abstemious pronouncements that ground 
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 themselves in the rigidity of universally recognized norms, Nussbaum’s version insists on 
the emotive residuals that mold the contours of our rational capacities and filter and order 
them according to the political and social roles the agents are called upon to play. “In 
generous engagements with a stranger,” Nussbaum writes, “we enact a duty of the moral 
imagination … we never do meet a mere abstract ‘human being’. But we meet the 
common in the concrete, as well as the concrete in the common.”291 Entering thus as far 
as possible, into the experiences of others via ‘generous imaginings,” defines the 
framework of cosmopolitan largesse, which sanctions a continuous, rather than sporadic 
and isolated, spontaneous and generous imagination of other persons, in order to 
eliminate the inherently aversive structural position of ‘foreignness.’ This romanticized 
view of “cultivating our humanity in a complex, interlocking world,” Nussbaum 
contends, “involves understanding the ways in which common needs and aims are 
differently realized in different circumstances.”292 The narrative imagination, then, 
enables one to enact oneself as an intelligent participant in the dramatic circumstances of 
others, which, in turn, requires a developed moral common sense and critical rationality.  
Such alternative visions of political reality are not immune from criticism. Leo 
Marx in his article, “Neglecting History” (1994), asks:  
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“If cosmopolitanism is as superior among conceivable views of the world as 
[Nussbaum] persuasively demonstrates, why has it so rarely been adopted? Why 
has its appeal been so largely restricted to small, eccentric, avant-garde, or elite 
groups? Why have institutions like the League of Nations or the United Nations, 
or movements like the World Federalist failed to elicit widespread support? Why 
do more parochial – nationalistic – creeds usually carry the day?”293 
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 An apt, yet far from intellectually satisfying, however, basally legitimate is the 
Aristotelian response. Recognizing that virtues, as opposed to vices, are harder to indulge 
in, as they require a prolonged lesson in consistent moral habituation, discipline and 
courage, the cosmopolitan ethos, like virtue and good manners, will not have the staying 
power when met with gruff and uncouth temperaments. Moreover, as Derrida himself in 
On Cosmopolitanisms and Forgiveness points out, the difficulty in negotiating and 
reconciling a “contradictory imperative” of unconditional hospitality, which the Kantian 
cosmopolitan pathos prescribes, with conditional political and legal rights to residence,  
multiplies moral difficulties and conflicts between an obliging duty and a jurisprudential 
right. Nussbaum, along with her eminent predecessors, the Cynics and the Stoics, 
recognizes that the worth of reason and moral purpose does not necessarily abide with 
social rank and status, national origin or location. Yet, reason alone, sustained by an 
emotive referent, is to be the effluent source of self-legislating moral conduct that does 
not obtrude the expression of one’s personality and identity.  
 Setting reason at the pedestal and granting it an irrevocable status capable of 
thrusting individuals into the universe of cosmopolitan ethos presents it with a structural 
problem. As Roxanne Euben points out, a vernacular idiom constituted by European 
culture around which contemporary philosophies of cosmopolitanism gravitate, “evinces 
and reinforces the valorization of a particular stance of skepticism toward certain modes 
of belonging and knowing that is itself the product of a specific genealogy rooted in a 
particular culture and religious tradition.”294 In sum, the purported ecumenicalism of 
cosmopolitanism is still but a provincial articulation of geographically and 
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 philosophically enclosed conditions that rarely “transpire beyond the coordinates of Euro-
American time and space.”295 A true cosmopolitan sensibility requires of agents an 
equally weighted Occidental and Oriental framework of reference, wary of constructing 
reality from the ill-articulated scrap heaps of historically and politically marginal 
investitures.  
The reciprocity in mutual disclosures via the language of rights, particularly 
human rights, may be a potent step in the direction of untying the inherently rooted from 
the circumstantial and accidental, the obscure and nebulous from the authentic and 
honest, and the intransigent from the mutable and malleable. The existential task before 
the readers and writers of the cosmopolitan magna moralia is not to iconize an image, but 
naturalize the practice, by dissenting from the quotidian routines bereft of awe and 
wonder about the lives of those whose mnemonic repositories, representational systems, 
and imaginary conjurations are not of our own making, but from whose endearing touch  
“everyone walks away richer, not having received grace and surprised … but 
richer in himself, newer to himself than before, broken open, blown at and 
sounded out by a thawing wind, perhaps more unsure, tenderer, more fragile, 
more broken, but full of hopes that yet have no name, full f new will and currents, 
full of new dissatisfaction and undertows …”296 
 
The project of cosmopolitanism, as outlined by Benhabib and Nussbaum, ought not to be 
conceived as a mere idealistic or abstract figment of human imagination or a contrivance 
of a discerning intellectual sensitivity, but as an increasingly tangible possibility that will 
test and unravel the ingenuity of human thought and reason in consolidating a political 
reality with a more pronounced humanistic and cosmopolitical orientation.  
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 Governance and Governmentality in an Era of Globalization  
Organizational dimensions of globalization suggest patterns of global 
stratification; as globalization transforms the organization, distribution and exercise of 
power, it creates hierarchies and asymmetries of power and control of access to global 
networks and infrastructures. Concurrently, transnationalization of political activity, 
itself, takes place in the context of greater internationalization of the state. It is seen by 
proliferation of social movements, associations, and ‘citizen democracy’ by means of 
which the populous comes to exert power across national borders. Globalization, and 
alongside it, cosmopolitanism, as the two conceptually contested concepts, are essentially 
appraisive, internally complex and relatively open to disputes about the proper standard 
of meaning and use. One may come to restrict cosmopolitanism297 to an ontological plane 
reified by an existential paradox, that is, a dynamic state of being enmeshed in and yet 
standing apart, ethically, from the parochial, rooted and static identity. The concept is 
conceived in the context of and often accompanied by the phenomenon of globalization. 
Held et al. in Global Transformations capture a three-fold internal dynamic of the process 
of globalization. 298 The authors’ articulated perception of globalization centers on 
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 widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness visible in all 
aspects of contemporary social life. Also William Scheuerman, distinguishes five core 
features of globalization: (i) deterritorialization, the increasing occurrence of social 
activities independently of geographical location of the participants involved; (ii) social 
interconnectedness, the ongoing reorganization of human relations beyond geographical 
and political boundaries; (iii) acceleration of social life, the proliferation of high-speed 
transport, communication and information technology; (iv) long-term process, which 
concerns not sudden or recent events but involves long-term constituents of modern 
society; (v) multi-pronged process, where features of globalized society display 
themselves in different domains of social activity, such as economics, politics, 
environmental problems, media and culture, law and ethics, military technology and 
defense. As a heterogeneous development which lacks precise definition, the sheer 
impact of the scale of social and economic change induces a sense of political fatalism 
and chronic insecurity, as the tempo and ubiquity of change seem to outstrip the capacity 
of national governments and individual citizens to control, contest and resist it.  In view 
of the above, political space and political community are no longer defined and limited 
by the national, statist-oriented framework. Increasingly the phenomenon of power 
diffusion signifies emerging multilayered governance, marked by development of 
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interconnectedness, (iii) velocity and institutional, structural, and distributive impacts of global flows, 
which collectively generate [unprecedented] 
transcontinental and interregional flows, [new] and more diffused modes and nodes of activity and 
interaction, and provide [new] opportunities for the exercise and contestation of power (Held, David. 1999. 
Global Transformations). 
 
 
 regional and global institutions and laws governing the administration and management 
of globalization.299 
 However theoretically fecund the debate on the seemingly limitless horizons of 
globalization and the range of possibilities ensuing as a result of its unprecedented 
transformationist underpinnings, it is important to underscore that neither globalization 
nor cosmopolitanism have dissolved the functional basis of the organizing principle - the 
state - the very structure which the theories’ most avid followers purport to increasingly 
marginalize, initiating thus a process of gradual withering way of the state, and by 
extension, a withering away of nation-bound identities reinforced by a citizen status. Any 
perceived weakening of states, Rosenau argues, “has not been followed by authority 
vacuums … so much as it has resulted in a vast growth in the number of spheres in which 
authority has moved.”300 In addition, the emergence of state-nations, micro-nations, 
region-nations, and regional unions brought the problems of identity and territorial 
affiliation to the fore of socio-political debate. The state’s sole, autonomous, sovereign 
and capacious authority in forming and deciding the questions of identity-politics, Hall 
and Biersteker301 argue, on the domestic and international arena has been significantly 
dislodged. A pertinent question arises, therefore, as to the extent to which the citizen-
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 subject, and on this reading, the self-enacting cosmopolitan citizen,302 ought to rely upon 
the state for her political identity, socio-cultural guidance, and moral fruition in an era of 
pronounced globalization.  
Transformationists, such as Rosenau and Giddens, unlike their skeptical 
counterparts, Hirst and Thompson, who share a penchant for mythologizing the 
phenomenon, admit that the contemporary patterns of globalization profoundly change 
the constitutional and operational basis of states and societies. The logic of governance is 
now exposed to multiple challenges emanating from: (i) interregional networks, systems 
of interaction, and exchange; (ii) deterritorialization and reterritorialization of socio-
economic and political space that issue in subnationalization, regionalization, 
supranationalization of economic zones, mechanisms of governance and cultural 
complexes; (iii) polyarchy, a mixed actor system, which replaces a ‘visible presence of 
rule’ with the ‘invisible government’ of banks, companies, international organizations, 
and quasi-supranational institutions. This, in itself, does not imply that the sovereign and 
legitimate position of the state as the principal political actor has been annulled; rather, a 
Foucauldian lens of analysis would suggest the changing “logic or rationality of 
government by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be 
acted upon … into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government.”303 The 
amalgams of non-state actors, rather than acting to usurp power from the centralized state 
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 authority, are directly implicated in the processes of its diffusion, creating a web of power 
relations on a scale never before encountered.  The state, Guehenno contends, being no 
longer the main mediator between the general public good and the public administrative 
apparatus, has transmogrified into a sum total of networks of highly specialized 
administrative agencies, which, through their effective mobilization, ensure the state’s 
continued legitimacy.304Thus, the generators of expert knowledge provided by mercenary 
organizations, armies, and corporations, rather than the general will, public consensus 
and public interest, dictate the proper means of governance and come to constitute the 
logical components of new global governmentality. The foundation of the new modes of 
governmentality is not so much the bare sovereign power as it is knowledge; although, it 
is progressively more difficult, in a constantly networked world, to distinguish when and 
in what capacity, and under what guise, the Baconian “knowledge is power.”  
David Held in “The Changing Contours of Political Community” credits the 
nation-state with an enduring and ‘immensely powerful’ capability, that of an 
unmitigated access to a “formidable range of resources, bureaucratic infrastructural 
capacity and technologies of coordination and control.”305 Yet, “it is no longer self-
evident,” Scheuerman argues, “that nation-states can be described as self-sufficient 
schemes of cooperation for all the essential purposes of human life … as the political 
units are now subject to increasingly deterritorialized activities … over which they have 
limited control, and they find themselves nested in webs of social relations whose scope 
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 explodes the confines of national borders.”306 Martin and Schumann307 suggest that the 
decline of state as an organizing principle of economic life augurs a transition in power 
concentrations - from democratically organized electorates to an unaccountable global 
web of financiers. The presumption of  unaccountability calls therefore for the enaction 
of new moral imperatives, or as Vaclav Havel stresses, an equation of globality with 
responsibility, which in a world of unqualified interdependence permits for structuring 
communities that transcend parochial affiliations defined by narrow national interests and 
territorial loyalty, without compromising, however, the objective mutual trust of all actors 
involved. Likewise, Seyla Benhabib contends that the transcendence of the nation-state is 
occurring in “the direction of the privatization and corporatization of sovereignty”, rather 
than in the direction of cosmopolitanism, by which public power of democracy and 
popular sovereignty is endangered by private commercial and administrative 
competence.308 
In their article, “Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and 
Power,” Ole Sending and Iver Neuman recognize the accelerating influence of the non-
governmental sphere, composed of non-state actors, in reorienting the focus of modern 
states to forms of knowledge and technical means for optimizing global governance. 
However, because government, for Foucault, signifies a “range of techniques and 
practices, performed by different actors, aimed to shape, guide, and direct individuals’ 
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 and groups’ behavior and actions in particular direction”309 the types of non-state actors 
in existence also reflect the changing governmental rationality concerned with the 
perpetuation of its productive operation of power and definition of its matrix of 
competence. Thus, rather than standing apart, Sending and Neuman argue, NGOs (i) are 
integral to the practices of governing in modern society in their capacity to mobilize 
‘technologies of agency’; (ii) are rarely in opposition to the political power of the state, 
but rather, make up its most central feature in their ability to carry out regulatory 
functions and assure of the state’s indissoluble existence and legitimacy.310 In sum, the 
authors imply that NGOs constitute the appendages of the state capable of articulating 
and channeling its evolving rationality, as well as identifying new sources for the 
conferral of legitimacy upon governmental entities and their practices.311 Sending and 
Neuman note that the micro-level relations between the state and non-state actors in cases 
involving the antipersonnel land-mines ban, regional development, and advocacy for 
reproductive health and rights permit the latter to institutionalize themselves as privileged 
loci of knowledge and technical expertise that lay the groundwork for international 
advocacy and policy. The multiplayer and polyarchic networks of non-governmental, 
inter-governmental and corporate entities which comprise the state under globalization 
are not implicated, however, in a zero-sum game through which the authority of the 
former is enhanced at the expanse of the latter. The kind of new governmentality 
emerging, the authors argue, is clothed in practices, techniques, and rationalities of rule 
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 that: (i) are progressively better defined by autonomous political subjects possessing the 
expertise and ability necessary to responsibly align themselves with and channel the 
political will-formation crucial for governing; (ii) enhance the operations of political 
power through, rather than on civil society; (iii) permit for governing through 
autonomous subjects, rather than on passive objects.312 It is precisely the interactive 
exchange between the subjects, non-governmental, and governmental entities that defines 
the limits of state’s intervention and its ubiquitous regulatory function and issues in the 
practices of counter-action, which, as the next sections will show, articulates the premises 
for the Foucauldian theory of international citizenship.   
 
Diffused Nation-States and the Challenges of Self-Enactment  
In his book, The Global Soul, Pico Iyer, an author of a hybrid Indian-British 
identity, raised the problematic of permanent transience, disorientation and disconnection 
accompanying citizenship in the “International Empire” made up of an unprecedented 
opacity of ‘fusions’ and ‘confusions.’ Iyer describes the state of privileged 
“homelessness” as a site of sporadic but discrepant affiliations and a state of tentative 
bliss issuing from a lack of binding obligations to one fixed community.  In this condition 
of neither exile nor expatriation nor refugeeism, the global soul, Iyer writes, lives in the: 
“metaphorical equivalent of international airspace … his currency might be air 
miles (40 percent of which are now earned on the ground), and the main 
catechism he knew by heart might involve ‘fastening your seat-belt low and tight 
across your lap.’ His memories might be set in airports that looked more and more 
like transnational cities, in cities that looked like transnational airports. Lacking a 
binding sense of ‘we’, he might nonetheless remain fiercely loyal to a single 
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 airline … His sense of obligation might be different … and his sense of home, if it 
existed at all, would lie in the ties and talismans he carried round with him. 
Insofar as he felt a kinship with anyone, it would, most likely, be with other 
members of the Deracination-state.”313  
Communitarians, such as Amitai Etzioni, voice concerns over the interweaving of 
identities that complicate the process of socialization and consensus-building on the 
uniform moral code, of which the state and civil society have, traditionally, been the main 
enforcers and promoters. It is, above all, the anchoring of individuals in communities, 
Etzioni contends, that permits them to remain independent of the state and to resist its 
pressures. A visible absence of such social foundations opens isolated individuals to 
totalitarian pressures.314 Alasdair MacIntyre goes even further in asserting that the 
communitarian315 context is an indivisible and non-negotiable condition for the 
establishment of the moral self. To divest oneself of context or the ‘moral starting points’, 
MacIntyre argues, and thus transcend the dimensions of local and communal identity, 
inevitably leads to individual moral vacuity; for when the fundamental grounds and 
instruments for proper moral flourishing provided by the community are eliminated, the 
possibility of holding any reason for maintaining a moral disposition toward humanity  is 
extinguished. An individual being upon transcending the dimensions of the local-
communal identity, MacIntyre contends, in seeking and “aspiring to be at home 
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 anywhere” becomes a “citizen of nowhere”316 - a persona of displaced moral obligations, 
devoid of any grounding moral constitution and instruments for personal ethical 
flourishing. An individual, when the need shall arise, and upon conspiring to sublimate 
any patriotic volitions, may thus elect to acknowledge and privilege abstract and distant 
interests of humanity over the immediate interests of the state [nation-state] of which she 
remains a de jure citizen - as an entity sine qua non that encapsulates, communitarians 
hold, the only substantive and normative prescriptions for a genuine exercise of moral 
concern. Arendt reverberates the claim to an undivided devotion to one’s ‘moral starting 
points’ by emphasizing that a “citizen is by definition a citizen of a country among 
countries” and cannot simultaneously hold dual and often conflicting loyalties, and be 
thought to honor them equally well, for “nobody can be a citizen of the world as he is the 
citizen of his country.”317  With the affirmation of a monolithic identity tied to singular 
citizenship comes a rejection of moral relativism often accompanying more resolute 
claims to an unbounded deontological horizon lying at the core of cosmopolitan largesse. 
Sharon Anderson-Gold in her book Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (2001) suggests 
that as far as individual citizens and states coexist in a state of mutual external influence, 
citizens are not completely subordinated to states in their claims to legal standing, and 
their legal personality is neither expressed nor exhausted by their nationality.  
It is precisely in the cultivation of “international citizenship” that Foucault saw an 
opening for resistance to the sole monopoly of the state in articulating the acceptable 
threshold of tolerance. In “Confronting Governments: Human Rights” in a three point 
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 manifesto published in Liberation  in June of 1984, Foucault summarized the obligations 
and responsibilities of the new individual right to international citizenship, which include: 
(i) an obligation to speak out against every abuse of power irrespective of its authorship 
and victimhood. “After all,” Foucault asserted, “we are all members of the community of 
the governed, and thereby obliged to show mutual solidarity.”318 (ii) A duty of the 
international citizenship to “always bring the testimony of people’s suffering to the eyes 
and ears of governments … The suffering of men must never be a silent residue of policy. 
It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold power.”319 (iii) “A 
new right of private individuals to effectively intervene in the sphere of international 
policy and strategy.”320 With this Foucault inaugurates a new political reality in which the 
will of individuals is “to make a place for itself” by “wrestling … little by little and day 
by day”321 with the monopoly of governmental right to decide the means and tactics for 
international intervention. Foucault points to the rising role international non-
governmental organizations, such as Amnesty International or Terre des Hommes, play in 
attacking the roots of the expressed political rationality of the state and its manifestations 
of power. These new extraterritorial formations engaged with a “practical critique that 
takes the form of a possible transgression”322 effectively ‘cut off the head of the king’ by 
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 freeing themselves from under the hold of the exclusive ‘juridico-discursive’ model of 
uncontestable state sovereignty.   
The emerging ‘world culture’ reinforced by values and goals of transnational 
actors has a potential of highlighting the ways by which the up-to-now irreconcilable 
normative and practical conceptualizations of political justice, liberty, and equality can 
become not only more transparent, but dialogically engaged across borders.  The 
‘augmentation of the meaning’323 and re-assignation of rights claims, which ultimately 
follow, can result in the growth of the political authority of individuals, who in a newly 
occasioned public sphere negotiate their political status, that between agents and subjects, 
and thus turn from docile bodies into subjects vested with identity. Situating deliberation 
at the exterior of the state unit provides an opportunity for the definition and 
consolidation of the parameters of transnational activism, which ceases to regard 
citizenship and national membership as the exclusive minimum standard commanding 
gestures of altruism and political philanthropy. This assertion is not foreign to Foucault, 
who, according to Mark Olssen, offers a political understanding of a deliberative 
association of non-governmental actors, which is premised not merely on a single 
universal principle, but on a distributive intent which aims at the minimization of 
domination and the “equalization or balance of countervailing powers on a global scale” 
instrumental in determining the means and ends of governance. 324 This point is well 
articulated in James Bohman’s Democracy across Borders, who proposes a model for 
global democracy based upon a de-centered model of democratic equality and a 
169 
                                                 
323 Benhabib, Seyla. 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pg. 49.  
324 Olssen, Mark. 2009. Toward a Global Thin Community. (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers). Pg. 202.  
 
 republican precept of non-domination. In its failure to provide a sufficient condition for 
democracy, Bohman contends, fixed national borders, as a limit to democratic 
deliberation, must be rethought in order to permit for alternative and more pluralistic fora 
for public deliberation. The proposed ‘decentered’ model of democracy is thus to 
“proceed across overlapping local, national, continental, and international communities 
and jurisdictions collaborating with one another in tandem, and with all citizens retaining 
the power to initiate deliberation and set the rules that will guide political activity.”325 
Embedded in the above is a call for a minimal right to contestation, a Foucauldian 
resistance, which rationalizes and problematizes the normalized procedural, juridical, and 
political status quo. It is, initially, a principally linguistic-discursive analysis concerned 
with unraveling the constructive components of the system of inclusions and exclusions, 
and theories in which they are rooted. It is not however, a wholly communicative act 
which presumes, as Habermas does, that the force of a better argument wins out. Rather it 
is a site of struggles premised upon layers of interactions between mass publics and 
governmental institutions, which ensue as a result of political decentralization and 
dispersion of the loci of power.326 In sum, the practical implementation of the right to 
contestation and the possibility of its multiple realizations requires: (i) “that rights be 
assigned to all”; (ii) “openness and symmetrical organization of power relations between 
individuals, countries, groups, agencies” be ensured; (iii) “institutional structures both 
within and beyond the nation-state to assure access to the means of expression and 
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 redress” be instituted; (iv) a “public institutional system of legal aid, rights of protection, 
assistance, of exit, and relocation” be established; (v) a global ethic of ‘life-affirming’ 
constructive norms that “guide institutions and determine the practices that constitute 
convention and custom” 327  be enacted to ensure a vibrant civil society invested with a 
power to check the merits and demerits of the governmental power.  
 
Cosmopolitan Ontology 
On an ontological plane of analysis the proliferation of fragmented lifestyles of 
choice or of necessity inevitably induces an uninhibited feeling of ‘standing among 
partial men for the complete man, and an appraisal not of personal wealth, but of the 
common wealth.’328 An increased sense of a “fluid and fragmented self” negates the 
universalized position of one true, unified, and fixed self and privileges a Foucauldian 
view of the historical subject as constituted by discursive practices, and abiding by an 
imperative of creating oneself as a “work of art.” Since, as Mark Poster contents, the 
“capitalist culture confines self-constitution to the activity of work,”329 it is possible to 
speak of the liberal post-Westphalian self-constitutional ethos as exhausted within the 
political borders of a nation-state. After all, it was the theory of democracy that 
presupposed a congruence and an overlapping network of codependences between the 
“demos, citizenship, electoral mechanisms, the nature of consent, and the boundaries of 
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 the nation-state.”330 The rise of hybrid counter-identities under globalization, which, 
Scholte argues, “decenter the self,”331 upset stability and narrative continuity, and as 
such,  manifest a radical change in the responses of subjects to the effects of power 
relations, auguring a necessity for the reevaluation of social codes and predominating 
models for political engagement. So far as there can be no identity without nationhood, 
through which an individual becomes existentially totalized, politically transparent, and 
intelligible, the cosmopolitan ethos, which inverts the above politico-juridical discourse, 
breaks-up the state’s monopoly on socio-political terminal definition of identity, and calls 
forth for an alternative modus vivendi by which the subject thinks herself a part of 
humanity, and whose fate cannot be separated from that of which she is a member.332 The 
Foucauldian cosmopolitan subject is, therefore, one who through critical deliberation, 
investigates historical events that have lead to the understanding of the self as a member 
of bounded and exclusionary community of citizen-subjects, and who, assisted by a 
mature understanding of her own self-constitution, seeks “to give new impetus … to the 
undefined work of freedom.”333 This knowledge of the self, however, Foucault contends, 
cannot be separated from the corrective care of the self, or desubjectification through 
which the subject “unlearns what one has learned, or unbecomes what one has 
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 become”334 resisting not only normalization, but also tending toward that free, vigilant 
self, which the subject has never quite been before.   
Critics of the aesthetics of the self, as propounded by Foucault, chief among them, 
Richard Wolin, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Jurgen Habermas, contend that a 
narcissistic preoccupation with the integrity of the self, its style of being, and its ethics of 
existence precludes any possibility of holding a more encompassing concern for and duty 
toward others. Not only do the aforementioned critics posit an existentially 
counterintuitive argument, by which internal self-determination and self-definition do not 
require an a priori understanding of and feeling oneself an individual saturated with 
reason and emotion, but invalidate the relational possibilities with other human beings, 
which are naturally contingent upon and follow from mature self-examination. Graham 
Longford’s reading of Foucauldian project of self-enactment suggests that rather that 
feeding on ‘personal gratification’ and self-aggrandizement, the care of the self occasions 
rather than suppresses the recognition of obligations and responsibilities to others.335For 
the instructions for self-fashioning borrowed from ancient Greeks implicitly aim to 
weaken the fixity and stability of identity, revealing not only its contingency as a product 
of habits, universalizing narratives, and inherited practices, but opening a field of 
possible future actualizations, which awaken curiosity and promote interest in a plethora 
of highly differentiated identities. In being wary of articulating models for self-enactment 
which would reproduce the stifling closure of routine social practices, Foucault’s 
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 aesthetics of the self meets the preconditions for experimental and productive 
cosmopolitan existence, “whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only 
as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, 
precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely”336 would be an 
exceedingly un-cosmopolitan thing to do. Since the cosmopolitan ethos increasingly calls 
for transformation in the system of ethics, the adoption of the Greco-Roman ensemble of 
practices, advocated by Foucault, as a model aimed at the enactment of oneself as a work 
of art through a method of genealogical inquiry that “separate[s] out from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or 
thinking what we are, do, or think,”337 creates room for reflexive action and “leaves 
individuals the liberty to transform the system”338 of inhibitive constraints and restraints. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow attribute to Foucault a certain cosmopolitanism that neither 
condones universalism nor sides with relativism, but which advocates an engaged ethos. 
Thus, rather than uncovering “deep truths”, an engaged Foucauldian subject is to concern 
herself with “invent[ing] new ways of thinking” in order to resist being led passively by 
those who claim an exclusive, categorical political mandate for defining the direction of 
her thought.339 The prescribed morality that is to preside over the subject’s task of 
critiquing the functional basis and logical underpinnings of institutions is to take the form 
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 of a transformative morality centered on the incessant analysis and questioning of the 
elemental consistency of norms embodied by the system. Such questioning cannot be 
effectively conducted unless the questioner constitutes oneself as a subject of moral 
conduct and evaluates, in tandem, the substance of one’s own consciousness by 
developing, as Foucault suggests in The History of Sexuality Volume II : The Use of 
Pleasure, a “relationship with the self” sustained by self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-
examination, accompanied by the decipherment of the self by oneself, and the 
transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object.340 This descriptive 
prescription by internal reflection on the nature of moral intuitions unravels the essential 
content of the political program and constitutes an instrument, which Foucault identifies 
as inherent and fundamental to all three categories of existence: emancipation, resistance, 
and self-enactment. Such an enterprise of enacting permanent resistance as a guarantee of 
freedom is inevitably sacrilegious in its attitude toward habits qua predetermined 
dispositions, which have been “made a virtue out of a necessity.” However, only though 
such a dissidence, and a continuous, layered, reciprocal dialectical exchange between 
theses and antitheses, can a Foucauldian subject judge when “morality collapse[es] into a 
mere set of mores – manners, customs, conventions to be changed at will,”341 and never 
be self-satisfied or complacent toward those moral standards and institutional regimes, 
which as long as they are socially accepted are never dreamt of being doubted, contested, 
or revoked.  
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 Conclusion: The Horizons of Cosmopolitan Democracy  
                “La liberte c’est l’exile et je suis condamne a etre libre.” 
- Jean Paul Sartre 
 
Since the early times of recorded writings, a human subject has sought both 
selfhood and order, divine perfection and the experience of lived reality. The systems of 
thought, refracted in a myriad of institutional set ups, readily ascribed either to 
appearances of comfortable conventionalism or overreaching radicalism. Historical 
scrutiny places a cosmopolitan ethos, according to Thomas Schlereth, within the 
intellectual confines of an ideal rather than a much sought after practical doctrine. One 
which invested itself with description of latent manifestations of institutional narrow 
mindedness, but which ultimately failed in providing prescripts for its effective 
overcoming. An ethos which, in its Stoic disdain for patriotism, aspiration toward 
harmonious international relations, belief in the primacy of personal dignity, devotion to 
reason and equal moral worth irrespective of socio-political affiliation, and the emphasis 
on the rule of law, acknowledged an early defeat with the resilient paradigm of the 
nation-state. Yet, the conditions of existence and the appealing logic of transnationalism 
propelled by  the currents of globalization, rather than serving as an ultimate graveyard to 
the cosmopolitan project of freedom, have seemed to revive the ideal anew and offered a 
fecund ground for its practical incorporation into the systems of governance and doctrines 
of law. It is no accident that Thomas Pogge contemplates the inscription of Rawlsian 
‘original position’ into the system of justice, and the neo-Kantian paradigms proffer 
duties to non-compatriots, and the neo-liberal theorists argue for the extension of 
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principles of democracy to non-governmental actors, regional political entities, and 
citizens intent on mediating the ethical, moral, and political norms with pressing 
existential problems of environmental, humanitarian, or military nature.  
As Foucault himself admitted, the 19th century was a century of utopia; the 20th 
and a dawning 21st century is one of heterotopia, in the absence of which “dreams dry up, 
and espionage replaces adventure.”342 The ‘prosaic sobriety’ of the international theater 
of political life is disturbed with Foucault’s meticulous multi-linear analysis of the 
systems and relations of power, and it is this very analytical-critical gaze of the 
Foucauldian subject, which prohibits the “reality to appear ready-made, the self, 
conventional, irresponsible, and dogmatic.”343 Since, as Jean-Marie Guehenno contends, 
the democratic associations of the future will be associations of reason, and at the same 
time, associations of memory and ambitious creations of our freedom, as well as always 
fragile inheritances of our history,344 the “labor of diverse inquiries” and interrogation of 
their rationalities will always implicate, in the process, a “historical ontology of 
ourselves” which works on our limits and gives “form to our impatience for liberty.”345 
This is the very call echoed by the cosmopolitan ethos, whose horizons must also be 
problematized in order to give dimension to the arts of self-creation and governance in an 
era of globalization.   
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